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Abstract
Deficits of attentional and motor set that are seen in patients with PD were investigated 
in the research reported in this thesis. A deficit of attentional set is a failure of selective 
attention to one aspect of a complex stimulus. Deficits of motor set manifest as an 
inability to form a state of motor ‘readiness’ that can speed movement initiation. 
Attentional set was investigated with tasks that require patients to shift attention 
between perceptual dimensions (extradimensional - ED - shifting tasks), and motor set 
was studied using reaction time (RT) tasks.
Study 1 rejected the hypothesis that the mechanism of Teamed irrelevance’ 
causes ED shift deficits in patients with PD. Studies 2 and 3 confirmed that learned 
irrelevance also plays no role in determining the difficulty of ED shifts in healthy 
subjects. The experimental manipulation used in Study 4 succeeded in creating changes 
in scores that resembled those seen in patients with PD. Thus, it appears that patients 
with PD may have a deficit similar to that induced by the experimental manipulation - 
that is, an inability to attend to all dimensions present when hypothesis testing after an 
ED shift.
A quantitative analysis of past RT studies of PD showed that the ability to 
speed movement initiation when given advance information about an upcoming 
movement - a form of motor set - is intact in patients with PD. In contrast, the motor set 
that underlies rapid simple RT performance is consistently dysfunctional in patients 
with PD. Study 5 investigated temporal and spatial motor set in PD, finding that these 
two mechanisms are functionally separate and that temporal motor set is intact in PD. A 
final study (Study 6) investigated the cognitive consequences of a novel neurosurgical 
treatment for PD, finding it to be largely a neiiropsychologically ‘safe’ procedure.
1.0 Introduction
L I  Parkinson’s disease: its nature, prevalence and impact
1.1.1 Nature
1.1.2 Prevalence
1.1.3 Impact
1.2 PD as a movement disorder
1.2.1 Cardinal symptoms
1.2.2 Natural history, before and after levodopa
1.3 PD as a disorder o f  cognition
1.3.1 Cognitive deficits are present in unmedicated patients with early 
PD
1.3.2 Cognitive impairment increases with disease progression 12
1.3.3 Cognitive impairment spreads to new domains with disease 
progression
1.3.4 The cognitive deficits of PD can be disabling
1.4 PD and the concept o f  'set’
1.4.1 Definition of ‘sef
1.5 PD and motor set
1.6 PD and attentional set
1.6.1 Formation and maintenance of set
1.6.2 Shifting set - studies of the WCST
1.6.3 The Odd-Man-Out test
1.6.4 Extradimensional shifting
/, 7 Anatomical substrates o f  the cognitive and motor deficits o f  PD
1.7.1 A note on the cognitive deficits of PD
1.7.2 Neuropathology of PD
1.7.3 Functional neuroanatomy of PD
1.7.3.1 Basal ganglia ‘loops’
1.7.3.2 Intrinsic basal ganglia circuitiy - the Alexander and
Crutcher model
1.7.3.3 Modifications to the model
1.7.3.4 The specific neural substrates o f ‘set’ and the status 
o f the ‘cognitive’ loop
1.7.3.5 Surgical treatment of PD
13
15
17
17
19
21
21
24
27
29
32
32
34
36
36
38
41
42 
44
1.1 Parkinson’s disease: its nature, prevalence and impact
1.1.1 Nature
Idiopathic Parkinson’s disease (PD) is a chronic, neurodegenerative disorder of late 
middle life, PD is a movement disorder that is associated with dysfunction of the 
extrapyramidal system and causes a progressive impairment of the ability to make 
voluntary movements. Patients experience a range of symptoms including tremor, 
slowness of movement and muscular rigidity (for a full description, see Section 1,2) that 
can that can leave individuals immobile and unable to care for themselves. The onset of 
symptoms is spontaneous and the cause of the disease is not known. PD is progressive 
in character, and whilst the rate of disease progression varies greatly between 
individuals the majority of patients experience an unremitting increase in the severity of 
symptoms. Although the most disabling aspect of PD is its impairment of movement, 
the disease can also cause cognitive deficits and is associated with a high level of 
affective disturbance.
1.1.2 Prevalence
It is estimated that 120,000 people in the UK and 1,500,000 people in the U.S.A. have 
PD (Parkinson’s Disease Society, 1998; National Parkinson Foundation Inc. 1996). The 
mean age of onset is around 60 (Quinn, 1995) and prevalence increases rapidly with 
advancing age (50-59 years - 0.08%; 70-79 years - 0.83%, Mutch et al., 1986). More 
men are diagnosed with PD than women (a ratio of 1.3 : 1 - Ben Shlorao, 1996) and in 
western countries more white people have the disorder than black people (Paddinson 
and Griffith, 1974; Pearce, 1992). It appears that PD is more common in western 
countries than in China or Africa, but it is unclear whether this impression is genuine or 
created by differences in diagnostic criteria and the age of sample groups between 
studies in different countries (Pearce, 1992). Otherwise, there are no known effects of 
socioeconomic status, level of education or occupation on the prevalence of the disease 
(Ben-Shlomo, 1996).
1.1.3 Impact
PD represents an increasing challenge to health and social services, as demographic 
trends and improvements in health care ensure that the number of people with severe 
PD will grow over the next decade. The growth in the U.K.’s elderly population (an 
extra 100,000 individuals over the age of 80 in the next 10 years - Department of
Health, 1997) will result in more cases of PD. Also, as health care improves, more 
patients with PD will survive to experience the more advanced stages of the disease. 
There is no known cure for PD and whilst symptomatic medical and surgical treatments 
are beneficial for a limited time they lose effectiveness in the long term and seldom stop 
PD’s progressive course. Therefore, the next decade will see a growth in the number of 
individuals who have advanced PD and few therapeutic options.
This thesis describes research into specific cognitive and motor symptoms 
experienced by patients with PD. The past literature relating to the study of these 
symptoms will be reviewed in detail in Sections 1.5 and 1.6; the following two sections 
provide brief descriptions of the onset and progression of motor and cognitive 
symptoms in PD. Whilst PD is a multifactorial disease that often causes simultaneous 
disturbances of movement, cognition and affect, it is useful to describe the effects of PD 
on these domains separately.
1.2 PD as a movement disorder
The four ‘cardinal’ symptoms of PD - tremor, rigidity, bradykinesia and postural 
problems - are described below, followed by an account of their onset and progression. 
Not all of these symptoms will be present in any individual patient and some symptoms 
are more common at certain stages of the disease. For example, disturbances of gait and 
posture are more common in advanced PD and 25% of patients do not have a resting 
tremor. Nonetheless, these are the primary symptoms of the disease; in order for a 
confident diagnosis of PD to be made, it is recommended that at least two of the 
following four symptoms should be present, at least one of which must be tremor or 
bradykinesia (Langston et al., 1992).
1.2.1 Cardinal symptoms
Tremor
Patients commonly show a rhythmical resting tremor in their hands and arms. This 
tremor oscillates at a rate of 4-6 Hz and is caused by alternating activity of 
flexor/extensor and pronator/supinator muscles. Tremor of the thumb and forefinger is 
often seen early in the disease and is referred to as a ‘pill-rolling’ tremor; tremor 
spreads to the whole hand and arm with disease progression and can ultimately result in 
a postural tremor. Although the tremor seen in PD is predominantly active when the 
affected limb is at rest, a less severe tremor is also sometimes seen with movement.
Rigidity
The limbs of a patient with PD are often ‘rigid’ and resistant to passive movement. 
Muscular rigidity affects the neck and shoulders early in the disease and is usually more 
prominent in the arms than the legs. Rigidity is caused by simultaneous contraction of 
agonist and antagonist muscles. However, flexor muscles are usually more active than 
extensor muscles and as a consequence patients’ limbs are often bent at the elbow and 
laiee. This contributes to the abnormal posture seen in patients with PD (see below). 
‘Cogwheel’ rigidity is often cited as characteristic of PD. This is observed when an 
examiner manipulates a patient’s limb whilst it is at rest; the limb is felt to move freely 
and then ‘stick’ repeatedly and in rapid succession. This phenomenon is thought to be 
caused by an interaction of rigidity and tremor.
Bradykimsia
The most disabling aspect of PD is its impact on patients’ ability to make voluntary 
movements. Patients are impaired in the initiation and execution of voluntary 
movements (akinesia and bradykinesia, respectively) and make a diminished number of 
spontaneous movements (hypokinesia). Patients report that the amount of ‘effort’ 
required to make a movement is drastically increased by PD. Movements that were 
previously fluid and automatic come to require deliberate conscious effort.
Simultaneous bimanual movements are particularly impaired (Benecke et al., 1986), as 
well as movements that form part of a sequence (Benecke et al., 1987a). Patients also 
have problems with fine finger movements, which can lead to difficulties with such 
tasks as fastening clothing and handwriting. Bradykinesia is independent of rigidity; 
thalamic lesions can abolish rigidity but leave bradykinesia unchanged (Marsden,
1990).
Posture and gait
PD forces patients to adopt an abnormal posture. As the disease advances, patients’ 
knees, arms and wrists become flexed due to rigidity and the trunk is bent forward. 
Rigidity also stops patients’ arms from swinging freely whilst walking. Patients take 
short, shuffling steps and in more advanced disease they sometimes ‘freeze’ and are 
unable to take further steps. There is also an impairment of balance that arises from the 
failure of normal ‘righting and rescue’ reflexes (Martin, 1967) that compensate for 
sudden shifts in an individual’s centre of gravity. As a consequence, patients frequently 
fall. Loss of balance also contributes to the ‘festinating’ gait seen in patients with PD
(Parkinson, 1817/1997); patients shuffle forward rapidly, apparently trying to avoid 
falling forward.
Other physical symptoms 
Patients often lose facial expression through muscular rigidity and their voices can lose 
volume and inflection. Constipation and bladder problems are common and over half of 
patients have sexual disorders.
1.2.2 Natural history ofPD, before and after levodopa
Onset o f  symptoms and disease progression - before levodopa 
The onset and progression of symptoms in untreated PD was documented by Hoehn and 
Yahr in 1967. Their five-stage classification of the progression of PD is still frequently 
used to categorise disease severity. Stage I lasts on average three years after the onset of 
the disease and is characterised by the presence of one or more of tremor, rigidity or 
bradykinesia on one side of the body. These symptoms spread to the previously 
unaffected side of the body in Stage II of the disease, which occurs on average between 
four and six years after onset. Although symptoms remain bilateral after this stage, 
patients usually experience more severe symptoms on one side of the body. In Stage III, 
on average seven years after onset, impairments of postural stability become apparent. 
Stages IV and V represent increasing levels of disability that are caused by worsening 
severity of existing symptoms. Individuals in Stage IV (nine years after onset) require 
much assistance in the activities of daily living but can still stand and walk without 
assistance; in Stage V (14 years after onset), patients are confined to bed or a 
wheelchair unless aided.
Onset and progression o f  symptoms - after levodopa 
Whilst Hoehn and Yahr’s (1967) description of the progression of PD is accurate, 
contemporary patients with PD do not experience the disease in this way. The 
underlying pattern of the disease is obscured by the symptomatic relief given by 
medical therapy, in particular by levodopa. Levodopa therapy provides good relief of 
mild to moderate symptoms in a majority of patients with PD and it prevents the 
unremitting decline into disability described by Hoehn and Yahr (1967). However, 
levodopa retains its clinical efficacy only for a limited time. Within the first five years 
o f levodopa therapy, over half of patients will experience interruptions of the previously 
smooth clinical response to the drug and possibly also side-effects (Quinn, 1995). The
twin problems of fluctuating response to medication and dyskinesias (abnormal, 
involuntary movements) characterise the movement status of contemporary patients 
with advanced PD, rather than the persistent rigid akinesia seen in patients who were 
treated before the introduction of levodopa.
Fluctuations
Medicated patients with advanced PD often switch abruptly from periods of mobility in 
which their medication is effective (‘on’ periods) to periods in which they receive no 
benefit of medication and are relatively immobile (‘o ff  periods). On taking a new dose 
of levodopa, a patient can rapidly revert from an ‘o ff  state to an ‘on’ state. These 
sudden changes in clinical status represent a major shortcoming of medical therapy for 
PD, particularly as ‘on’ periods are often associated with the presence of dyskinesias 
(see below). Patients experience the level of motor disability associated with their 
‘underlying’ unalleviated PD in ‘o ff  phases, and the transition into an off phase is 
associated with feelings of dysphoria and panic in two-thirds of patients (Nissenbaum et 
al., 1987).
Dyskinesias
One of the side-effects of levodopa therapy is to cause patients to make a range of 
involuntary movements. These movements are usually choreic or dystonie in nature, 
though in some severe cases (usually younger patients - Quinn, 1995) they can be 
ballistic. Dyskinesias are associated either with the point at which a dose of levodopa 
has the greatest clinical effect (‘peak-dose dyskinesia’) or with the beginning and end of 
a dose (‘diphasic dyskinesia’). In some patients with advanced disease, the thresholds 
for clinical effectiveness of a dose of levodopa and for the generation of dyskinesias are 
the same; thus, these patients are either in an ‘o ff  phase and immobile or in an ‘on’ 
phase and dyskinetic. Severe dyskinesias not only interfere with voluntary movement 
but can also be physically exhausting.
1.3 PD as a disorder of cognitive function
Charcot (1875, cited in Lees and Smith 1983) recognised that patients with PD often 
experience cognitive deficits, contradicting Parkinson’s (1817/1997) original assertion 
that PD left “the senses and intellect uninjured” (p.l). However, it is only through 
recent clinicopathological studies (such as that of Hughes et al., 1993) that it has been 
confirmed that PD alone - in the absence of other neuropathology - can cause serious 
cognitive deficits. Although the cognitive deficits of 10 to 15% of patients with PD can 
be so severe as to be described as dementia (Brown and Marsden, 1984), in the majority 
of patients the deficits are less severe. As a consequence, the cognitive changes of PD 
are nearly always of lesser concern to patients than their motor symptoms. However, the 
fact that cognitive deficits are masked by even more disabling motor symptoms does 
not make the cognitive problems of PD any less real; if there are currently 120,000 
people with PD in the U.K., at least 12,000 of these will either currently have dementia 
or will develop it as a consequence of their condition.
It is beyond the scope of this section to provide a comprehensive review of all 
of the research findings on the cognitive deficits of PD, and the specific deficits under 
investigation in this thesis will be reviewed in detail in Section 1.6. This section instead 
aims to provide context for the discussion of specific cognitive deficits by describing 
the cognitive changes of PD in similar terms to the motor symptoms. It will be shown 
that cognitive deficits are present in early, unmedicated PD (Section 1.3.1), that they 
become more severe and encompass more domains of cognition as the disease 
progresses (Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3) and that they can be disabling (Section 1.3.4).
1.3.1 Cognitive deficits are present in unmedicated patients wnth early PD 
Cognitive deficits can be found in patients with PD as early as 16 months after the 
appearance of motor symptoms (Cooper et al., 1991). The study of cognitive deficits in 
unmedicated patients with early PD is informative, as it shows that such deficits are an 
integral part of the disorder, rather than a consequence of widespread neuropathology in 
advanced disease. Also, some antiparkinsonian medication - particularly 
anticholinergics - can cause cognitive deficits (Van Spaendonck et al., 1993) and the 
study of unmedicated patients eliminates this factor. Table 1.1 summarises the findings 
of 16 studies that have investigated cognitive deficits in unmedicated patients with early 
PD. It is clear from this table that studies have frequently found areas of spared 
cognitive function in such patients. This is unsurprising, as most of the patients studied 
were early in the course of what is primarily a movement disorder. The fact that
cognitive deficits are frequently found in such mildly affected patients is more striking; 
also, these deficits appear to affect a wide range of cognitive domains.
Selective attention
Inspection of Table 1.1 shows that deficits of selective attention are a consistent finding 
in unmedicated patients with early PD. A total of eight studies describe deficits in the 
performance of the Wisconsin Card-Sorting Test (WCST - Milner (1963) or Nelson 
(1976) version), extradimensional shifts or the Stroop task. The one study that found 
preserved card sorting (Pillon et al., 1997) used the Nelson (1976) version of the 
WCST, which is less demanding than Milner’s (1963) version and may measure 
different abilities (DeZubicaray and Ashton, 1996).
Memory and sti'ateg}>
Recall of verbal material has also been shown to be frequently impaired in early 
unmedicated PD by the Rey Auditory-Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT) and subtests of 
the Wechsler Memory Scales (WMS). However, it is unclear whether impaired memory 
processes cause these test deficits. Biiytenhuis et al. (1994) have shown that deficits on 
a memory test similar to the RAVLT can be partially explained by the failure of patients 
with PD to use appropriate strategies to organise material. This ‘strategy’ problem 
extends to spatial memory deficits. Pillon et al. (1997, 1998) constructed a spatial 
memory test that appeared to be more sensitive to deficits caused by PD than the spatial 
working memory test of the CANTAB battery (see Table 1.1). In fact, deficits on Pillon 
et al.’s test were largely due to a failure of ‘strategic’ processes (Pillon et al., 1998), 
indicating that this test was more sensitive to strategy use than the CANTAB test, rather 
than being more sensitive to spatial memory deficits. These findings are significant, as 
they demonstrate that high-level cognitive deficits, such as problems with ‘strategic’ or 
‘executive’ function, can influence performance in a wide range of cognitive domains.
The research findings relating to other cognitive domains listed in Table 1.1 are 
more equivocal; this is perhaps unsurprising, as subject numbers vary widely between 
studies and the subject groups used vary in their characteristics. For example, the mean 
age of the patient groups in these studies varies widely, and neuropsychological 
performance has been shown to be worse for patients who are older when they 
experience the onset of symptoms (Reid et al., 1989). As a consequence, studies that 
examine deficits across a range of cognitive domains in a single group of patients can 
give a clearer indication of which domains are more vulnerable to PD. Cooper et al.’s 
(1991) study is an example of this approach, testing a group of 60 patients on 15 
neuropsychological tests. Cooper et al. (1991) found deficits in immediate verbal
memory, verbal fluency, the WCST and cognitive sequencing; language function other 
than fluency was intact, as was memory after a delay, visual perception and forward 
digit span. Whilst Table 1.1 indicates the range of cognitive function that can be 
impaired by early PD, Cooper et al.’s results are a better guide to the 
neuropsychological tests that are most sensitive to early PD.
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Domain Test Significant
impairment
No impairment
Selective attention to WCST, MCST (any measure) 
aspects
ED shifting (CANTAB) 
Stroop 
Odd-man-out 
Fimm set-shifting test (wdth 
external cue)
Verbal Fluency
Miscellaneous 
‘frontal / executive’
Memory: Spatial
Memory: Verbal
Memory: Visual
Visuospatial / 
visuoconstructive
Language
Letter
Category
Trails test 
Tower o f London (CANTAB) 
Cognitive estimates 
WAIS picture arrangement 
Proverb interpretation 
Backward digit span & digit 
ordering
Spatial Working Memory - 
(CANTAB)
Spatial Span (CANTAB) 
Pillon visuospatial learnmg 
test
RAVLT 
Pillon verbal associates test 
Pillon ver'bal learning test 
WMS logical memory 
WMS Associates 
Brown-Peter'son Test 
Owen ver'bal memory
WMS visual r'epr'oduction 
Wai'rmgon RMT -faces 
Benton Visual Recognition 
Recall ofRey) Figure 
Patter'n r'ecognition 
(CANTAB)
Gollin incomplete pictures - 
recognition: 
recall:
WAIS Block design 
Berrton form discrimination 
& Benton line orientation 
Map test & mental rotation 
Matchsticks test 
Har'tikainen 
visuoconstructive tests
WAIS sirnilar'ities 
Repor'ters test 
Boston Naming test & token 
test
1,8, 16
4, 9,11
7,13
I*. 5,8
6,7
1
13, 14
15, 16 
14
1.7
1.7 
1,2
1,7
15
1
13
13
5, 13, 16 
1*, 13
16
9
9, 10, 12 
9
13
16
12
16
8
9, 10
16
1
subjects showed a deficit on one category, but no deficit on the other category
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Table 1.1 (previous page): Significant deficits and sparedfunction in unti'eatedpatients 
with PD. Unique tests are named after the first author o f  the article e.g. ‘Owen verbal 
memory test. \ Abbreviations: WCST - Wisconsin Card-Sorting Test; MCST - Modified 
Card-Sorting Test; WAIS - Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale; CANTAB - Cambridge 
Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery; RAVLT - Rey Auditory-Verbal Learning 
Test; WMS - Wechsler Memory Scale; RMT - Recognition Memory Test 
Studies included: 1 - Cooper et al. (1991); 2 - Cooper and Sagar (1993); 3 - Cronin- 
Golomb et al. (1994); 4 - Downes et al. (1989); 5 - Fimm et a l (1994); 6 - Hartikainen 
et al. (1993); 7 - Hietanen and Teravainen (1986); 8 - Lees and Smith, (1983); 9 - Owen 
et a l (1992); 10 - Owen et a l (1993a); 11 - Owen et a l (1993b); 12 - Owen et a l 
(1997); 13 - Pillon et a l (1997); 14 - Pillon et a l (1998); 15 - Reid et a l (1989); 16 - 
Taylor et a l (1987)
The studies summarised in Table 1.1 all compare mean cognitive performance 
for a group of patients with that of a group of controls. This gives no information about 
the distribution of deficits in the PD population; for example, are all patients impaired 
or do a subgroup have spared cognitive function? The only study that addresses this 
issue is that of Reid et al. (1989). The authors of this study plot the percentage of 
patients with a score greater than two standard deviations below the control mean for 
each of the tests used. This gives a clear picture of the proportion of patients with more 
serious impairment in each domain of cognitive function.
In summary, unmedicated patients with early PD have been shown to have 
cognitive deficits in a number of domains. Deficits of selective attention and memory 
are common; basic language skills and visual perception are generally spared (Cooper et 
al. 1991). Disturbances of higher-level cognitive function may account for deficits in a 
number of cognitive domains. For example, deficits of strategy use can cause problems 
of recall of verbal and spatial material (Buytenhuis et al., 1994; Pillon et al., 1998).
1.3.2 Cognitive impairment increases with disease progression 
The existence of gross cognitive deterioration as a consequence of the progression of 
PD is well-established and a number of longitudinal studies have attempted to find 
factors that predict the development of parkinsonian dementia (e.g. Jacobs et al., 1995; 
Palazzini et al., 1995; Mahieux et al, 1998). The existence of more subtle decline in 
cognitive performance has also been shown by longitudinal studies. For example, 
Capparos-Lefebvre et al. (1995) have shown that cognitive deficits that are typical of 
unmedicated patients with early PD - that is, executive function (including the WCST) 
and memory - were significantly worse three years after a baseline test. This worsening 
appeared to be specific to the progression of PD, as it did not depend on patients’ age at 
the followup stage. Capparos-Lefebvre et al. also found evidence of a more global
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decline in cognitive function; group performance on the modified Mini-Mental State 
Examination (mMMSE) was worse at the three year followup. Such a decline in 
mMMSE performance was also noted by Starkstein et ai. (1992) after only one year in 
depressed patients with PD.
A more common method of demonstrating the relationship of cognitive deficits 
to disease progression is to correlate cognitive performance with measures of disease 
severity in a single group of patients at a particular time. Both Reid et al. (1989) and 
Cooper et al. (1992) have found a number of significant correlations between cognitive 
and motor status using this method. However, the relationship between cognitive status 
and disease severity is not simple; for example, Cooper et al.’s (1992) study was 
preceded by a study in 1991 (Cooper et al., 1991) that used the same cohort of patients; 
in 1991, when these patients were earlier in the course of the disease and unmedicated, 
the relationship between cognitive and motor symptoms was much less strong.
However, this may have been due to the fact that both the cognitive and motor deficits 
seen in the untreated patients with early PD were mild (Cooper et al., 1992). It also 
appears that the association between cognitive and motor status may only hold true for 
certain cognitive functions and particular disease variables. For example, Van 
Spaendonck et al. (1996) found that verbal fluency was not associated with any measure 
of disease severity; in contrast, card sorting performance was associated with rigidity, 
but not with bradykinesia or tremor. Thus, it appears that whilst cognitive impairment 
does increase with disease progression, individual domains of cogn ition are likely to 
degenerate at different rates that are related to the progression of certain motor 
symptoms.
L3.3 Cognitive impairment spreads to new domains Mnth disease progression 
It is well-established that some of the movement symptoms of PD can be absent when 
the disease is in its early stages but can appear with disease progression. For example, 
postural instability and postural tremor are most commonly seen in advanced PD. The 
cognitive symptoms of PD can also progress from the relatively selective set of deficits 
seen in early PD (Section 1.3.1) to a global loss of function that can be described as 
dementia (see Section 1.3.4). Owen and colleagues have provided the most convincing 
demonstration of this ‘spread’ of deficits in a series of studies of patients at different 
stages of PD (Owen et al., 1992, 1993a, 1995, 1996c). Using a cross-sectional design, 
Owen et al. have assessed the performance of groups of patients at different stages of 
PD (e.g. unmedicated mild PD, medicated mild PD, medicated severe PD) on a number
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of tests of planning and memory. These studies have shown that patients with PD are 
impaired in the performance of a number of relatively ‘simple’ memory tasks that those 
with less severe PD can perform normally. For example, Owen et al. (1992) found that 
performance on a simple measure of spatial ‘span’ was normal in patients with mild PD, 
but impaired in those with severe PD, Similarly, Owen et al. (1993a) found a range of 
deficits in patients with severe PD that were not present in mild PD, including deficits 
of spatial recognition memory, visual matching-to-sample and learning of paired 
associates.
This ‘spreading’ of cognitive deficits also affects the performance of more 
complex memory tasks that require use of a strategy to attain optimal performance. 
Owen et al. (1997) found that memory deficit that selectively impaired recall of one 
type of material could ‘spread’ to affect the recall of a range of different materials.
Owen et al. found that medicated patients with mild PD showed a deficit on a working 
memory task that required recall of spatial information, but not on structurally similar 
tasks that required recall of verbal and pictorial information. However, in patients with 
severe PD the meraoiy deficit had ‘spread’ such that memory for all of these items was 
impaired. Owen et al. (1993, 1997) account for this spread of memory deficits in terms 
of the pattern of degeneration seen in the caudate nucleus of patients with PD. It is often 
noted that the cognitive deficits of mild and moderate PD resemble those seen after 
frontal lobe damage (Taylor et al., 1986). Owen et al. argue that this is due to loss of 
dopamine in the anterior regions of the head of the caudate nucleus, which is the part of 
the striatum that receives affereiits from parts of the prefrontal cortex. This would 
account for deficits on such tasks as the CANTAB Spatial Working Memory test, which 
are seen in both mild PD and after frontal lobe damage (Owen et al., 1992, 1990 
respectively). Owen et al. suggest that the nonspatial working memory deficits seen 
could either arise from dopamine depletion in more posterior areas of the caudate 
nucleus, or could be non-striatal or non-dopaminergic in origin. A subsequent study in 
monkeys (Levy et al., 1997a) has shown that the performance of nonspatial working 
memory tasks is associated with activity in the body of the caudate nucleus, suggesting 
that the memory deficits seen in Owen et al.’s (1993, 1997) studies are striatal in origin.
Deficits of visual perception have also been shown to emerge with disease 
progression. Flowers and Robertson (1995) compared the performance of medicated 
patients with mild, moderate and severe PD on a number of tests of visual perception. In 
the more severely affected patients, deficits were present on those tests that required the 
use of ‘higher-level’, ‘interpretive’ perceptual abilities. Patients with mild PD were
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unimpaired in the performance of both the Embedded Figures test and the ‘pattern 
comprehension’ and ‘progression’ sections of Raven’s Progressive Matrices, whereas 
patients with ‘moderate’ or ‘severe’ PD were impaired in the performance of all of 
these tests. Again, this demonstrates that the progression of PD can lead to the 
emergence of entirely new cognitive deficits; the progression of PD does not just cause 
existing deficits to worsen. This is significant as the cognitive deficits seen in patients 
with early PD are relatively selective, and only a ‘spreading’ of these deficits can 
account for how PD can cause the global deterioration of cognitive function known as 
‘dementia’.
1.3.4 The cognitive deficits ofPD  can he disabling
As noted above, ‘dementia’ as defined by DSMIII-R criteria can be caused by the 
neuropathology of PD alone (Hughes et al., 1993). The increased risk of this dementia 
above that of the general population has been estimated at 10-15% (Brown and 
Marsden, 1984). However, the nature and characteristics of dementia caused by PD are 
not well understood, and are certainly less well understood than the more mild cognitive 
changes caused by PD. It is presumed that dementia results from the increasing severity 
of the cognitive deficits found in PD combined with the ‘spread’ of deficits to a wide 
range of functions described in Section 1,3.3. Two factors have inhibited understanding 
of the characteristics of the dementia caused by PD. First, in an attempt to exclude 
patients suffering from neuropathology other than PD, most studies of the cognitive 
deficits of PD have excluded subjects who were thought to have dementia. This 
necessarily excludes patients who have dementia caused solely by PD and may lead to 
studies underestimating the severity of cognitive change in PD. Second, studies that 
investigate dementia caused by PD seldom carry out post-mortem examination to verify 
the diagnosis of PD and to rule out the possibility of other neuropathology such as 
Alzheimer’s disease being present. Despite these limitations, attempts have been made 
to describe the dementia caused by PD and most of these relate to showing that PD 
causes a ‘subcortical’ rather than a ‘cortical’ dementia.
‘Subcortical dementia’ is a label that has been applied to the disabling cognitive 
changes caused by diseases such as progressive supranuclear palsy, Huntington’s 
disease and PD. It is thought to differ from ‘cortical dementia’ - for example, 
Alzheimer’s disease - by the absence of cognitive deficits such as agnosia, apraxia and 
aphasia that are associated with cortical pathology. In contrast, subcortical dementia is 
thought to be associated with mood changes, cognitive deficits similar to those seen
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after frontal lobe damage, and the clinical impression of ‘slowed thought’ or 
bradyphrenia (Darvesh and Freedman, 1996). However, the distinction between cortical 
and subcortical dementia remains controversial, and ‘cortical’ deficits may not in fact 
be absent from patients with dementia caused by PD. Reid et al. (1996) found that 
dementia in patients with PD resembled ‘subcortical dementia’ initially but it 
progressed to include ‘cortical’ functions and was eventually indistinguishable from 
dementia caused by Alzheimer’s disease. Similarly, Kramer and Duffy (1996) found 
that the presence of agnosia, aphasia and apraxia were of little use in distinguishing 
Alzheimer’s dementia from dementia caused by PD and normal pressure 
hydrocephalus. Thus, the classification of dementia caused by PD as a ‘subcortical’ 
dementia may be premature. However, neither Reid et al.’s nor Kramer and Duffy’s 
studies carried out post-mortem examination to exclude the possibility that their 
patients with PD were also suffering from a coexistent, more ‘cortical’ pathology.
The controversy over the distinction between ‘cortical’ and ‘subcortical’ 
dementia is significant for the consideration of the anatomical substrate of the cognitive 
deficits of a range of disorders. However, for the purposes of this section it is sufficient 
to note that PD can cause disabling and relatively global impairments of cognitive 
function.
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1.4 PD and the concept of ‘set’
Researchers have often attempted to account for a number of the cognitive and motor 
deficits of PD in terms of the breakdown of a single mechanism (for example, Brown 
and Marsden, 1990). The concept o f ‘set’ has frequently been cited and ‘inflexibility’, 
‘breakdown’ or ‘instability’ of set has been held responsible for deficits in both 
cognitive and motor domains (Flowers and Robertson, 1985; Robertson and Flowers, 
1990). This section will define the concepts of ‘motor set’ and ‘attentional set’ and will 
review the literature that relates the breakdown of these mechanisms to the deficits seen 
in PD
1.4.1 Définition o f 'set'
The term ‘set’ is defined as follows in one of the most widely-used modern dictionaries 
of psychology: “Any condition, disposition or tendency on the part of an organism to 
respond in a particular manner” (Reber, 1985, p. 689). Thus, ‘set’ has been used to 
describe almost any state that is ‘internal’ to an organism that influences its behaviour 
in a fashion independent of external cues or stimuli. This usage is clearly too broad to 
be useful, but it reflects the long history of the term; ‘set’, with various prefixes such as 
‘perceptual’ or ‘motor’, has been used to describe a range of psychological phenomena 
that have little In common. The unregulated use of the term ‘set’ is not a new 
phenomenon; Gibson reviewed the use of the term in 1941, finding that “the underlying 
meaning is indefinite, the terminology chaotic, and the usage by psychologists highly 
individualistic” (p. 781). Gibson found that ‘set’ had been used to describe phenomena 
as diverse as visual hallucinations and Pavlovian conditioning. He concluded that no 
common meaning could be discerned for the term, but he defined a number of areas of 
research in which the term ‘set’ was used to describe a relatively consistent set of 
psychological phenomena. Two of these areas are the topics of this thesis.
Gibson defined one use of the term ‘set’ as follows: “an intention to react by 
making a specific movement, or not so to react (reaction time and conditioning 
experiments)” (p. 811). This thesis focuses on the ‘intention to react’ that is seen in 
reaction time (RT) studies and this ‘intention’ will be termed ‘motor set’. Gibson noted 
that reaction times (RTs) are faster when subjects are ready to react and anticipating the 
stimulus. This is demonstrated by the manipulation of foreperiod, that is, the interval 
between a warning stimulus and an imperative stimulus in an RT task. Both very short 
and very long foreperiods lead to relatively slow RTs due to the failure of a subject to
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be optimally ‘ready’ for the imperative stimulus. Similarly, RTs tend towards zero 
when the foreperiod is constant and the imperative stimulus can be anticipated; in all of 
the cases, the warning signal imperative signal and response requirements are the same, 
but the internal ‘set’ of the subject alters RT. Thus, the term ‘motor set’ is used in this 
thesis to refer to the speeding of RT that occurs as a consequence of a subject’s 
anticipation of the imperative stimulus and readiness to respond.
The term ‘attentional set’ will be used to describe another of Gibson’s 
categories. He defines this type of process thus: “a prearoused expectation of stimulus 
objects, qualities or relations (perception experiments)” (p. 811). Gibson describes work 
by Külpe (1904) to illustrate this type of set. KlUpe presented sets of coloured letters 
tachistoscopically, having instructed subjects to report a particular aspect of these 
stimuli. The subjects’ perceptions of the stimuli varied greatly according to the 
instructions that they had been given. For example, if subjects had been instructed to 
count the number of letters that had been displayed, they often could not report the 
colour of these letters. Subjects were attending selectively to one aspect of a stimulus, 
to the detriment of the other attributes of that stimulus. This ability is explicitly tested 
by a number of widely-used clinical neuropsychological tests such as the WCST and the 
Stroop test, and is often referred to as ‘attentional set’. Studies of the ability of patients 
with PD to attend selectively to one of a number of possible stimulus attributes will be 
reviewed in Section 1.6.
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1.5 PD and motor set
Patient with PD have frequently been shown to have an RT deficit (see Section 4.0). 
The cause of this deficit is unknown, but it is widely accepted that peripheral factors 
such as muscular activation cannot account for such slowing of RTs. It is known that 
sometimes patients with PD fail to initiate a movement because muscular activity 
(measured by electromyography - EMG), whilst present, is of insufficient magnitude to 
move a limb (Hallett, 1990). However the main problem in RT tasks appears to be that 
the onset of patients EMG activity is later than that of controls, rather than insufficient 
(Yokochi et al., 1985). This is not caused by slowed information transmission from 
motor cortex; studies using stimulation of motor cortex have shown that corticospinal 
conduction times are normal in patients with PD (Thompson et al., 1986). Thus, the RT 
deficit seen in patients with PD appears to arise from the slowing of some ‘central’ 
process that must occur before the execution of the motor program.
A number of lines of evidence implicate a failure of ‘motor set’ in the RT 
deficit of patients with PD. Studies have suggested that patients with PD are unable to 
use ‘advance information’ about a movement to speed their RTs; that is, when patients 
are informed of tlie nature of the response required before it is prompted by the 
imperative stimulus they are less able than controls to use this information to speed 
their movements (Bloxham et al., 1984; Sheridan et al., 1987). This can be described as 
a failure to attain the appropriate ‘set’ to maximally speed RTs. However, there is 
contradictory evidence showing that patients can use advance information - for a 
review, see Section 4.2. It has also been suggested that a failure of a kind of ‘set’ causes 
the simple RT deficit seen in patients with PD. Goodrich et al. (1989) suggested that 
healthy subjects are able to use a form of ‘set’ that is not accessible to patients with PD 
to speed their RTs in simple RT tasks. Because response selection is not required in a 
simple RT task, Goodrich et al. suggested that healthy subjects are able to ‘attentionally 
focus’ on the appearance of the imperative stimulus. Goodrich et al. demonstrated the 
role of this ‘focus’ or ‘set’ by requiring patients and controls to perform a secondary 
task whilst engaged in a simple RT task. The secondary task impaired controls’ RTs 
such that they performed at the same level as patients; in contrast, the secondary task 
did not impair patients’ performance. Goodrich et al. argued that the secondary task 
disrupted the controls’ focusing, or ‘set’, but that the patients’ performance was 
unchanged because they had never attained a ‘set’. Both the studies relating to the use 
of ‘advance information’ and ‘attentional focusing’ suggest that patients with PD are in
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some sense unprepared for the imperative signal in an RT task; they have not attained 
the appropriate ‘set’.
The slowing of RT seen amongst patients with PD is often seen as a facet of 
their ‘akinesia’, the general problem of movement initiation experienced by patients 
with PD. A further reason to implicate a failure of motor ‘set’ in the PD RT deficit 
comes from clinical obseiwations of akinesia. Set is defined as an internal predisposition 
or state that is not dependent on external cues, and it has often been noted that patients’ 
akinesia is worst when they are required to move without external cues or prompting. 
Numerous clinical reports indicate that akinesia can be overcome, at least temporarily, 
if patients are cued strongly enough (Schwab, 1972). For example, if lines are painted 
on the floor for patients to step over, patients’ gait improves markedly (Martin, 1967). 
Thus, akinesia is worst when patients have to generate movements ‘internally’; a failure 
of motor ‘set’ could contribute to akinesia and by extension to the PD RT deficit.
Section 4 of this thesis includes a quantitative review of past studies of RTs in 
patients with PD. This review aims to establish the conditions under which patients with 
PD show an RT deficit and also to resolve controversies surrounding the effects of 
medication on RTs, the consistency of the simple RT deficit and patients’ ability to use 
advance information to speed their movements. Section 5 describes a study of a form of 
‘motor set’ that is seen in RT tasks that use a variable foreperiod.
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1.6 PD and attentional set
The hypothesis that patients with PD have impaired attentional set has arisen from the 
finding that they are impaired in the performance of a number of tasks that require 
selective attention to one aspect of a complex stimulus. Patients’ impairment on the 
WCST has already been noted (see Section 1.3.1) and patients also show consistent 
impairments on such tasks as the Stroop test, the Odd-Man-Out test (OMO, Flowers and 
Robertson, 1985), extradimensional (ED) shifting (Downes et al., 1989) and the 
Embedded Figures test. Some of these tests incorporate ‘shifts’ of attentional set and 
some have a problem-solving element (for example, the WCST). Other tasks, such as 
the Stroop test, only test the ability to form and maintain an attentional set. However, all 
require subjects to attend to one aspect or attribute of a complex stimulus on the basis of 
an internal ‘disposition’ rather than by using information in the stimulus. This section 
will review the literature describing the performance of patients with PD on these tests. 
Tests that index the basic ability to form and maintain a set will be reviewed first, 
followed by an account of the ‘classic’ attentional set-shifting deficit of patients with 
PD, the WCST deficit. Finally, studies that attempt to clarify the nature of the WCST 
deficit will be described.
1.6.1 Formation and maintenance o f  set 
Figiire-groiind perception 
There is evidence that some patients with PD have problems in the basic ability to form 
and use an attentional set. A number of studies show that patients with PD do not 
perform optimally when required simply to attend to one aspect or attribute of a 
stimulus whilst ignoring other competing aspects. Two studies show that some patients 
have problems distinguishing ‘figure’ from ‘ground’ in perceptual displays. Talland 
(1962) showed that patients were less able than controls to control their perception of 
the Necker cube. When patients attempted to sustain one view of the Necker cube their 
perceptions spontaneously reverted to the other ‘view’ more often than controls. Also, 
patients were less able than controls to voluntarily switch between the two views of the 
cube. A deficit has also been reported on the Embedded Figures test (Flowers and 
Robertson, 1995). This test requires subjects to ‘pick out’ the outline of a simple shape 
that is embedded in a more complex figure. As such, the test requires selective attention 
and the ability to ignore irrelevant aspects of a stimulus. Flowers and Robertson (1995) 
found a deficit on this test in moderately and severely impaired patients with PD,
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though not in mildly impaired patients. This test was also included in Taylor et al.’s 
(1986) study, which also reported no deficit in patients with early PD. Thus, it appears 
that the ability consistently to distinguish figure from ground is impaired only in 
patients with more advanced PD.
Sti'oop effect
Two paradigms have been used to test patients’ ability to attend selectively to one of 
two perceptual ‘dimensions’. The first is the widely-used Stroop test, the second a 
sophisticated visual attention paradigm devised by Maddox et al. (1996). Both of these 
tests tax subjects’ ability to attend to one dimension in the presence of another 
competing dimension; neither (in their original forms) test subjects’ ability to ‘shift’ or 
‘switch’ attentional set. The Stroop task tests subjects’ ability to attend to a dimension 
in the face of strong interference. Subjects are required to report the colour of the ink in 
which a number of words are printed. The ‘Stroop effect’ is seen when two conditions 
are compared (though the exact procedure often varies - Lezak, 1995); in one condition, 
the colour word and the ink colour are congruous (e.g. the word ‘RED’ printed in red 
ink), in the other condition they are incongruous (e.g. ‘BLUE’ printed in yellow ink). 
The Stroop effect is the increase in either latency or errors seen in the ‘incongruous’ 
condition compared to the ‘congruous’ condition. The increase in difficulty is caused by 
the ‘automatic’ reading of the colour word and the interference of this with naming the 
ink colour. Thus, the Stroop test can be seen as a strong test of selective attention to the 
dimension ‘ink colour’.
Patients with PD have frequently been shown to have a deficit on the Stroop 
task; that is, they show an increased ‘Stroop effect’, measured either by increased 
latency or errors (Brown and Marsden, 1988; Henik et al., 1993; Hietanen and 
Teravainen, 1986; Meco et al., 1996; Pillon et al., 1996; Stam et al., 1993). Only two 
studies have shown intact Stroop performance in patients with PD (Cools et al., 1984; 
Van Spaendonck et al., 1995). Van Spaendonck et al.’s failure to find an effect may be 
explained by subject characteristics; whilst the mean age for the patient groups in which 
deficits were found was 64.1 years, the mean age of Van Spaendonck et al.’s patient 
group was 53.9 years implying that a deficit was not seen due to the patient group’s 
early age of onset (Reid et al., 1989). There is no obvious reason for the failure of Cools 
et al.’s (1984) study to find a deficit on the Stroop test but this single study does not 
detract from the overall finding of a deficit on the Stroop test in patients with PD.
Some studies have attempted to investigate the mechanisms underlying the 
parkinsonian Stroop deficit. Brown and Marsden (1988, 1991) have suggested that
22
patients with PD have limited attentional ‘resources’ and that a Stroop deficit is present 
when patients’ ‘resources’ are exceeded. They have supported this argument by 
showing that the presence of cues ameliorates the Stroop deficit seen in patients with 
PD and claiming that this is due to the cues reducing the ‘resource requirements’ of the 
task (Brown and Marsden, 1988). They have also showed that patients’ (but not 
controls’) performance of the Stroop task is impaired by the presence of some 
secondary tasks and have argued that this is because the secondary task increases 
‘resource demands’ beyond the patients’ limits. This account of the Stroop deficit seen 
in patients with PD is attractive, but cannot account for all of the data. A study by Henik 
et al. (1993) shows that an alteration of attentional function is more likely to cause the 
Stroop deficit than a nonspecific ‘reduction of resources’. Henik et al. compared the 
speed of ink colour naming when the word was congruent with the ink colour (e.g. 
‘RED’ in red ink) or irrelevant to the ink colour (e.g. ‘TIGER’ or ‘XXXX’ in red ink). 
The colours of the congruent words were named more quickly than those of the 
irrelevant words for all subjects, but this benefit of congruence was greater for patients 
with PD than for controls. This facilitatory effect cannot be accounted for in terms of 
‘resource depletion’ and appears to arise from a ‘beneficial’ inability to inhibit word 
reading in patients with PD.
The Maddox paradigm 
A recent study by Maddox et al. (1996) provides further evidence that some patients 
with PD have deficits of selective attention. Maddox et al. displayed either horizontal 
or vertical lines, or both, and required subjects to categorise these lines by their length 
(e.g. ‘long’ or ‘short’) according to a simple criterion that was clearly displayed 
throughout the study. Patients with PD could successfully categorise vertical lines that 
were displayed on their own and also performed normally when required to categorise 
according to the relative lengths of the horizontal and vertical lines. However, when 
patients were required to categorise according to the length of the vertical line and to 
ignore the horizontal line, a proportion of patients with PD did not perform optimally. 
This is a clear demonstration of an inability to attend selectively in the presence of 
competing stimuli which is particularly convincing due to the simple nature of the task.
To summarise, Maddox et al. (1996) found a deficit of selective attention in 
patients with PD that had also been indicated by studies using the Stroop test. However, 
both of these paradigms demonstrate deficits under extreme experimental conditions. 
The Stroop test is a curiosity because few perceptual dimensions interfere as 
competitively as written words, and Maddox et al.’s test is so simple to perform that
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specialised mathematical modeling must be used for each subject’s data to detect a 
deficit. In contrast, the ‘paradigmatic’ attentional set-shifting deficit in PD is usually 
considered to be poor performance on a test that requires repeated shifting between 
simple dimensions - the WCST
1.6.2 Shifting set - studies o f  the WCST
The WCST is a widely-used test in clinical neuropsychology, favoured for its sensitivity 
to frontal lobe damage (Milner, 1963). To carry out this test, subjects are given a pack 
of ‘response’ cards and must place them next to one of four ‘stimulus’ cards (see Figure 
1.1) according to a rule. Subjects select the appropriate ‘stimulus’ card for their 
individual ‘response’ card on the basis of one of three rules; subjects must either match 
colour, shapes or number of shapes. For example, when sorting to the rule ‘colour’, a 
response card showing a yellow shape must be placed next to stimulus card with a 
yellow shape. If  the rule is ‘number’, a response card with two shapes on it must be 
placed next to the stimulus card that has two shapes. Further examples of this sorting 
process can be seen in Figure 1.1.
B D
X Y + ++ +
Figure 1.1: This figure depicts the four ‘sthmiliis cards' used in the WCST (A to D) and 
two sample response cards (X and Y). I f  the ride is ‘shape then card X  must be placed 
next to A, and card Y  next to C. Alternatively, i f  the ride is ‘colour ’ (here shown in gray 
tones) X  must be placed next to B and Y next to A.
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However, the exact procedure by which the WCST is administered varies greatly 
between the two versions of the test. Milner (1963) developed the original version of 
the WCST, but a simpler version was created by Nelson (1976) who noted that Milner’s 
procedure was found to be too difficult and frequently aversive by many patients. The 
principal differences between the two tests are as follows;
(a) Selection of rules: In Milner’s version, the ‘rule’ that subjects must use is decided by 
the tester and subjects must work it out on the basis of feedback (‘correct’ / ‘wrong’) 
given by the tester. In the Nelson version of the WCST subjects are invited to select any 
rule and then to follow it.
(b) Rule shifts: In Milner’s version, the rule is changed without informing the subject 
after ten consecutive correct responses to the previous rule. In contrast, subjects are 
invited to ‘find another rule’ after six consecutive correct responses in Nelson’s version.
(c) Feedback: Ambiguous feedback is possible in Milner’s version of the WCST. For 
example, if a subject makes a correct response by placing a response card depicting two 
red triangles next to a stimulus card showing one red triangle, then the subjects could 
conclude that either of the rules ‘colour’ or ‘shape’ are correct. In Nelson’s version, 
response cards that can yield ambiguous feedback are not used.
Both versions of the WCST yield a number of performance measures; the number of 
rules successfully used (or ‘categories achieved’) is recorded, and the number of 
different types of error are also recorded.
A review of the literature reveals 17 studies that compared the performance of 
patients with PD and controls on the WCST and reported either comparison statistics or 
raw scores. Different studies used different versions of the WCST. Milner’s and 
Nelson’s versions of the WCST are quite different and there is some consensus that they 
should not be regarded as testing the same abilities (DeZubicaray and Ashton, 1996). As 
a consequence, studies of PD that used the Milner version are reviewed separately from 
those that used the Nelson version.
Milner version - review 
Nine studies were found that used the Milner version of the WCST. The only outcome 
measure reported by all of these studies was the ‘number of categories achieved’, so 
studies are reviewed in terms of this measure. Patients achieved fewer categories than 
conti'ols in six out of nine studies (Bowen et al., 1975; Lichter et al., 1988; Meco et al., 
1996; Taylor et al,, 1986, 1987; Troster et al., 1995). Three studies found that patients 
performed normally (Cooper et al., 1991, 1992; Dalryniple-Alford et al., 1994) but in all
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of these studies the patients tested had mild PD. Cooper et al. (1991) studies newly- 
diagnosed, unmedicated patients with PD and their 1992 study tested the same cohort of 
patients four month later whilst medicated. Similarly, Dalrymple-Alford et al. (1994) 
found no WCST deficit in a group of patients described as having “mild PD of 
relatively recent onset” (p. 361). It would be desirable to review all nine studies in terms 
of a more sensitive measure than ‘categories’, such as ‘number of perseverative errors’, 
but only five out of nine studies report this measure and even fewer report ‘non- 
perseverative’ errors. However, the ‘categories’ measure still shows a PD deficit in the 
majority of studies and in all studies of more advanced PD.
Nelson version - j'eview 
Of the eight studies found that used the Nelson version of the WCST, five reported 
reduced category achievement in patients with PD (Brown and Marsden, 1988; Gotham 
et al., 1988; Lees and Smith, 1983; Partiot et al., 1996 (my calculations); Pillon et al., 
1986). Three studies report no deficits in patients with PD (Canavan et al., 1989; Pillon 
et al., 1996, 1997) but two of these studies used patients with mild PD, a group that has 
already been shown to sometimes perform normally on the Milner version of the WCST 
(see above). Pillon et al. (1997) used ‘de novo’ unmedicated patients and Canavan et al. 
(1989) described their patients as being in the ‘early stages’ of PD. However, Pillon et 
al.’s (1996) patients were medicated and had moderate PD, so disease severity cannot 
account for a failure to find a WCST deficit in category achievement in this group. 
Although these patients achieved the same number of categories as controls, their 
performance was not normal as they made more perseverative errors than controls. Thus 
it appears that moderately or severely impaired patients have a consistent deficit in 
some aspect of performance of the Nelson version of the WCST. It is interesting to note 
that although the tasks differ substantially, the Nelson and Milner versions of the WCST 
seem equally sensitive to PD and equally insensitive to mild PD.
This review has confirmed the widely-held opinion that a deficit in WCST 
performance is characteristic of patients with PD, although it appears that some patients 
with early PD may be unimpaired. The WCST deficit is one of the most consistent 
cognitive deficits that has been found in PD. As noted in Section 1.3.2, it appears that 
this deficit increases in severity with disease progression (Caparros-Lefebvre et al., 
1995). It is also of interest that the WCST deficit seen in patients with PD is not 
ameliorated by levodopa treatment. Bowen et al. (1975) found that a group of levodopa- 
treated patients achieved no more categories on the WCST than untreated patients 
despite having better disease status due to medication. Gotham et al. (1988), Kulisevsky
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et al. (1996) and Starkstein et al. (1989) have all assessed WCST performance in 
patients undergoing withdrawal of levodopa medication. Neither Gotham et al. or 
Starkstein et al. found any differences in WCST performance ‘on’ or ‘o ff  medication. 
Kulisevsky et al’s findings were similar, but they also noted a transient decrease in 
performance one hour after the administration of levodopa in a group of patients who 
showed a ‘wearing-off response to levodopa. Thus, it appears that patients’ WCST 
deficit is not eliminated by medication and may even be worsened by medication in 
patients who have lost their smooth response to levodopa.
Although the WCST deficit of patients with PD is well-established, the 
impaired cognitive mechanism that causes this deficit has not been characterised. 
Successful performance of the WCST requires a range of cognitive abilities; for 
example, Downes et al. (1989) have argued that subjects must be able to use a 
matching-to-sample principle, learn conditional visuospatial contingencies and shift 
attentional set. Analysis of WCST error scores has indicated little about the cognitive 
abilities involved in this task other than the fact that more than one ability is required. 
Factor analysis of WCST performance has revealed two factors (Greve et al. 1997;
Paolo et al., 1995). The first factor has been termed “conceptualisation”, “problem­
solving” (Paolo et al.) and “undifferentiated executive function” (Greve et al.)’ the 
second had been termed “failure to maintain set” (Paolo et al.) and “attentional 
function” (Greve et al.). These broad and ill-defined definitions are clearly unhelpful for 
explaining the deficit seen in patients with PD and it seems unlikely that further 
analysis of the WCST in its classic form will clarify the cognitive abilities that underly 
successful performance. Instead, a number of researchers have elected to design new 
tasks that are aimed at pinpointing the aspect of the WCST that challenges patients with 
PD. These tasks are reviewed in the following sections.
1.6.3 The Odd-Man-Oiit (OMO) test
Many studies have attempted to replicate and extend the PD WCST deficit using 
different paradigms, or have devised tests with the intention of isolating the particular 
cognitive demand that causes the WCST deficit in patients with PD. However, these 
studies have often taken the central ability underlying successful WCST performance to 
be ‘set-shifting’, which is often loosely defined as the ability to switch from almost any 
behaviour to another behaviour. As such, these studies have often used paradigms that 
do not test attentional set. An example of this is a series of studies by Van Spaendonck 
et al. (1993, 1995, 1996). This group has attempted to extend the WCST ‘set-shifting’
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deficit by using structurally similar card-sorting tasks that require subjects to categorise 
different types of stimulus material. For example, Van Spaendonck et al. have created 
the ‘Animals Sorting T esf. In this test, subjects are given a pack of cards with animal 
names on them, such as ‘giraffe’, and are required to sort these onto two piles on the 
basis of a rule which is subsequently changed. An example of such a rule might be 
‘native vs. exotic’ or alternatively ‘herbivore vs. carnivore’. This may be an interesting 
test, but is does not test visual selective attention to one aspect of a complex stimulus. 
There are many other examples of studies that claim to test ‘set-shifting’ but test 
abilities unrelated to attentional set (e.g. verbal fluency - Downes et al., 1993; priming - 
McDonald et al. 1996; problem-solving - Cronin-Golomb et al,, 1994). However, two 
paradigms have been developed that clearly test visual selective attention and each had 
been used in a number of studies of PD. These tests are the Odd-Man-Out (OMO) test 
(Flowers and Robertson, 1985) and the attentional shifting test from the CANTAB 
battei-y (Roberts et al., 1988).
Flowers and Robertson (1985) state that they developed the OMO test due to 
dissatisfaction with the Nelson version of the WCST. However, the demands of the 
OMO test are quite similar to those of Nelson’s WCST. Subjects are shown a card that 
depicts three shapes; one shape differs from the other two in terms of one dimension 
(such as ‘size’) and another shape differs from the others in a different dimension (such 
as ‘shape’). Subjects are invited to ‘pick the odd one out’ and are allowed to select a 
rule relating to either perceptual dimension. Subjects must then select the odd one out 
according to the same rule for new cards until that pack is finished, when a new pack is 
started and subjects are required to choose a different rule. The main difference between 
the OMO test and Nelson’s WCST (apart from the exact nature of the sorting task) is 
that the requirement to keep sorting to the end of a pack of cards allows assessment of 
maintenance of set. Indeed, Flowers and Robertson (1985) found that patients with PD 
were impaired in this ‘set-maintenance’ rather than ‘set-shifting’ between rules. 
However, this finding has not been replicated. Both Richaids et al. (1993) and Pillon et 
al. (1996) found shifting deficits on the OMO test in patients with PD. Pillon et al.’s 
(1997) study even contradicts these two studies, showing normal performance in 
patients with PD. However, this study tested ‘de novo’ unmedicated patients who were 
also shown to be unimpaired in the performance of the WCST.
The principal problem with the OMO test is not the inconsistency of the results 
that have been found with it, but that the mechanisms underlying the performance of 
this task are no clearer than those required by the WCST. Another paradigm is
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noteworthy for allowing the assessment of visual selective attention alone, 
uncontaminated by other cognitive demands. This is the attentional set-shifting 
component of the CANTAB battery, described below.
1.6.4 Extradimensional (ED) shifting
The completion of a rule shift on the WCST requires subjects to shift their attention 
from one perceptual dimension (for example, colours) to another (for example, shape). 
An ED shift is a relatively pure measure of this ability to shift attentional set; it is also 
well researched, and comprehensible in terms of learning theory. Roberts et al. (1988) 
have devised a test that includes a test of ED shifting as well as other abilities that are 
required for the performance of the WCST. This test can be completed, with some 
modification, by both humans and marmosets and the methodology used has benefited 
from much previous work (see Slamecka, 1968).
Roberts et al.’s paradigm involves a number of different tests of discrimination 
learning that increase in difficulty as the test progresses. Subjects move from one stage 
of the test to the next when they reach a criterion of six consecutive correct responses; if 
they do not achieve this criterion after 50 trials the test is terminated. The initial stage of 
the test is a simple two-choice visual discrimination task where subjects are required to 
work out which of two black shapes is ‘correct’ on the basis of feedback. A reversal 
stage follows this. After the reversal stage, a new ‘perceptual dimension’ is introduced; 
white lines are superimposed on the black shapes, creating a compound stimulus. 
However, the black shapes continue to be relevant for the purposes of discrimination 
learning. The two most significant stages of this test take place whilst both ‘dimensions’ 
are present, and are termed the intradiniensional (ID) and extradimensional (ED) shifts. 
In both of these stages, black shapes and white lines are present before and after the 
shift, but the individual shapes and lines change in form (a ‘total change’ design - 
Slamecka, 1968). At the ID shift, the stimulus containing one of the new black shapes 
will be correct after the shift. In contrast, after an ED shift subjects must cease 
responding to the black shapes that were relevant before the shift and instead attend to 
the white lines. This shift of attention from one dimension to the other is thought to 
parallel the rule shift of the WCST. The relevant comparison that isolates shifts of 
attentional set in the Roberts et al. paradigm is the comparison between ID and ED 
shifting performance. After both ID and ED shifts, subjects are confronted with novel 
stimuli and must work out the new correct response on the basis of feedback. The only 
difference between the two shifts is the influence of subjects’ attentional set; other
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factors such as the requirement to carry out hypothesis testing are equivalent in the two 
shifts. If subjects were selectively attending to black shapes before the shifts, this aids 
ID shifting as black shapes remain relevant, but retards ED shifting as black shapes are 
now irrelevant and must be ignored. As a consequence, both healthy humans and 
marmosets acquire ID shifts more rapidly than ED shifts (Roberts et al. 1988).
Patients with PD show deficits of ED shifting with spared or only mildly 
impaired ID shifting (Downes et al., 1989; Lange et al., 1992; Owen et al., 1992; 
Robbins et al., 1994). That is, patients are able to maintain attention to a dimension, but 
are impaired in switching their attention between dimensions. ED shift deficits have 
been found in patients at all stages of PD and in both medicated and unmedicated 
patients. No study has yet found intact performance of the standard ED shift in patients 
with PD; in contrast to the WCST, ED-shift deficits are found in unmedicated patients 
with early PD (Downes et al., 1989; Owen et al., 1992). Although only four studies have 
found ED shift deficits in patients with PD the inclusion of more than one group of 
patients in some studies means that deficits have been found in a total of seven separate 
groups of patients.
Like the WCST deficit, the ED shift deficit appears to increase in severity with 
disease progression; Owen et al.’s (1992) ‘medicated - severe’ group performed more 
badly at the ED shift than the ‘medicated - mild’ and ‘unmedicated’ groups. It also 
appears that levodopa medication does not reduce the ED shift deficit. Downes et al.
(1989) and Owen et al. (1992) compared unmedicated patients with medicated patient 
with mild PD, but found no difference in ED shift performance between these groups. 
However, in both of these studies the ‘medicated - mild’ groups had more advanced PD 
than the unmedicated groups, so it is possible that any cognitive improvement caused by 
levodopa might have been ‘canceled out’ by disease progression. The best evidence 
relating to the effects of medication comes from a study by Lange et al. (1992) in which 
patients performed ED shifts whilst medicated and after 13 hours of medication 
withdrawal. The same number of patients failed to acquire the ED shift when on or off 
medication.
This brief review has shown that an ED shift deficit is present even at the 
earliest stages of PD when motor symptoms are minimal. The deficit increases in 
severity with disease progression and is not ameliorated by levodopa. The presence of 
intact ID shift shows that the cognitive problem in patients is one of visual selective 
attention only. Studies I to 4 of this thesis (Sections 2.0 and 3.0) are aimed at clarifying
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w h a t  c a u s e s  th e  E D  sh if t  d e f ic i t ,  w h ic h  is  o n e  o f  th e  m o s t  c o n s is t e n t  c o g n it iv e  d e f ic i t s
s e e n  in  P D .
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1.7 Anatomical substrates of the cognitive and motor deficits of PD
The cognitive and motor deficits described above are likely to have different neural 
substrates, as deficits in cognitive and motor domains are of a different magnitude and 
are sometimes uncorrelated. This section aims to provide a brief review of current 
theories relating to the anatomy underlying the cognitive and motor deficits of PD. In 
order to do this, it is necessai'y to describe both the neuropathology of PD and the 
anatomy and connectivity of the basal ganglia. The principal neuropathological lesion 
seen in PD is a loss of cells in the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) that leads to a 
massive loss of dopamine in the striatum. However, this cannot be seen as a discrete 
‘lesion’ and it would be incorrect to attribute the deficits seen in PD solely to striatal or 
nigrostriatal pathology. The striatum is part of a number of larger neural circuits, or 
‘loops’, that involve other areas of the basal ganglia as well as thalamus and cortex; 
disruption of striatal function alters the function and ‘balance’ of these loops. Thus, the 
ultimate functional consequences of striatal dopamine loss can result from disruption of 
one of the structures in a ‘loop’ that is physically distant from the damaged striatum.
The first section of this review (1.7.2) will describe the neuropathology of PD, 
emphasising the points at which this pathology affects the basal ganglia ‘loops’. This 
will be followed by a description of the anatomical connections within these loops 
(Section 1.7.3). Contemporary theories of basal ganglia function cite an imbalance in 
these intrinsic circuits as causing the symptoms of PD. These theories will be 
summarised in Section 1.7.3, as they provide the rationale for the surgical treatment of 
PD that is described in Section 6.0.
1.7.1 A note on the cognitive deficits ofPD
The following sections assume that loss of dopamine in the putamen is the principal 
cause of the movement deficits of PD, particularly bradykinesia. This is 
uncontroversial. Levodopa is known to have its beneficial effects on movement 
symptoms by acting in the putamen (Pearce, 1992) and a number of imaging studies 
have found a correlation between putaminal dopamine metabolism and motor status in 
patients with PD (e.g. Holthoff-Detto et al., 1997; Morrish et al., 1995). Some 
movement symptoms of PD may have extrastriatal origins - for example, there may be a 
cerebellar component to tremor (Caparros-Lefebvre et al., 1994; Deiber et al., 1993) - 
but the role of the putamen in the generation of bradykinesia is not disputed. However, 
the following sections will also attribute the attentional set-shifting deficits of PD (and
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many other cognitive deficits) to loss of dopamine in the head of the caudate nucleus. In 
contrast to the consensus surrounding motor symptoms, the neurochemical and 
neuroanatoniical basis of the cognitive deficits of PD is a topic of much debate (see 
Dubois and Pillon, 1995). PD causes disruption of a range of neurotransmitter systems 
(see Section 1,7.2) and investigators have often asserted that the cognitive deficits of 
PD are extrastriatal or non-dopaminergic in origin (e.g. Cooper et al., 1991). Thus, the 
association of cognitive deficits with caudate dysfunction must be justified.
Some of the cognitive deficits of PD are almost certainly independent of 
caudate dopamine loss. For example. Stern et al. (1984) and Mayeux et al. (1987) have 
found that deficits of vigilance in PD (as measured by the Continuous Performance 
Test) are associated with CSF levels of noradrenaline metabolites but not dopamine 
metabolites. However, there is also substantial evidence that many of the cognitive 
deficits of PD are a consequence of caudate dysfunction or of disruption of the cortical 
projection sites of the caudate nucleus. The caudate was originally implicated in the 
cognitive deficits of PD because of the resemblance of these deficits to those seen after 
frontal lobe damage (Taylor et al., 1986). The caudate is part of a loop that receives 
projections from and projects to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and animal 
studies have shown that lesions of the head of the caudate and its projection sites in 
frontal cortex can have similar behavioural consequences (Battig et al., 1962). The 
caudate is also involved in the performance of cognitive tasks that have been shown to 
be sensitive to the effects of PD. Performance of the Tower of London task in humans 
and a spatial working memory task in monkeys has been shown to be associated with 
caudate metabolism (Owen et al., 1996a; Levy et al., 1997a, respectively). Most 
directly, a recent imaging study has shown that performance of a memory task is 
correlated with caudate dopamine metabolism in patients with PD (Holthoff-Detto et 
al., 1997).
There is no direct evidence that links deficits of attentional set-shifting to 
caudate dysfunction. However, indirect evidence is plentiful. ED-shifting deficits are 
present in patients with very early PD, when neuropathology is principally confined to 
dopamine loss in the striatum (see Section 1.3.1). Damage to the frontal lobes, 
particularly to the lateral frontal areas that are reciprocally connected to the caudate, 
results in ED-shift deficits (Dias et al., 1996; Owen et al., 1990). However, it is possible 
that the ‘frontal-like’ attentional set-shifting deficits seen in patients with PD are due to 
the loss of intrinsic dopamine in the frontal cortex (see Section 1.7.2) rather than to 
dopamine loss in the caudate. This explanation was ruled out by a study by Roberts et
al. (1994) which showed that dopamine depletion of the frontal cortex in monkeys 
enhanced ED shift performance. Thus, it seems most likely that the ED shift deficits 
seen in patients with PD are due to caudate dysfunction. Although the ED shift deficits 
seen in patients with PD and those with frontal damage are not identical (see Owen et 
al., 1993b and Section 2.4) there is more evidence to connect the ED shift deficits seen 
in PD to dopamine depletion of the caudate nucleus than to depletion of any other area 
or neurotransmitter system. The following sections proceed from this premise.
1.7.2 Neuropathology o f  PD
PD causes both structural changes and the loss of a range of neurotransmitters; Agid et 
al. (1990) provide a detailed review of these changes. This section will briefly 
summarise the nature and location of the principal neurochemical changes seen in PD. 
Loss of striatal dopamine has been cited above as the most important pathological 
change of PD, and this will be described first. The functional significance of changes to 
other neurotransmitter systems is less clear, and these will be described subsequently.
Dopamine systems - Nigrostriatal 
Pigmented cells are lost in the SNc of patients with PD, which leads to degeneration of 
the nigrostriatal bundle. Dopaminergic innervation of the striatum is lost, and striatal 
dopamine levels are drastically reduced. The degeneration of the SNc and striatum 
varies widely between individuals (Kish et al., 1988), but often follows a similar general 
pattern; the ventrolateral tier of SNc cells is affected first, leading to depletion of 
dopamine in the posterior putamen that subsequently spreads rostrally to into the 
anterior putamen and the caudate nucleus (Sawle, 1995). Dopamine depletion has been 
found to be around 85-90% in the putamen and 75% in the caudate (Marsden, 1992). It 
is widely accepted that motor symptoms do not appear until putaminal dopamine 
depletion reaches around 80% and there is thought to be a ‘preclinical’ period in which 
dopamine levels are falling but no motor symptoms are apparent (Morrish et al., 1995).
Mesocorticolimhic
The mesocorticolimhic dopamine system arises from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) 
and projects to a range of subcortical structures, including the nucleus accumbens, 
hypothalamus, amygdala and hippocampus. The VTA also innervates frontal, cingulate 
and entorhinal cortices, and the paiolfactory gyrus. Tyrosine hydroxylase (a marker of 
dopamine synthesis) is reduced by 50-70% in the VTA (Agid et al., 1990) and 
dopamine depletion in the nucleus accumbens can reach 75% (Marsden, 1992).
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Other dopaminergic systems 
Loss of dopamine is seen in the globus pallidus and there is also dopamine depletion in 
the hypothalamus that cannot be accounted for by dysfunction of the mesocorticolimhic 
pathway. It is thought that hypothalamic dopamine depletion is due either to loss of 
intrinsic dopamine degeneration of nigro-hypothalainic fibres (Agid et al., 1990). 
Dopamine levels are also halved in two brainstem structures - the locus coeruleus and 
the area postrema.
Noradrenaline
Pigmented cells are lost in the locus coeruleus, leading to a degeneration of dorsal 
ascending noradrenergic pathways. Cortical and subcortical noradrenaline and its 
metabolites are depleted.
Acetylcholine
There is widespread loss of cholinergic neurons in the Nucleus Basalis of Meynert in 
PD, which leads to a loss of acetylcholine in frontal, temporal and entorhinal cortices as 
well as the hippocampus. Cholinergic cell loss in the NBM has been shown to be as 
severe as that seen in Alzheimer’s disease (Candy et al., 1983). 40% of cholinergic 
neurons are also lost in the pedunculopotine tegmental nucleus (PPTG). In contrast, 
levels of choline acetyltransferase (CAT, a marker of cholinergic neurons) are normal in 
the caudate nucleus and SNc.
Serotonin
Serotonin and its metabolite are reduced in the basal ganglia, hypothalamus, 
hippocampus and frontal cortex of patients with PD. This results from loss of cells in 
the raphe nuclei and ascending serotonergic pathways.
GABA
The impact of PD on GABAergic pathways is unclear, as the marker for GABA 
(glutamic acid decarboxylase, GAD) is affected by a number of conditions that are 
associated with prolonged terminal illness, such as anoxia. GAD levels are reduced in 
many areas of the brains of patients with PD at post-mortem, but in contrast GABA 
receptors are present in normal numbers in all areas but the SN (Agid et al., 1990). 
Neuropeptides
Five neuropeptides have been consistently found to be depleted in patients with PD - 
cholecystokinin, leu- and met-enkephalin, somatostatin and substance P.
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1,7.3 Functional neuroanatomy ofPD
This section describes the impact of striatal pathology described above on the function 
of the basal ganglia in PD. Much contemporary research on the functional 
neuroanatomy of the basal ganglia has been guided by models proposed by Alexander et 
al. (1986) and Alexander and Crutcher (1990). These models describe the anatomy of 
the basal ganglia at two levels of organisation. The first model (Alexander et al., 1986) 
describes the extrinsic connections of the basal ganglia and introduces the concept of 
cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical ‘loops’. Alexander et al. (1986) proposed that 
there are a number of ‘loops’ passing from and to cortical areas through the basal 
ganglia; two of these ‘loops’ are thought to subserve motor and cognitive (‘executive’) 
processes respectively and are described in detail in Section 1.7.3.1. The second model 
(Alexander and Crutcher, 1990) describes the connectivity of structures within the basal 
ganglia. Alexander and Crutcher (1990) proposed that there is a common 
neuroanatomical ‘layout’ within the basal ganglia that is shared by all of the ‘loops’ 
described above. Using data from neurophysiological studies of parkinsonian monkeys, 
Alexander and Crutcher (1990) have created a model of how the weights of these 
intrinsic basal ganglia connections are changed by PD and how these changes generate 
the symptoms of PD. This model will be described in Section 1.7.3.2.
Alexander and Crutcher’s (1990) model has been extremely influential, but it 
has been updated by subsequent research. The principal changes to the model are 
described in Section 1.7.3.3. However, the majority of the recent research on basal 
ganglia neuroanatomy has been aimed at refining understanding of the ‘motor’ loop that 
passes through the putamen. The ‘cognitive’ loop is much less well understood, and 
research clarifying its function will be summarised in Section 1.7.3.4.
1.7.3.1 Extiinsic connections o f  the basal ganglia - the 'loops ’
It is well-established that the basal ganglia receive projections from a wide range of 
cortical areas and that the basal ganglia also project to cortex via the thalamus (Parent, 
1990). Alexander et al.’s (1986) widely-cited model emphasises that these cortical 
connections are arranged as a ‘loop’. The basal ganglia are thought to receive 
connections from a range of cortical areas and to project to a more restricted subset of 
the same cortical areas. Within the basal ganglia, inputs from cortex are received by the 
striatum, and efferents leave the basal ganglia via the internal section of the globus 
pallidus (GPi) and the substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr) which are regarded as
output nuclei. The processing that occurs between the striatum and the output nuclei is 
the topic of the following section (1.7.3.2). Overall, the loops are thought to proceed 
thus: cortex - striatum - GPi/SNr - thalamus - cortex.
The ‘motor’ loop is the most clearly understood of the basal ganglia loops and it 
has been the focus of much research aimed at clarifying the causes of the motor 
symptoms of PD. The motor loop ‘begins’ with a range of cortical areas, including the 
supplementary motor area (SMA), motor cortex (MC), somatosensory cortex (SC) and 
the arcuate premotor area (APA, see Figure 1.2). These all project to the putamen 
which, as noted above, is the principal site of dopamine depletion in PD. The motor 
loop passes from the putamen to the ‘output’ nuclei of the basal ganglia, passing though 
the ventrolateral GPi and caudolateral SNr. Projections are then sent back to the SMA 
via the ventrolateral nucleus of the thalamus.
The basal ganglia loop that involves the DLPFC and passes through the caudate 
nucleus is known as the ‘dorsolateral prefrontal’ loop (Alexander et al., 1986) and has 
been most closely associated with cognitive processes. This loop will be referred to as 
the ‘cognitive’ loop for brevity; this is not intended to imply that other basal ganglia 
loops are devoid of cognitive function. For example, the anterior cingulate and lateral 
orbitofrontal loops may well subserve some cognitive processes, just as the oculomotor 
loop sei*ves ‘motor’ processes relating to eye movements. The ‘cognitive’ loop arises 
from three cortical areas - the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), posterior parietal 
cortex (PPC) and APA (see Figure 1.2). These areas project to the dorsolateral sector of 
the head of the caudate nucleus. As for the motor loop, the cognitive loop leaves the 
basal ganglia through the GPi/SNr and projects back to the DLPFC via the thalamus. 
However, it is a feature of Alexander et al.’s (1986) model that the cognitive and motor 
loops are thought not to overlap in these areas (see Figure 1.2). Cognitive and motor 
loops also pass through different areas of the striatum, but both the caudate and the 
putamen are dopamine-depleted in PD so both loops may be affected despite their 
anatomical segregation. The majority of recent research into PD focuses on the 
consequences of striatal dopamine depletion for information processing within the basal 
ganglia. The following section describes Alexander and Crutcher’s (1990) and 
DeLong’s (1990) theories relating to how striatal pathology generates the motor 
symptoms of PD.
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Figure 1.2: The organisation o f the ‘motor’ and ‘cognitive ’ loops. Abbreviations are as 
follows: SMA - supplementary motor area; APA - arcuate premotor area; MC - motor 
cortex; SC - somatosensory cortex; Put - putamen; vl-GPi - venti'olateral GPi; cl-SNr - 
caudolateral SNr; VLo - venti'olateral nucleus o f  the thalamus pars oralis; VLm - 
venti'olateral micleus o f  the thalamus pars medialis; DLPFC - dorsolateral prefi'ontal 
cortex; PPC - posterior parietal cortex; Caud - caudate nucleus; Idm-GPi - lateral 
dorsomedial GPi; rl-SNr - rostrolateral SNr; VApc - ventral anterior nucleus o f  the 
thalamus, pars parvocellularis; MDpc - mediodorsal nucleus o f  the thalamus, pars 
parvocelhdaris. Figure adaptedfi'orn Alexander et al. (1986).
1.7.3.2 Intrinsic basal ganglia circuits 
Figure 1.3 is an adaptation of Alexander and Crutcher’s (1990) diagram of the internal 
connections of the basal ganglia. According to Alexander and Crutcher, this 
organisation is common to all of the basal ganglia ‘loops’. Parts of this diagram have 
already been described above; for example, the connection of the cortex to the striatum
and the efferent projections from GPi/SNr to cortex via the thalamus. The diagram also 
depicts the dopaminergic innervation of the striatum by SNc.
Cortex
Striatum
Dopamine M
Indirect Direct
GPi/
SNrBrainstem 
Spinal cord PPTG
Figure 1.3: The intrinsic connections o f  the basal ganglia. This diagi'ain depicts the rtvo 
routes by which the striatum is thought to be able to influence the GPi/SNr - the 'direct ' 
pathway (striatum - GPi/SNr) and the ‘indirect/ pathway (stjiatum - GPe - STN - 
GPi/SNr). Filled arrows represent inhibitory connections and unfilled arrows represent 
excitatory connections. These are primarily GABAergic and glutamatergic respectively, 
with the exception o f  the dopaminergic SNc-striatum connection (labeled ‘dopamine ). 
New abbreviations: GPe - external segment o f  the globus pallidus; STN  - subthalamic 
nucleus; PPTG -pedimculopontine tegmental nucleus. Figure adaptedfl'om Alexander 
and Crutcher (1990).
The new aspects of Figure 1.3 are the depiction of the connections between the striatum
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and GPi/SNr, which include the external segment of the globus pallidus (GPe) and the 
subtlialamic nucleus (STN). Also, the connections in this diagram are labeled as 
excitatory (unfilled arrows) or inliibitoiy (filled arrows). Excitatory connections are 
glutamatergic and inhibitory connections are primarily GABAergic, with the exception 
of the SNc-striatum connections which are dopaminergic. Figure 1.3 indicates that there 
are two routes by which the ‘input’ regions of the basal ganglia (the striatum) can 
influence the ‘output’ regions (the GPi/SNr) - the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ pathways.
Activity of the direct and indirect patliways has opposing effects on the activity 
if GPi/SNr neurons, and the two pathways are differentially affected by dopamine in the 
striatum. Dopamine has an excitatory effect on the direct pathway and an inhibitory 
effect on the indirect pathway. If the direct pathway is active, its inhibitory nature 
suppresses activity of GPi/SNr neurons. GPi/SNr inhibition of the thalamus is therefore 
decreased, disinhibiting the thalamus and allowing it to send a strong excitatory signal 
to cortex. Activity of the indirect pathway has the opposite effect on GPi/SNr and 
thalamocortical neurons. GPe neurons are inhibited by the striatum, leading to a 
reduction of the GPe’s inhibitory projection to the STN. The STN is disinhibited, and 
sends a strong excitatory connection to the GPi/SNr, increasing the activity of neurons 
in this structure. The GPi/SNr inhibits the thalamus, leading to underactivity of 
thelamocoitical neurons and a weak excitatory connection to cortex. In the motor loop, 
it is thought that that activity of the indirect pathway inhibits movement by suppressing 
the activity of thalamocortical neurons, whereas activity of the direct pathway facilitates 
movement by having the opposite effect.
The effects o f  PD
The effects of PD on the function of the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ pathways has been 
studied in monkeys that have been rendered parkinsonian by the protoxin MPTP. These 
animals show motor symptoms and neuropathology that closely resembles those of PD 
in humans, and electrophysiological studies of these monkeys is the basis of the 
following model (DeLong, 1990). This model sets out to describe the implications of 
PD for the motor loop; the effects of PD on the cognitive loop were not considered by 
Alexander and Crutcher (1990) or DeLong (1990), and this will be discussed further in 
Section 1.7.3.4.
DeLong (1990) argued that dopamine depletion of the striatum causes the direct 
pathway to become underactive and the indirect pathway to become overactive, in 
accordance with the proposed differential effects of nigrostriatal dopamine on these two 
pathways. Underactivity of the direct pathway leads to a loss of striatal inhibition of
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GPi/SNr neurons, and overactivity of the GPi/SNr results. The GPi/SNr therefore 
strongly inhibits the thalamus, suppressing thalamocortical activity. Overactivity of the 
indirect pathway also leads to hyperactivity of GPi/SNr neurons. The striatum inhibits 
GPe, leading to a failure of GPe to inhibit STN. The disinhibited STN sends a strong 
excitatory connection to GPi/SNr. Thus, the overall effect of the changes in both 
pathways is to overexcite GPi/SNr neurons; the GPi/SNr therefore inhibits the thalamus 
and suppresses normal thalamocortical activity. This tonic inhibition of thalamocortical 
neurons is thought to be the primary cause of the movement deficits of PD. The precise 
mechanism by which this change generates movement symptoms in unknown. DeLong
(1990) speculated that the increased tonic activity of the GPi/SNr could ‘wash out’ or 
diminish the phasic changes of activity in this structure that are associated with 
movement. Alternatively, the suppression of thalamocortical neurons could simply 
result in the underactivation of the cortical projection areas of the motor loop. There is 
some evidence for this; the SMA has been found to be underactive in patients with PD 
performing self-generated movements (e.g. Jahanshahi et al., 1995; Playford et al.,
199ZX
1.7.3.3 Modifications o f Alexander and Crutcher’s model 
Subsequent studies of the motor loop in primates and rodents have indicated that some 
modifications must be made to Alexander and Crutcher’s (1990) original model. 
Reviews of this research by Chesselet and Delfs (1996) and Levy et al. (1997b) have 
concluded that whilst Alexander and Crutcher’s model was principally correct, the 
nature of the ‘indirect’ pathway and the functions of the GPe and STN must be 
reinterpreted. For example, one piece of evidence suggests that the ‘indirect’ pathway 
may not in fact constitute a link between the striatum and GPi/SNr. Parent and Hazrati 
(cited in Graybiel, 1995) have shown that neurons from the GPe do not synapse onto 
neurons that project from STN to GPi/SNr. Instead, these GPe neurons connect with 
neurons that project from STN back to GPe. However, there is neurophysiological 
evidence that is even more problematic for the traditional picture of the indirect 
pathway. Recent research has confirmed that the STN and GPi/SNr are overactive in 
animals with experimentally induced parkinsonism. However, it appears that GPe is not 
underactive in either patients with PD or in animal models of PD (Levy et al., 1997b). It 
was a feature of Alexander and Crutcher’s (1990) model that overactivity of the STN 
was caused by a loss of inhibition from the underactive GPe. If the GPe is not 
underactive, it is clear that STN hyperactivity must derive from a source that was not
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included in the original indirect pathway. There are two possible sources of STN 
overactivity; STN is heavily innervated by cortex and also receives dopaminergic input 
from the SNc. No study has yet verified which of these two connections is important.
The research reviewed by Chesselet and Delfs (1996) and Levy et al. (1997b) 
has also led to a major re-evaluation of the functional role of the STN. In Alexander and 
Crutcher’s model, the STN was only a relay station in the indirect pathway. However, 
the STN is now regarded as a major input structure of the basal ganglia. Cortical input 
to the STN was noted in Alexander and Crutcher’s model (see Figure 1.3), but it was 
accorded no functional significance. This view has changed, partly because cortical 
innervation may be a source of STN hyperactivity and partly because this connection 
allows cortex to influence the GPi/SNr as rapidly as the traditional direct pathway - that 
is, with only two synapses. The direct and rapid nature of this connection is thought to 
imply functional significance (Mink and Thach, 1993). Despite confusion about its 
primary sources of input, the role of the STN in driving the hyperactivity of GPi/SNr is 
still thought to be important. Contemporary approaches to the surgical treatment of PD 
have involved lesioning either the GPi or the STN in an attempt to reduce inhibition of 
thalamocortical neurons (Goetz, 1993; Limousin, 1995). Both approaches are beneficial 
and it would appear that the STN lesion could only have a positive effect by its 
influence on GPi/SNr activity.
In summary, it is still accepted that overactivity of the STN and the GPi/SNr are 
pathological hallmarks of PD. However, it appears that the overactivity of the STN was 
not caused by disinhibition by GPe via the indirect pathway. Rather, STN hyperactivity 
may be caused either by cortex or by SNc. The STN is now regarded as highly 
functionally significant and a major input area of the basal ganglia.
L 7.3.4 The specific neural substi-ates o f  ‘se t’ and the status o f  the cognitive
loop
The sections above have given an extensive description of the functional neuroanatomy 
of the ‘motor’ loop. The role of this loop in the generation of many of the motor 
symptoms of PD is undisputed, but two questions are left unanswered by the 
descriptions of neuroanatomy above. First, what is the neural substrate of motor ‘set’
(as defined in Section 1.4.1) as opposed to the other motor symptoms of PD? The 
second question concerns the cognitive loop. The functional anatomy of this loop is 
much less well defined than the motor loop and it has not been mentioned at all in the 
section immediately above. What evidence is there that the cognitive deficits of PD are
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dependent on dysfunction of the cognitive loop?
There is substantial evidence that the motor loop described above subserves 
deficits of motor ‘set’ as well as the other symptoms of PD. The beneficial motor 
effects of GPi lesions include alleviation of akinesia (lacono et al., 1995) which is a 
problem of movement initiation and consequently of motor set. It is clear that 
pallidotomy has its effects on the motor loop, as although it is a subcortical intervention 
it results in restoration of bloodflow to the SMA (Davis et al., 1997; Grafton et al.,
1995; Samuel et al., 1997) which is the cortical projection site of the motor loop.
Further evidence for the involvement of the motor loop in motor set was described in 
Alexander and Crutcher’s (1990) original paper. Alexander and Crutcher explicitly 
suggested that the motor loop subserved preparatoiy motor ‘set’ due to the finding of 
‘set’-related neurons in the putamen and SMA. These neurons become active with the 
onset of a signal that cues the direction of an upcoming movement. This activity persists 
until the movement is prompted by the imperative signal, and thus these neurons appear 
to be holding the future direction of the movement ‘online’ until it is initiated. Thus, 
there is evidence from PET studies of patients with PD to single-neuron studies in 
monkeys that the motor loop subserves the deficits of motor ‘set’ seen in PD.
Evidence for the involvement of the cognitive loop in the cognitive deficits of 
PD is less direct. It is clear that the cognitive loop can be dysfunctional in PD. 
Bloodflow in the DLPFC (the cortical target of the cognitive loop) has been shown to be 
reduced in PD (e.g. Jahanshahi et al., 1995). Also, pallidotomy has been shown to 
restore bloodflow to the DLPFC (Ceballos-Baumami et al., 1994; Eidelberg et al., 1996; 
Samuel et al., 1997); in order for there to be restoration of bloodflow to the DLPFC 
there must presumably have been preoperative hypometabolisni. However, the linkage 
of this cortical hypometabolisni to the cognitive deficits of PD is tenuous. Both 
Jahanshahi et al.’s (1995) study and all of the studies of pallidotomy cited above have 
showed a reduction of DLPFC bloodflow whilst patients have been performing motor 
tasks. The only study that related the function of the cognitive loop to the cognitive 
deficits of PD is that of Owen et al. (1998).
Owen et al. (1998) found consistent differences in bloodflow in the right GPi 
between patients and controls when they were performing spatial working memory and 
planning tasks. This result might appear uninformative, as both cognitive and motor 
loops pass through the GPi. However, the right GPi was ipsilateral to the side of the 
movement in Owen et al.’s (1998) tasks, ruling out the involvement of the motor loop. 
Owen et al. also found differences in caudate bloodflow between patients and controls
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when they were performing a spatial memory task, which also strongly implicates the 
cognitive loop. Although Owen et al.’s study is only preliminary and did not find 
differences in DLPFC bloodflow between patients and controls, the results of this study 
provide direct evidence of cognitive loop involvement in the cognitive deficits of PD 
that confirms the suggestive evidence cited in Section 1.7.1.
1.7.3.5 Surgical treatment fo r  PD 
In previous sections, allusions have been made to surgical treatment of PD by the 
creation of lesions in GPi (‘pallidotomy’). This is not currently a common treatment for 
PD. Pallidotomy was widely used before the introduction of levodopa, with surgeons 
placing lesions in the anterodorsal and ventrolateral pallidum (lacono et al., 1995). 
However, the results of these procedures were variable, and when levodopa became 
available in the 1960s, pallidotomy was largely discontinued. Pallidotomy was 
reintroduced by a group of Swedish neurosurgeons in the late 1980s (Laitineii et al., 
1992). At the time, GPi hyperactivity had just been reported in parkinsonian monkeys, 
and Laitinen et al. (1992) noted that abolition of this hyperactivity could have been the 
source of the clinical efficacy of pallidotomy. Thus, Laitinen et al. carried out 
pallidotomies that were aimed at the ventrolateral GPi on the basis of evidence from 
functional neuroanatomy in monkeys, using stereotaxic procedures guided by CT 
imaging. Initial reports of the effectiveness of this procedure were highly optimistic - 
Laitinen et al. (1992) claimed that pallidotomy could ‘abolish all parkinsonian 
symptoms’ (p. 14). The current consensus on the effectiveness of pallidotomy is more 
modest. Most investigators accept that pallidotomy is highly effective at controlling 
levodopa-induced dyskinesias, but that its effect on the negative symptoms of PD (e.g. 
bradykiiiesia) are less strong and are inconsistent (Favre et al., 1996; Samuel et al., 
1998). Pallidotomy is currently still regarded as an experimental treatment. A number 
of studies have been published that assess the consequences of pallidotomy for motor 
function (e.g. Baron et al., 1996; Dogali et al., 1995), but the cognitive consequences of 
this ablative technique are less well understood. Section 6.0 reviews the literature to 
date that describes the cognitive consequences of pallidotomy, and also describes a 
followup study of two patients undergoing this technique.
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2.1 Introduction
Patients suffering from Parkinson’s disease show a deficit in the performance of 
the Wisconsin Card-Sorting Test (WCST, Grant and Berg 1948 - see Section 1.6.2). A 
deficit on the WCST is usually regarded as evidence of frontal lobe dysfunction 
(Milner, 1963), but the poor performance of patients with Parkinson’s disease does not 
always resemble that of patients with frontal lobe lesions. Frontal lobe damage leads to 
gross deficits in the performance of the test, characterised particularly by high numbers 
of perseverative errors and achievement of fewer categories than controls (Milner,
1963). The deficits of patients with PD are consistent but usually less severe (Brown 
and Marsden, 1990), and some studies have even shown normal levels of category 
achievement (see Section 1.6.2) and no increase in perseverative errors (Bowen et al., 
1975; Cooper et al., 1991; Lees and Smith, 1983).
The processes that underlie successful performance of the WCST are poorly 
understood. It is thought to test “attentional set-shifting”, the ability to stop attending 
and responding to one perceptual dimension and acquire a response to a new one. As 
described in Section 1.6.4, Roberts et a l  (1988) have developed an attentional set- 
shifting paradigm that is designed specifically to dissociate the different cognitive 
requirements of the WCST, in a sophisticated, multi-stage test. Basic discrimination and 
reversal learning ability are tested initially, followed by the introduction of compound 
stimuli created from more than one dimension (as are WCST cards) and intra- and 
extradimensional shifts. Intradimensional shifts (ID shifts) require subjects to acquire a 
response to a novel exemplar of a previously correct dimension. Extradimensional shifts 
(ED shifts) resemble the rule shift of the WCST; subjects are required to cease 
attending to the previously correct dimension and to respond to a dimension that was 
previously irrelevant. Patients with PD show impaired ED shift performance on Roberts 
et a l ’s test, in the presence of spared ID shift performance (Downes et al., 1989; Lange 
et al., 1992; Owen et al., 1992). This pattern of results is also seen in patients with 
frontal lobe lesions (Owen et al., 1991).
The parkinsonian ED shift impairment does not appear to be due to 
perseverating in a response to the last correct dimension. Downes et al. (1989) found 
that measures of lose-stay behaviour (i.e. perseverating on the previously relevant 
dimension) after an ED shift did not differ between patients and controls. An alternative 
explanation is that patients were failing due to a tendency to ignore a previously 
irrelevant dimension, which, after the shift, became relevant. Subjects that failed the ED
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shift reported generation of a number of elaborate hypotheses about the correct response 
after the shift, but failed to consider the previously irrelevant dimension as an option.
The difficulty in making the shift might be due to Teamed irrelevance’, which 
is defined in the animal learning literature as retardation of conditioning to a stimulus 
that has previously been experienced as uncorrelated with reward (Mackintosh, 1983).
It is intuitively plausible that patients with Parkinson’s disease suffer from enhanced 
learned irrelevance, as it is closely related to latent inhibition (the slowing of 
conditioning to a preexposed stimulus) which is known to be increased by dopamine 
antagonists such as haloperidol (Feldon and Weiner, 1991; Williams et al., 1994).
Owen et al. (1993 b) formally tested the role of perseveration and learned 
irrelevance in the ED shift deficit using two modified versions of Roberts et al.’s (1988) 
ED shift. The ‘perseveration’ shift required subjects to switch their response to a novel 
dimension whilst the previously relevant dimension became irrelevant. Learned 
irrelevance cannot affect the learning of this shift (the old irrelevant dimension is 
replaced by the novel dimension) and therefore poor performance would indicate a 
perseverative deficit. The converse of this is a shift (‘learned irrelevance’) in which the 
previously relevant dimension is replaced by a novel one (so preventing perseveration), 
and subjects must acquire a response to the previously irrelevant dimension. 
Enhancement of learned irrelevance would retard the acquisition of this shift. Downes 
et al.’s (1989) conjectures were confirmed by Owen et al. (1993b). Medicated patients 
with Parkinson’s disease showed a deficit on the ‘learned irrelevance’ shift, but not on 
the ‘perseveration’ shift. Medication appeared to have the effect of reducing 
perseveration, as unmedicated patients showed an additional perseverative deficit. By 
contrast perseveration was pronounced amongst a group of patients with frontal lobe 
lesions, who showed no learned irrelevance deficit. This pattern of results may explain 
why WCST deficits are a consequence of both Parkinson’s disease and frontal lobe 
damage, but increases in perseverative errors are not always seen in patients with 
Parkinson’s disease.
Van Spaendonck et al. (1995) followed up Owen et al.’s (1993b) results, 
reasoning that increased learned irrelevance should cause difficulties in the rule-shifting 
phase of a card-sorting test, but not in the initial rule-acquisition phase; in the 
acquisition phase, the relevant dimension has not been previously exposed as irrelevant. 
However, patients with Parkinson’s disease showed a deficit in the first rule-shift, but 
not the second. The salient dimension after the second shift had been preexposed as 
irrelevant for longer than its counterpart in the first shift, so exaggerated learned
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irrelevance should have caused a greater deficit in the second shift. Van Spaendonck et 
al. concluded that increased learned irrelevance is not the source of the parkinsonian 
card-sorting deficit, and suggested that a “reduced self-generation of problem-solving 
strategies” caused the deficit found in their study. This form of deficit has frequently 
been postulated in Parkinson’s disease (Taylor and Saint-Cyr, 1995), but does not 
explain why there should be a learned irrelevance deficit but no perseverative deficit in 
Owen et al.’s (1993b) study; their perseveration shift does not appear to require less 
self-generation of strategies than the learned irrelevance shift.
Owen et al.’s (1993b) hypothesis of a parkinsonian enhancement of learned 
irrelevance remains attractive due to its specificity and the ease with which it can be 
tested. Previous explanations of the parkinsonian deficit in attentional set-shifting have 
been highly general, and have attempted to account for performance on a wide range of 
cognitive tasks. Cools et al. (1984) proposed that patients have a general deficit in 
“shifting aptitude” that affects both cognitive and motor domains. Flowers and 
Robertson (1985) suggested that patients have a problem with maintenance of set, 
resulting in errors across all phases of a test rather than exclusively the shifting phases. 
Two theories suggest that the source of the attentional set-shifting deficit lies 
specifically in dysfunctional attentional mechanisms. Brown and Marsden (1990) have 
formulated one of the most ambitious and general theories to date, suggesting that 
patients have depleted attentional resources, and as a result are abnormally dependent 
on external cues to aid their performance. ED shifts are harder than ID shifts for healthy 
controls; the parkinsonian ED shifting deficit could be due to the extra attentional 
demands of ED shifting exceeding the limited processing resources available to 
patients. Maddox et al. (1996) have found evidence for a more specific parkinsonian 
deficit in visual selective attention. A proportion of the patients in their study could not 
optimally attend to one perceptual dimension in the presence of a similar, irrelevant 
dimension. Such an attentional deficit would certainly cause problems in the 
performance of an attentional set-shifting task.
The hypothesis of an enhancement of learned irrelevance contrasts with the 
theories above. It deals with a much more specific cognitive process which has been 
well-defined in experimental psychology research. Learned irrelevance is a widely- 
studied mechanism in the literature on animal learning (Mackintosh, 1983), where It 
applies to a discrete stimulus, and learned irrelevance to a perceptual dimension has 
been verified as playing a role in ED shifting in humans (Whitney and White, 1993). 
The purpose of this study is to provide a strong test for the hypothesis that there is a
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parkinsonian enhancement of learned irrelevance but not perseveration. To do this, a 
replication of Owen et al.’s (1993) study was undertaken, with the addition of two 
conditions in which an enhancement of learned irrelevance or perseveration should 
improve performance. Additionally, preexposure to the relevant and irrelevant 
dimensions is equalised for patient and control groups. Animal studies have shown that 
the strength of learned irrelevance is dependent upon the amount of experience of the 
irrelevant stimulus (Bennett et al., 1995a). A patient deficit in the early stages of Owen 
et al.’s (1993b) study (such as on simple discrimination or reversals) could lead to 
increased preexposure to either or both dimensions, enhancing learned irrelevance or 
perseveration in the absence of abnormal attentional mechanisms. A decision time 
measure is also included to provide a measure that is possibly more sensitive than errors 
to criterion, and less prone to ceiling effects; in Owen et al.’s Teamed irrelevance’ 
condition, controls were performing almost optimally in terms of errors to criterion (the 
shift could be solved using perfect hypothesis testing in a maximum of two errors, and 
controls recorded an average of 2.8).
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2.2 Method
2.2.1 Subjects
2.2.1.1 Patients with Parkinson’s disease
Ten patients took part in the study. All patients were outpatients at Dundee Royal 
Infirmary, and were diagnosed as having idiopathic PD in the absence of dementia by a 
consultant neurologist (Dr. Richard C. Roberts, University of Dundee). All patients 
showed a strong clinical response to levodopa, and none had a history of any 
neurological disorder other than PD or any neurosurgical intervention. Disease severity 
varied between Hoehn-Yahr stages I and III, with an average of 2.25 (Hoehn and Yahr,
1967). All patients were taking levodopa, and additionally seven were taking benzhexol, 
four were taking dopamine agonists (bromocriptine/ropinirole) and two selegiline. 
Neuropsychological data for the patients are contained in Table 2.1 (National Adult 
Reading Test (NART, Nelson 1982), Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE, Folstein 
et al., 1975), and Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS, Yesavage et al., 1982). MMSE and 
GDS scores were not available for two patients.
2.2.1.2 Control subjects
Twelve controls were tested, having been recruited from the St. Andrews branch of the 
Royal British Legion and by advertisement. None had a history of neurological 
disorder, and none were taking drugs known to affect CNS function. Controls did not 
differ significantly from patients in age orNART-estimated premorbid verbal IQ. 
Patients reported significantly more affective disturbance than controls on the GDS, and 
scored significantly lower on the MMSE than controls (see Table 2.1 for means). All 
subjects gave informed consent before taking part in tlie study.
50
Patients Controls
_ _  65.8 (2.5) 68J (2.3)
MMSE 27.6(0.8) 29.8(0.1)
GDS 8.9 (2.0) 3.6 (1.1)
NART  109.1(3.3) 115.7 (2.5)
Hoehn-Yahr stage 2.25 (0.2)
Maie : Female 7 :3  10: 2
Handed - R : L 9 : 1  10 : 2
Table 2.1: Subject characteristics fo r patients and conti^ols. Figures in parentheses are 
standard errors.
2.2.2 Materials and procedure
Testing took place in a quiet office, either in Dundee Royal Infirmary or in the 
School of Psychology at St. Andrews. The test program was run on a portable computer 
(Datalux databrick), using a touchscreen (MicroTouch TruePoint) to record responses. 
Subjects were introduced to the touch screen and the basic format of the test procedure 
using a practice program. This was a simple two-choice discrimination, in which 
subjects were required to deduce which shape (either a circle or a cross) was ‘correct’, 
using the feedback that they were given after each response.
A trial was initiated by the subject holding down the space bar, and a response 
was registered when the subject touched one of the two boxes containing stimuli on the 
screen. Subjects used their preferred hand. When the space bar was pressed, a variable 
delay was initiated (300, 500,700, or 900 ms), and subsequently one stimulus appeared 
on the left and one on the right of the screen. Subjects were required to decide which 
stimulus was correct, and to release the space bar and reach out and touch the correct 
stimulus. Response time was defined as the time between appearance of the stimulus 
and release of the space bar. As soon as the space bar was released, the stimuli 
disappeared; this ensured that subjects did not make their decision after releasing the 
space bar (a problem in previous studies - Zimmermann et al., 1992). After the subject 
touched a box on the screen, both boxes immediately disappeared and a message 
appeared in the centre of the screen saying “Correct”, followed by a tick, or “Wrong”, 
followed by a cross. Movement time was defined as the latency between releasing the 
key and touching the screen. The practice program terminated after thirty trials.
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The format described above for the practice program was also used for the test 
program. The principal differences were that complex, compound stimuli were used and 
subjects were required to deduce the rule that defined which stimulus was correct. Also, 
the stimuli changed periodically (a ‘shift’ - see below), and this was usually 
accompanied by a change in rule. The test program was initiated with the following 
instructions:
“Hold down the key and you will see two shapes [experimenter demonstrates]. There is 
a rule that tells you which one is correct. The rule will be something like “always the 
black one is correct” or “always the triangle is correct”. There will be a lot of different 
shapes throughout the test - some of them will have spots or stripes, or there may be 
more than one shape, perhaps of different colours - but there is always one simple rule 
that tells you which one is correct, and you have to work this out. As before in the 
practice program, you will be guessing for the first couple of tries. Eveiy so often, the 
shapes will change, and this may be followed by a shift in the rule. You will then have 
to work out the new rule. Also, the computer will sometimes tell you how you are doing 
- for example, it will say “well done, you’ve got the rule”, or “bad luck, the rule is in 
fact...” . This doesn’t mean that there’s been a shift in the rule, it’s just to help you 
along. You can start now. Go at your own pace, and if you feel tired, take a rest.”
After the subject had performed 30 trials, their performance was analysed 
online by the computer. If  they had achieved a criterion of eight or more out of the last 
ten trials correct, a message appeared on the screen congratulating them and confirming 
that they had guessed the correct rule. I f  they had scored less than eight out of the 
previous ten correct, a message appeared that explicitly informed them of the correct 
rule. This criterion was chosen to reflect the fact that subjects might have learned the 
rule, and yet still make isolated mistakes. Between eight and twelve trials later, a 
similar criterion was applied, and if the subjects were above criterion, a shift occurred. 
Using this procedure, we hoped to equalise exposure to the dimensions, as most 
subjects should shift after 30 + 8-12 trials. Explicitly informing subjects of the correct 
rule also ensured that they were responding stably to the correct rule before the 
subsequent shift. If subjects scored below eight out of ten when the criterion was 
checked a second time, another message appeared and informed them of the correct 
exemplar, and another eight to twelve trials elapsed. If  they had reached criterion at this 
point, a shift occurred, otherwise that block of the test terminated.
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2.2.3 Stimuli and types o f  shift
The presence of a single feature in one of the two stimuli presented defined it as 
correct, and this was the ‘rule’ that the subjects were required to learn. The stimuli were 
made from two ‘dimensions’, and a pair of stimuli always differed from each other on 
both dimensions; the dimensions used were ‘shape’, ‘colour’, ‘pattern’, and ‘number’. 
For example, if stimuli were created from the dimensions shape and colour, two 
possible stimulus pairs would be red square/green circle, or green square/red circle. The 
rule in this case could be “always touch the red [or green] stimulus, irrespective of its 
shape”, or “always touch the circle [or square], irrespective of its colour”. The 
particular examples of a dimension that were used to make up a stimulus were referred 
to as ‘ exemplars’. For example, red and green are exemplars of the dimension ‘colour’. 
The dimension from which the correct feature was taken was referred to as the 
‘relevant’ dimension, and the dimension that was uncorrelated with reward was called 
the ‘irrelevant’ dimension.
Stimuli changed when a shift occurred. Six different types of shift were used 
(see below and Table 2.2) and a ‘total change’ design (Slamecka, 1968) was used in all 
but one case (‘cued nonshift’, see below). In a total change design, if a dimension is 
present both before and after a shift, the individual examples of that dimension change. 
For example, if the dimension ‘colour’ was represented by red and green before a shift, 
these examples would be replaced by two other colours, such as blue and yellow, after 
the shift.
All shifts are described below, and represented graphically in Table 2.2. There 
were two pairs o f ‘deficit’ and ‘improvement’ shifts. If  patients had shown enhanced 
learned irrelevance, they should have generated more errors than controls on the learned 
irrelevance shift (deficit), and fewer errors on the learned irrelevance PLUS shift 
(improvement). Similarly, increased perseveration by patients should have resulted in a 
deficit on the perseveration shift, and an improvement on the perseveration PLUS shift. 
The intradimensional, learned irrelevance and perseveration shifts are all structurally 
identical to those used by Owen et al. (1993b).
Inti^adimensional shift (ID):
In this shift, the same dimensions were relevant and irrelevant before and after the shift. 
As a consequence, subjects did not have to switch their attention to a different 
dimension after the shift. The only requirement was to acquire a response to a new 
exemplar of the relevant dimension. Although patients at various stages of PD have 
shown variable ID shift performance in past studies, the patient groups that most closely
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resemble the patients in this study (medicated patients with mild PD) have been found 
to be unimpaired in ID shift performance (Downes et al., 1989; Owen et al., 1992, 
1993b).
Learned irrelevance (LI)
After this shift, the previously irrelevant dimension became relevant, and as a 
consequence subjects were required to acquire a response to a dimension that they had 
previously been ignoring. If  subjects showed an enhanced tendency to ignore the 
previously irrelevant dimension (that is, enhanced learned irrelevance), this would have 
slowed the acquisition of the new rule, and caused errors. The dimension that had been 
relevant before the shift disappeared, and a novel irrelevant dimension was introduced. 
Any enhanced tendency to attend to the previously relevant dimension (that is, 
perseveration) could not affect the performance of this shift, as the previously relevant 
dimension was not present after the shift.
Learned irrelevance PLUS (LI+):
After this shift, the dimension that had been irrelevant remained irrelevant. The 
previously relevant dimension was replaced with a novel relevant dimension. If 
enhanced learned irrelevance was present in patients, they would have persisted in 
ignoring the dimension that was irrelevant after the shift. As a consequence, they would 
have been more likely to sample the novel relevant dimension as they searched for the 
rule. This would have reduced the numbers of errors committed by patients.
Perseveration (P):
The previously irrelevant dimension disappeared after this shift, so learned irrelevance 
could not have affected the performance of this shift. The previously relevant dimension 
became irrelevant after the shift. If patients had shown an enhanced attentional bias to 
the previously relevant dimension, they would have persisted in searching this 
dimension for the rule after the shift. This would have resulted in the generation of 
errors. The new rule was taken from a novel relevant dimension introduced after the 
shift.
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Perseveration PLUS (P+):
This shift was similar to the ID shift, as the dimension that was relevant before the shift 
remained relevant after the shift. There was a change in the irrelevant dimension at the 
shift, however; the previously irrelevant dimension was replaced by a novel irrelevant 
dimension. Perseveration would facilitate the performance of this shift, as subjects 
would preferentially attend to the relevant dimension after the shift and would not be 
perturbed by the change of the irrelevant dimension.
Cued Nonshift (Cnon):
This was a change in stimuli that appeared to be a shift but in fact involved no change in 
rule. The structure of this change was similar to that of the P+ shift, described above. 
The previously irrelevant dimension was replaced by a novel, irrelevant dimension. The 
previously relevant dimension remained relevant, and there was no change in the 
exemplars of this dimension. The same exemplar defined the correct rule after the 
change. Thus, the appearance of the stimuli changed due to the introduction of a new 
irrelevant dimension, but the rule remained the same. Previous studies have shown 
patients with PD to be more distractible than controls (Sharpe, 1990), and also more 
likely to make errors when a simple stimulus becomes compound even though the rule 
does not change (C D stage, Owen et al., 1992). The Cnon shift should reveal any 
tendency to shift when the appearance of the stimuli changes.
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Leaiiied Irrelevance (LI):
Relevant Irrelevant
A  B Preshift
B Postshift
Learned Irrelevance PLUS (LI+): 
Relevant Irrelevant
A B Preshift
B Postshift
Perseveration (P):
Relevant Irrelevant
A B Preshift
A Postshift
Perseveration PLUS (P+):
Relevant Irrelevant
A B Preshift
C Postshift
Cued Nonshift (Cnon):
Relevant Irrelevant
Aj B Preshift
A i C Postshift
Intradimensional shift (ID):
Relevant Irrelevant
A B Preshift
B Postshift
Table 2.2: Each letter represents a dimension present before (top row) and after 
(bottom row) a shift. The letters in the left column o f  each shift represent the relevant 
dimension fi^om which the rule was taken. In all cases shown, the relevant dimension 
before the shift is represented by 'A \ and the irrelevant dimension before the shift is 
represented by 'B ’. As an example, in the learned irrelevance shift (LI), the previously 
irrelevant dimension (B, top line) becomes relevant after the shift (B, bottom line). The 
previously relevant dimension (A) disappears, and is replaced by a novel dimension 
(C). In the Cnon shift, ‘A j  ’ represents a specific exemplar o f  the dimension A  ’ M>hich is 
correct both before and after the shift.
A  typical testing session consisted of two separate blocks of trials. Each block 
included an ‘acquisition’ phase, where subjects learned an initial rule, and then between
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two to four shifts. There was a break between the two blocks in which other 
neuropsychological tests were completed in order to minimize the effects of fatigue. 
Subjects were tested in two separate sessions on different days.
The ID shift was always performed first, and only occurred once. All other 
shifts were performed twice over the course of the study. An example of the sequence 
of shifts experienced in a typical testing session can be seen in Table 2.3. The order of 
presentation of shifts was arranged such that when a shift was performed for a second 
time, it was preceded by a different shift to that which preceded it the first time. It was 
important to ensure that no shift was associated with a particular set of dimensions or 
rules. If  some dimensions are harder to ‘shift to’ than others, it could confound results if 
these dimensions were consistently associated with particular shifts. To avoid this, there 
were two versions of the test; half of the subjects completed the ‘normal’ version, and 
half the ‘counterbalanced’ version in which dimensions and rules were introduced in a 
different order.
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ID
Day 1
Shape Coloiu'
L I+
Shape Colour
Pattern Coloiu'
L I
Colour Number
BLOCK 2
P+ Colour Shape
P Colour Pattern
Number Colour
Cnon Number Shape
Day 2
BLOCK 3
P Colour Shape
P+
Pattern Colour'
Pattern Number
Cnon Pattern Shape
BLOCK 4
Shape Coloiu'L I
Colour Pattern
L I+
Number Pattern
Table 2.3: This table represents the sequence in W’hich one subject experienced the 
shifts. Subjects were tested over t^vo days, performing two blocks each day. The left 
column for each block represents the shifts experienced in that block. The right column 
represents an example o f  the dimensions that might be associated with each shift, with 
the relevant dimension in bold type. The experiment always started with an ID shift, but 
thereafter the order o f  presentation o f  the blocks was counterbalanced. The order o f  
shifts within the blocks remained constant. H alf o f  the subjects were in a 
‘counterbalanced’ group, in which the dimensions were introduced to each block in 
roughly the opposite order.
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2.2.4 Data analysis
2.2.4.1 Errors to criterion
The principal dependent measure was errors to criterion. Subjects were judged to have 
reached criterion when they had performed six correct responses in a row after a shift. 
As each subject performed each shift twice, their average score was used in 
calculations. The criterion differed from that used to determine progression to a shift 
(eight out of ten; see above), and was chosen as it was the criterion used by Owen et al. 
(1993b), allowing these results to be directly comparable to theirs. If subjects did not 
reach this criterion by the thirtieth trial after the shift, the total number of errors 
committed up to that point was used,
2.2.4.2 Response times
Two measures of response time were calculated. ‘Decision time’ was a measure 
intended to reflect the average ‘thinking time’ for trials before subjects learned the rule. 
This was the mean response time from the second trial after a shift (the first was always 
a guess) to the trial where subjects reached criterion. After the rule was learned, the task 
was essentially a two-choice reaction time. ‘Reaction time’ was the average response 
time for the all of the trials after criterion was reached. Post-hoc cutoffs were applied to 
the response time data; trials were only included if response time was greater than 150 
ms, less than 15000 ms, and movement time was less than 3000 ms. A movement time 
of over 3000 ms was thought to reflect a trial where the subject had failed to make his 
or her decision whilst holding down the space bar.
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2.3 Results
Predictions
If  patients with PD have increased learned irrelevance or perseveration, they should 
show an increase in errors on the ‘deficit’ shift (LI or P, respectively), and fewer errors 
on the ‘improvement’ shift (LI+, P+).
2.3.1 Deficit and improvement shifts
Visual inspection of errors to criterion for the LI and LI+ shifts revealed that patients 
did not show the predicted pattern of deficit on the LI shift and superiority on the LI+ 
shift (see Figure 2.1, Panel A). Rather, the patients show elevated errors on both shifts, 
ruling out the possibility of a parkinsonian deficit in learned irrelevance. Inspection of 
Panel B of Figure 2.1 suggests that a perseverative deficit might be present amongst 
patients, however; patients make more errors than controls on the P shift, and 
marginally fewer on the P+ shift. It is, however, unlikely that this crossover provides 
good evidence for the existence of a perseverative deficit. The P+ shift is functionally 
the converse of the P shift, but differs from it in another important fashion; the P+ shift 
is a type of ID shift, whereas the P shift is an ED shift. The P+ shift does not require 
subjects to acquire a response to a different dimension after a shift (see Table 2.2), 
whereas this is a requirement of the P shift. Given that patients with PD have previously 
been shown to have a selective ED shifting deficit with preseiwed ID shifting (Downes 
et al., 1989), it is parsimonious to assume that the pattern of results reflects this, rather 
than being illustrative of a perseverative deficit.
2.3.2 Intradimensional and exti'odimensional shifts
The pattern of results in this study is remarkably consistent when the shifts are 
categorised as either ED or ID shifts. The LI, LI+ and P shifts all require subjects to 
acquire a response to a different dimension (see Table 2.2) and therefore are examples 
of ED shifts. The ID and P+ shifts are both ID shifts (Table 2.2). (Cnon is not a shift at 
all - the rule does not change - and must be considered separately.) When the three ED 
shifts are analysed, there is a clear overall parkinsonian deficit [main effect of group 
F(1,19) = 11.38,/? < 0.005]. The shifts differ in difficulty, indicating that although all 
are ED shifts they are not homogeneous [main effect of shift F(2,38) = 3.85,/? < 0.05]. 
The pai'kinsonian deficit is consistent across all shifts, however, as can be seen from 
Figure 2.1 and the absence of a group by shift interaction [^(2,38) = 0.04,/? > 0.1]. 
When a similar analysis is performed for the two ID shifts (P+, ID) no parkinsonian 
deficit is found [main effect of group F(l,20) = 1.07,/? >0.1]. Although the P+ and ID 
shifts do not differ overall in difficulty [main effect of shift F(l,20) = 0.77,/? > 0.1]
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there is a group by shift interaction [F(l,20) = 4.37, j!? < 0.05], caused by the decrement 
in control performance on the ID shift. This was unexpected, but can be explained by 
the outlying poor performances of two control subjects (making 10 and 15 errors 
respectively; no other subject made more than 4 errors at the ID shift). The ID shift was 
only performed once, and is thus more vulnerable to isolated incidences o f bad 
performance; all other shifts were performed twice, and the two error scores were 
averaged to give each subjects’ performance.
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ED shifts ID shifts
Figure 2.1: Mean errors to criterion fo r  patients and controls across the six shifts. The 
shifts can be seen as pairs o f  'deficit’ and ‘improvement’ shifts (LI/LI+; P/P+), or as 
examples o f  ED shifts (LI, LI+, P) and ID shifts ID). Error bars represent the
standard error o f  the mean.
Performance can also be analysed in terms of "optimal’ hypothesis testing. All 
shifts in this experiment could be successfully solved whilst making only 0, 1 or 2 
errors, if a systematic deductive approach was taken (0, of course, representing a Tucky 
guess’). Table 2.4 shows the percentage of ED and ID shifts solved optimally for 
patients and controls. There is parity between groups in the performance of ID shifts, 
but a clear parkinsonian decrement in ED shift performance. Furthermore, there is a 
consistent parkinsonian deficit on all ED shifts, irrespective of which mechanism 
(learned irrelevance or perseveration) the shift had been designed to test.
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PD Control
ED shifts 45.3 77.1
ID shifts 79.3 83.3
Table 2.4: Numbers represent the percentage o f  ID and ED shifts solved in 0, I  or 2 
errors by patients and controls. Solving a shift in under 3 errors was thought to 
represent optimal hypothesis testing.
2.3.3 Spontaneous shifting and loss o f  set
Subjects from both groups occasionally made errors after reaching criterion, indicating 
that they had Tost set’. Mean errors after criterion per block of testing was calculated 
for each subject; patients with PD made more errors after criterion than controls [/(20) = 
3.37, p  < 0.01]. Patients with PD did not make any more errors on the Cnon shift than 
controls [^(20) = 0.80,;? > 0.5]. Thus, a change in the appearance of the stimuli did not 
perturb the patients’ performance any more than that of controls.
2.3.4 Response times
Performance did not differ significantly between the six shifts for either decision or 
reaction time, and there were no main effects of group or interactions for either measure 
[all ;? > 0.1]. The absence of a parkinsonian deficit on any of the response time 
measures was surprising. In fact, the PD group was on average 130ms slower than 
controls at the “reaction time” stage of the task but this difference did not reach 
significance.
2.3.5 Movement Times
Although no parkinsonian deficit was found on any response time measure, patients 
showed significantly slower movement times than controls [^(20) = 2.91,/? < 0.01].
2.3.6 Correlational analysis
An association has previously been found between GDS score and the difference 
between ID and ED errors on a similar task (Downes et al., 1989). In order to test for 
such an association in these data, the procedure used in Downes et al.’s (1989) study 
was replicated. Mean ID and ED shift error scores were calculated for each subject, and 
the difference between the two was entered into a Spearman’s correlational analysis 
with the variables age, NART, GDS and MMSE. The ID-ED difference did not
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correlate significantly with any of the demographic or neuropsychological variables (all 
p >  0.05).
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2.3 Discussion
This study set out to provide a strong test for the hypothesis that patients with 
PD might have exaggerated learned irrelevance or perseveration. An enhancement of 
either learned irrelevance or perseveration in patients should have produced a 
distinctive pattern of results; namely, deficits on the LI and P shifts, and improvements 
on the LI+ and P+ shifts, respectively. The results did not fit either predicted pattern. 
Instead, patients with PD showed a clear deficit on those shifts that demanded 
acquisition of a response to a different perceptual dimension (ED shifts). Patients’ 
performance was spared on shifts that did not require a shift in response to a new 
dimension (ID shifts). There appeal's to be a global ED shift deficit amongst patients 
with PD that is unrelated to the mechanism (learned irrelevance or perseveration) that 
each shift was designed to test. Patients also made more errors after criterion, indicating 
that they Tost set’ more frequently than controls. Distractibility or a tendency to 
spontaneously shift do not appear to account for this result, as patients showed no 
tendency to switch rule when the appearance of the stimuli changed in the manner of a 
shift in rule.
These results have clear implications for Owen et al.’s (1993b) claims of 
enhanced learned irrelevance in medicated patients with PD. If  increased learned 
irrelevance causes a deficit on the LI shift, it should cause an improvement on the LI+ 
shift; in fact, patients showed greater errors on both shifts. It can be concluded that 
enhanced learned irrelevance, as indexed by the LI shift, is not present in medicated 
patients with PD. A similarly strong conclusion cannot be drawn about a perseverative 
deficit. This is because the P and P+ shifts are not absolutely comparable, as the P shift 
is an ED shift, whereas the P+ shift is an ID shift. The increase in errors on the P, but 
not P+, shift could be taken as evidence of a perseverative deficit, but is better 
accounted for in terms of the well-established selective parkinsonian ED-shifting 
deficit.
The conclusion that must be drawn is that there is a global ED-shifting deficit in 
patients with PD. This is a straightforward extension of the past literature. Furthermore, 
the present results indicate that an ED-shifting impairment can arise from a mechanism 
that is not learned irrelevance or perseveration. There are some discrepancies between 
the results of this study and that of Owen et al. (1993b). Although the patients in this 
study were all medicated, nevertheless their performance resembled that of Owen et 
al.’s non-raedicated PD group in showing a deficit at both LI and P shifts. This study 
failed to replicate Owen et al.’s finding of normal P shift performance in medicated
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patients with PD. This discrepancy could be explained if the patients in this study had 
been experiencing fluctuations in their response to medication; if they were 
experiencing an 'o f f  period at the time of testing, it might explain why their results 
resemble those of non-medicated patients. However, the patients in this study were all 
well-stabilised on their medication, and they were all tested whilst ‘on’. Fluctuations in 
response to medication become more common with increasing severity o f PD. As the 
patients in this study and Owen et al.’s medicated group did not differ substantially in 
disease severity (mean Hoehn-Yahr stage of 2.25 vs. 2.65 respectively), it is unlikely 
that they differ in their response to medication. A difference in experimental design 
between the two studies is most likely to account for the difference in results.
There were also differences in overall numbers of errors between this study and 
that of Owen et al. (1993b), This is undoubtedly due differences in the intrinsic 
‘difficulty’ of the stimuli used in the two studies. However, in addition, there were 
differences in relative difficulty for the P and LI shifts in our study and that of Owen et 
al.. The LI and P shifts are structurally identical across the two studies, yet errors to 
criterion show that controls found the P shift harder than LI in Owen et al.’s study, 
making nearly three times as many errors on the P shift than on the LI shift. In the 
present study, we find the opposite - controls make twice as many errors on the LI shift 
than on the P shift. The control groups from the two studies are comparable in terms of 
age and N ART-estimated verbal IQ. The relative difficulty of the P and LI shifts also 
differs for patients. In Owen et al.’s study, the medicated PD group made a similar 
number of errors at the LI and P shifts, whereas in this study the pattern of patients’ 
performance resembles controls - more errors on the LI shift than on the P shift. It is 
possible that the methodological differences that account for these differences in 
relative difficulty may also explain the failure to replicate normal performance on the P 
shift for patients with PD in this study.
This study differs methodologically from that of Owen et al. (1993b) in three 
significant ways. First, the studies differed in the way in which individual shifts were 
associated with particular dimensions. It is clearly important to avoid associating any 
given shift with the same dimensions in every subject, as it is easier to acquire a 
response to some dimensions than to others. Owen et al. avoided this problem by using 
unique dimensions for the LI and P shifts, and counterbalancing the assignment of 
dimensions to shifts. Subjects encountered entirely different dimensions at the P and LI 
shift, thus subjects never experienced a dimension twice. Counterbalancing was also 
used in this study, although it consisted of using the same dimensions in a different
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order (thus associated with different shifts) rather than using completely different 
dimensions. In the present study, there were also the additional shifts (P+, LI+, Cnon). 
Thus, to enable the repeated measures design, dimensions had to be used more than 
once. Therefore, dimensions were used repeatedly, but subjects were each tested on 
each shift twice, with the pre/post-shift dimensions never identical. This further 
diminished the association between a specific shift and particular dimensions.
Secondly, preexposure to the various dimensions before a shift was not 
controlled for in Owen et al.’s (1993b) study. All subjects received more exposure to 
the dimension that was relevant before the ED shift than its irrelevant counterpart. The 
extra preexposure to the relevant dimension might affect the LI and P shifts 
differentially, and may account for the elevated errors in the P shift in Owen et al.’s 
controls. Preexposure to stimulus dimensions was equalised across groups and shifts in 
this study.
Finally, Owen et al.’s (1993b) dependent measure (EDen-ors) differs from that 
used in this study. They count errors to a criterion of six consecutive trials correct, as in 
this study, but also add the errors committed at the subsequent reversal stage (EDR) to 
create their ‘EDeixors’ nieasure. Thus, it is impossible to derive the number of errors 
committed at the ED shift from the scores given. With hindsight, this combination of 
scores is inadvisable, as the performance of ED shifts and reversals is likely to have 
different neural substrates (Dias et al., 1996). It is unfortunately impossible to point to 
any single one of the above methodological differences as a clear explanation for this 
study’s failure to replicate the normal performance found on the P shift in Owen et al.’s 
(1993 b) medicated PD group. The performance of the patients in this study is more 
similar to that of Owen et al.’s non-medicated PD group, who show a clear deficit at 
both the P and LI shifts.
This study set out to test one hypothesis about the source o f the ED-shifting 
deficit in patients with PD. The hypothesis that learned irrelevance is enhanced in 
medicated patients with PD has not been supported. Instead, the presence of a global 
ED-shifting deficit in patients with PD has been replicated and is shown here to extend 
to a number of new variants of the classical ED shift. The cause of the ED-shifting 
deficit remains unclear, however, and hypotheses other than that of learned irrelevance 
must be considered as potential explanations.
There is no global deficit of ‘shifting aptitude’, as proposed by Cools et ai. 
(1984), in the patients studied in this experiment. Both ID and ED shifts required 
subjects to shift response to a new rule, but no ID shifting deficit is seen in patients in
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this study. The patients in this study also display no general problems of increased 
distractibility, as they show no tendency to shift spontaneously when the stimuli 
changed in the manner of a shift (Cnon shift). Flowers and Robertson (1985) suggested 
that patients with PD suffer from a problem in the maintenance of set that is not caused 
solely by distractibility or perseveration. This general description of the parkinsonian 
deficit fits the results of this study well. Errors after criterion are elevated, indicating a 
loss of set that would be ameliorated by simple attentional perseveration. Flowers and 
Robertsons’ proposals effectively describe some of the results of this study, but they 
give no insight into the processes underlying either loss of set or the ED-shifting deficit 
in patients with PD. In contrast, Brown and Marsden (1990) refer to specific 
psychological models in their theory of attentional resource depletion (central executive 
- Baddeley, 1986; supervisory attentional system - Norman and Shallice, 1980). Their 
theory can predict a selective cognitive deficit that affects ED shifting but spares ID 
shifting by suggesting that ED shifts ‘overload’ the limited attentional resources 
available to patients in a way that ID shifts do not. Unfortunately, as Brown and 
Marsden (1990) have noted, there is no way of predicting in advance what will overload 
resources. Thus, the suggestion that ED shifts exceed available resources is post hoc, 
which weakens the explanatory power of Brown and Marsden’s theory. Also, Brown 
and Marsden would not predict increased errors after criterion, in patients, as this 
‘reaction time’ phase of the test is presumably not very attentionally demanding.
Most recently, Maddox et al. (1996) have identified a parkinsonian deficit in 
visual selective attention that would certainly alter shifting tasks that make use of two 
perceptual dimensions. Maddox et al. demonstrated that their patients could attend to a 
single dimension and combine information from two dimensions as effectively as 
controls. Patients with PD no longer performed optimally when required to attend 
selectively to one dimension whilst ignoring an irrelevant dimension. Whilst this deficit 
is a plausible cause of a number of problems in an attentional set-shifting task, it cannot 
account for a selective ED shifting deficit in the presence of spared ID shifting. The 
analysis of the nature of ED and ID shifts below will explain why this is the case, as 
well as ruling out some potential explanations of the parkinsonian ED-shifting deficit as 
impossible.
ED and ID shifts make identical demands on subjects when considered in terms 
of pure hypothesis testing. After both types of shift, two new exemplars of both 
dimensions are present, and one of these must define the new rule. The subject must 
deduce which one of the four features defines the stimulus as correct. However, if
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subjects are preferentially attending to one dimension before and immediately after a 
shift, this will have opposing effects on the ED and ID shifts. Subjects will first 
consider the previously relevant dimension as a possible source of the new rule. This 
will speed ID shifting, as the new rule will indeed be chosen from the previously 
relevant dimension. If  subjects are performing an ED shift, however, their attentional 
bias towards the previously relevant dimension will work against them, as the 
dimension they consider first has become irrelevant after the shift. Thus, the finding that 
humans or animals find ED shifts harder than ID shifts has always been used as 
evidence of the presence of selective attention (Slamecka, 1968). In patients with PD, 
the ID-ED difference is exaggerated. This suggests that the problem experienced by 
patients with PD is one of exaggerated selective attention, not a global failure of 
selective attention. The deficit found by Maddox et al. (1996) would elevate errors at 
both ED and ID shifts, and after criterion. Similarly, a basic perceptual problem or 
‘reduced self-generation of problem-solving strategies’ (Van Spaendonck et al., 1995) 
would exaggerate errors at both ED and ID shifts. An explanation for the selective ED 
shifting deficit must postulate an inflexible exaggeration of selective attention rather 
than a global breakdown of selective attention. One of the merits of Owen et al.’s 
(1993b) proposed mechanisms of learned irrelevance and perseveration is that they are 
exaggerations of attention and can therefore account for a selective ED-shifting deficit.
The existence of elevated errors after criterion appears inconsistent with the 
presence of exaggerated selective attention; an increased attentional bias towards the 
relevant dimension should reduce errors after criterion rather than increase them. 
Flowers and Robertson (1985) offer a possible explanation for this contradiction, 
suggesting that old response sets ‘intrude’ over new ones in patients with PD. It is 
possible that errors after criterion represent the intrusion of an excessively strong 
attentional bias that was present before the shift. This proposal is easy to test; there 
should be more errors to and after criterion at an ED shift than at an ID shift amongst 
patients with PD. Intrusions of the set present before the shift would cause errors after 
criterion at an ED shift due to an attentional switch to the irrelevant (previously 
relevant) dimension. Such a switch would not generate errors after an ID shift, as the 
same dimension is relevant before and after the shift. Also, errors after criterion should 
not be elevated after an LI shift. After such a shift, the previously relevant dimension is 
no longer present, so the set relating to attention to that dimension cannot interfere with 
discrimination learning. Unfortunately, there is insufficient data in this study to test 
these hypotheses.
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This study allows some conclusions to be drawn about the nature of the 
parkinsonian ED-shifting deficit, but the exact cause of this problem remains unclear. 
ED-shifting deficits have been found in patients with schizophrenia (Elliott et al., 1995), 
Huntington’s disease (Lange et al., 1995) and after frontal lobe damage in humans and 
monkeys (Dias et al., 1996; Owen et al, 1991, 1993b). This study partially replicates 
Owen et al.’s (1993b) finding of a dissociation between the performance of patients 
with Parkinson’s disease and those with frontal lobe damage. We found increased errors 
on the LI shift in patients with Parkinson’s disease, which is in marked contrast to the 
normal LI shift performance seen in patients with frontal lobe damage (Owen et al., 
1993). This finding provides further evidence for the existence of dissociable 
mechanisms underlying ED-shift performance, and it is clinically important to 
understand these mechanisms. Learned irrelevance could cause an ED-shifting deficit 
(Whitney and White, 1993), but a deficit on the LI shift is not necessarily evidence for 
enhanced learned irrelevance. The absence of an improvement on the LI+ shift in this 
study indicates that the LI shift deficit in patients with PD cannot be due to enhanced 
learned irrelevance.
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3.1.1 Introduction
Humans and some other animals are able to attend selectively to specific aspects of 
compound visual stimuli. This ability is demonstrated when a subject is required to 
respond to one element of a complex stimulus and ignore irrelevant aspects of that 
stimulus. Studies have repeatedly shown that humans can both attend to one aspect, or 
‘dimension’, of a stimulus and also shift their attention between dimensions; that is, 
they can stop responding to one dimension and acquire a response to a dimension that 
had previously been irrelevant and unattended. Such a shift is known as an 
extradimensional (ED) shift. Although performance on ED shifts has been extensively 
studied (Wolff, 1967), the mechanisms that govern selective attention to one stimulus 
dimension amongst many and the subsequent shift to another dimension are not well 
understood. Ignorance of the mechanisms underlying ED shift performance has clear 
clinical consequences, as a number of patient groups have been found to show ED 
shifting deficits. Patients with Parkinson’s disease (Downes et al., 1989), frontal lobe 
damage (Owen et al., 1991), schizophrenia (Elliot et al., 1995), Huntington’s disease 
(Lange et al., 1995) and multiple systems atrophy (Robbins et al., 1992) all fail to make 
ED shifts more often or make more errors on ED shifts than healthy controls. 
Breakdown of a single cognitive mechanism could be responsible for the deficits seen 
in all these patient groups, or different groups may fail the shift for different reasons.
Owen et al. (1993b) proposed that there are two mechanisms which are 
involved in the ability to attend selectively to one of two dimensions in an ED shifting 
task that involves two dimensions. An exaggeration of either of these mechanisms could 
cause ED-shifting deficits. The first mechanism, known as ‘perseveration’, governs the 
active maintenance of attention to the dimension that is relevant. Whilst perseveration is 
essential for the performance of a discrimination task that requires selective attention, it 
slows the successful completion of an ED shift. I f  strong perseveration is present at the 
time of the ED shift, attention will be maintained to the dimension that was relevant 
before the ED shift but becomes irrelevant after the ED shift. A primary requirement of 
successful ED shifting is that subjects must stop attending to the previously relevant 
dimension; perseveration slows this. The second mechanism proposed by Owen et al. 
(1993b), known as ‘learned irrelevance’, is the process whereby subjects actively inhibit 
attention to the irrelevant dimension. As with perseveration, this mechanism is probably 
an essential component of the simple selective attention required in a discrimination 
task, as it prevents information from the irrelevant dimension from interfering with
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responses to the relevant dimension. Thus, enhanced learned irrelevance would also 
retard ED shifting. Successful completion of an ED shift requires that subjects acquire a 
response to a dimension that was previously irrelevant; the presence of learned 
irrelevance ensures that this dimension will be unattended immediately after the ED 
shift, thus making a shift of attention to this dimension more difficult.
The mechanisms of learned irrelevance and perseveration can explain the 
maintenance of attention to a single dimension by excitatory and inhibitory attentional 
mechanisms that aie similar to those found in work on spatial attention (Posner and 
Petersen, 1990). Owen et al. (1993b) provided evidence for the existence of learned 
irrelevance and perseveration by means of a double dissociation. Two novel versions of 
the ED shift were created, that were thought to be differentially susceptible to 
disruption by increased learned irrelevance and perseveration. Patients with frontal lobe 
damage were found to have exaggerated errors only on the ‘perseveration shift’, and 
medicated patients with Parkinson’s disease showed elevated errors only on the ‘learned 
irrelevance shift’.
Subsequent research has placed Owen et al.’s (1993b) hypothesis in doubt. An 
experiment with patients with Parkinson’s disease (Study 1) showed that Owen et al. 
(1993b)’s ‘learned irrelevance shift’ may not adequately measure learned irrelevance, 
which casts doubt on the empirical evidence for the dissociation between learned 
irrelevance and perseveration. However, intuitively, it seems to be a reasonable 
hypothesis and there is some empirical support. Whitney and White (1993) used 
generalisation gradients to analyse the transfer of attention between dimensions at the 
ED shift. They concluded that learned irrelvance was the principal mechanism that 
slowed ED shifting in young adults. Also, ED-shifting tasks closely resemble some 
paradigms used to induce a phenomenon termed latent inhibition in adult humans.
Latent inhibition paradigms consist of two phases, a ‘preexposure’ phase and a ‘test’ 
phase that are equivalent to the period before and after an ED shift in a dimensional 
shifting task. At the preexposure phase, subjects’ attention is engaged by some form of 
cognitive task, known as the ‘masking’ task, that is designed to divert the subject’s 
attention away from an irrelevant stimulus that is repeatedly presented without 
consequence. This phase can be seen as equivalent to the phase before an ED shift, 
where subjects respond to a relevant dimensions and ignore an irrelevant dimension.
The ‘test’ phase of the latent inhibition paradigm is similar to an ED shift, as subjects 
are required to cease attending to the stimuli involved in the masking task and to 
acquire a response to the stimulus that had previously been irrelevant. This task is then
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compared with a condition in which the stimulus that becomes relevant at ‘test’ was not 
experienced or preexposed as irrelevant. Preexposure of a stimulus as irrelevant has 
been shown to retard acquisition of a response to this stimulus in a number of studies 
(Lubow and Gewirtz, 1995). This effect is known as latent inhibition and closely 
resembles Owen et al.’s (1993b) proposed mechanism of learned irrelevance, which 
consists of slowing of acquisition of a response to a perceptual dimension that has been 
preexposed as irrelevant. Indeed, the separation of learned irrelevance and latent 
inhibition into two separate mechanisms may be false; Bonardi and Hall (1996) have 
shown that effects attributed to learned irrelevance in rats can be accounted for in terms 
of the mechanism of learned irrelevance. The similarity of latent inhibition to learned 
irrelevance and of adult human latent inhibition paradigms to ED shifting adds face 
validity to the possibility that learned irrelevance can affect ED shifting.
Nearly all of the experimentation on ED shifting in clinical populations has 
used ‘standard’ ED shifts in which the same dimensions are present before and after the 
shift. However, Owen et al. (1993b) used novel versions of the ED shift in an attempt to 
index leai ned irrelevance and perseveration. These shifts involved introduction of a 
novel dimension after the ED shift, and Study 1 has cast doubts on the ability of these 
shifts to accurately index learned irrelevance and perseveration. Ideally, it would be 
possible to study the effects of learned irrelevance and perseveration on the ‘standard’ 
ED shift, as this would give results that would be most relevant to work with clinical 
populations. An experimental design has been developed that permits such a study, 
using a method that resembles a latent inhibition paradigm. This method permits the 
selective preexposure of either the relevant or irrelevant dimension, and allows the 
effects of this preexposure on ED-shifting performance to be studied in healthy 
subjects. As learned irrelevance and latent inhibition closely resemble each other and 
may not be different mechanisms (Bonardi and Hall 1996), preexposure of the 
irrelevant dimension should retard ED-shifting.
This preliminary study will only examine learned irrelevance, as this 
mechanism is implicated in ED-shifting by Whitney and White’s (1993) study and it 
closely resembles the well-established phenomenon of latent inhibition. Both young and 
elderly healthy subjects were tested, as unpublished data (Salzman 1993, cited in 
Lubow and Gewirtz, 1995) suggests that elderly subjects may show a greater effect of 
latent inhibition than young subjects. This study compared ‘preexposed’ (PE) with 
‘non-preexposed’ (NPE) groups in both young and elderly subjects. Care was taken to 
select levels of preexposure that would be appropriate to demonstrate an effect of
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learned irrelevance in the PE group. As no previous experiments have attempted to 
induce learned irrelevance in an ED shifting task through preexposure, there are no 
published precedents that indicate which levels of preexposure are appropriate. 
Therefore, the levels of preexposure used in this study were selected on the basis of a 
study of latent inhibition (De la Casa et al., 1993) and an older literature relating to 
‘overlearning’ in ED shifting tasks.
De la Casa et al. (1993) carried out the only study to date that has related levels 
of preexposure to latent inhibition effects in humans. They found no latent inhibition 
effect after 3 minutes of preexposure, but found a clear effect of latent inhibition after 6 
and 15 minutes of preexposure. Using De la Casa et al.’s (1993) study as a guideline, 
the PE group in this study received 200 trials (around 10 minutes) of preexposure. The 
selection of a level of preexposure group was more complex, as the level chosen had to 
account for a well-established effect of prior learning on ED shifting known as 
‘overlearning’ (Wolff, 1967). ‘Overlearning’ refers to the facilitatoiy effect of low 
levels of preexposure of both dimensions on ED shifting. Studies from the overlearning 
literature usually compare tlie ED shift performance of two groups; the first group 
encounters an ED shift immediately after learning the rule (reaching ‘criterion’) at the 
preceding discrimination phase, whereas the second group is allowed 10 or 20 ‘extra’ 
discrimination trials after reaching criterion before the ED shift occurs. The group that 
did not experience the extra ‘overlearning’ trials performs less well at the ED shift. 
Thus, there appears to be a performance deficit associated with experiencing very low 
levels of preexposure; that is, performance is poorer when no overlearning is 
experienced. It is clearly important to avoid any deficits in performance in the NPE 
group in this study, as they could cancel out deficits due to learned irrelevance in the PE 
group. Therefore, it was necessary to give subjects in the NPE group sufficient 
overlearning to ensure that they had no performance ‘deficits’ caused by excessively 
brief preexposure. Subjects in the NPE group received 40 trials (around 2 minutes) of 
preexposure. This level was designed to allow at least 20 trials of overlearning in the 
NPE group, whilst corresponding to a level of preexposure that had previously been 
shown not to induce latent inhibition (De la Casa et al.’s ‘3 minutes’ group). Any 
remaining performance differences seen between the PE and NPE groups in this study 
should be due to learned irrelevance alone and should not be minimised by excessively 
brief preexposure in the NPE group.
Previous experimental work has indicated that young healthy subjects perform 
close to ‘ceiling’ in ED shifting tasks when simple, easily discriminable stimuli are used
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- for example, squares and circles and colours such as red and green (Study 1, 
unreported data). They tend to make only one or two errors, and their response times are 
rapid. In this study, it was felt to be important to avoid ‘ceiling’ and ‘floor’ effects in 
both young and elderly subjects, as maximum sensitivity to any effect of preexposure 
was needed. It was accepted that any effect of preexposure might be small, particularly 
as there was no way of determining the amount of preexposure that would be optimal. 
Pilot testing was carried out to ensure that stimuli presented an appropriate level of 
difficulty, and a measure of response time was taken to provide a more sensitive 
measure than errors to criterion.
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3.1.2 Method
3.1.2.1 Subjects
Young subjects
Eighteen young subjects were tested, drawn from the undergraduate and postgraduate 
community at the University of St. Andrews. This group consisted of ten males and 
eight females, with a mean age of 21.2 years (range 18-31).
Elderly subjects
Eighteen elderly subjects were recruited by advertisement. Six males and twelve 
females were tested, with a mean age of 63.4 years (range 54-73). All denied a history 
of major psychiatric or neurological problems, and scored above 24 on the Mini-Mental 
State Examination (Folstein et al., 1975).
All young and elderly subjects claimed to have intact colour vision. Informed 
consent was obtained from all subjects prior to the experiment, and subjects were paid 
at a rate of £3.50 per hour. Experimental design and procedure were almost identical for 
young and elderly subjects throughout, with minor variations in stimuli and display time 
described below.
3.1.2.2 Materials and procedure
The experimental test was run on a portable computer (Datalux Databrick), and 
responses were registered by a touch screen (Microtouch Truepoint). Before starting the 
main test, subjects completed a practice program that illustrated the format of the 
experimental task and introduced the response requirements in a graded fashion. The 
final stage of the practice program was a two-choice visual discrimination task. Subjects 
were required to work out which of two shapes (a circle or a cross) was ‘correct’ on the 
basis of feedback (‘correct’ / ‘wrong’) given after each response.
The experimental program was a two-choice visual discrimination in which 
subjects were required to work out a ‘rule’ that defined which of two complex stimuli 
was correct. A stimulus was correct when a certain visual feature was present in it. This 
feature could be an aspect of the shape of the stimulus, its colour, a striped pattern on 
the stimulus or the background colour behind the stimulus. As in the practice program, 
subjects were required to use feedback to work out the rule. During the course of the 
test, the rule that defined the correct shape changed periodically. A trial was initiated 
when the subject pressed and held down the space bar of a keyboard with his or her 
preferred hand. After a delay of variable length (300, 500, 700 or 900 ms) elapsed, one 
‘box’ appeared on the left, and one on the right of the screen, each containing one
76
stimulus. The subject was required to release the space bar and to reach out and press 
one shape with his or her preferred hand. If one second elapsed before a response was 
made (two seconds for elderly subjects), the stimuli disappeared and subjects were 
required to press one of the empty boxes. As soon as a response was made, feedback 
was delivered in the form of a graphical ‘tick’ or ‘cross’ followed by the words 
‘correct!’ or ‘wrong...’ respectively. ‘Response time’ (RT) was defined as the time 
elapsed between the appearance of the stimuli on the screen and the release of the space 
bar. The time between the release of the space bar and a response on the screen was 
termed ‘movement time’ (MT).
Before starting the main test, subjects were given comprehensive instructions 
which are reproduced here in full; “This is the main program. The format is basically 
the same as the practice program that you’ve just completed. You press down the space 
bar and two shapes appear - one is right, one is wrong, and your job is to press the one 
that is correct. There is a rule telling you which shape is correct. This rule will be 
something like ‘always press the red shape’, or ‘always press the triangle’. A number of 
different rules are possible, as the shapes can differ in four ways. They can be different 
colours or different shapes, they can have different striped patterns on them, or there 
can be a different colour behind the shape. The shapes can differ from each other in 
more than one way at once, so they may look complicated. However, there is always 
one simple rule that tells you which shape is correct. Your job is to work out this rule 
and press the correct shapes.
Although I have said that the rule is simple, this does not mean that the task is 
easy. The differences between the shapes may be very subtle, and quite hard to see. For 
example, there may be a small difference in the outline of the shape, or a slight 
difference in the shading of the colour. As a consequence, I suggest that at first you hold 
down the space bar for long enough to give yourself time to look at the shapes. After a 
few trials, you will be confident that you know what the rule is, and then you can speed 
up and treat this as a reaction time task.
There are two additional factors that make this task difficult. First, the rule will 
change as you go through the task. For example, the shapes will change and you will 
realise that the old rule can no longer apply. If  this happens, I suggest that you slow 
down and give yourself time to look at the shapes, and when you are confident that you 
know the rule you can speed up again and treat it as a reaction time task. The second 
difficulty is that you only ever get about one second [“two seconds” for elderly 
subjects] to look at the shapes. That is, after the shapes have been on the screen for one
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second [“two seconds”] they will disappear. If  you have not decided which shape to 
press by this time, you will have to press one of the boxes anyway. One final point - 
there are no hidden rules. The rule always has something to do with the shapes, colour, 
stripes or background colour, although it might be hard to see. You can start the test 
now.”
3.1.2.3 Stimulus composition and types o f  shift
A pair of complex stimuli appeared on each trial, one of which was ‘correct’. These 
stimuli could differ from each other in colour, shape, superimposed pattern or 
background colour. These general visual features were known as ‘dimensions’, and 
stimuli always differed from one another on two dimensions. For example, a pair of 
stimuli might differ from one another in colour (blue or yellow) and shape (triangle or 
cross), creating two possible stimulus pairs - blue triangle / yellow cross, or yellow 
triangle / blue cross. (The stimuli used in this study were not as simple as this - see 
Section 3.1.2.5 and Figure 3.1.) The presence of a single visual feature from one of the 
two dimensions defined the stimulus as correct, and this was the ‘rule’ that subjects 
were required to work out. An example of such a rule might be ‘always press the blue 
shape’, or ‘always press the triangle’. The two instances of each dimension were known 
as ‘exemplars’; for example, ‘blue’ and ‘yellow’ were both exemplars of the dimension 
‘colour’.
The rule changed, or ‘shifted’, either four or six times in the course of the 
experiment. Two types of shift were important for this study: intradimensional (ID) 
shifts and extradimensional (ED) shifts. In both ID and ED shifts, the same dimensions 
were present before and after a shift. However, when the shift occurred, the particular 
exemplars associated with these dimensions were changed. For example, the colours 
blue and yellow might be replaced with red and green, and the shapes triangle and cross 
might change to square and circle. In an intradimensional shift, the new correct 
exemplar was chosen from the dimension that was relevant before the shift. If the 
colour ‘blue’ had been correct before the shift, the correct exemplar would be either the 
colour ‘red’ or the colour ‘green’ after the shift. In contrast, after an ED shift the new 
correct exemplar was taken from the previously irrelevant dimension. As a 
consequence, subjects were required to ignore the dimension that they had previously 
attended to (colour) and acquire a response to a new, previously irrelevant dimension 
(shape - either ‘square’ or ‘circle’).
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3.1.2.4 Design
The principal aim of this experiment was to examine the influence of preexposing the 
previously irrelevant dimension on the performance of the ED shift. Subjects were 
therefore randomised into preexposed (PE) and non-preexposed (NPE) groups in a 
between-subjects design. As ED shift performance was being compared between 
groups, the last two shifts completed by both groups were an ED shift and an ID shift.
In order to allow comparison between groups, the stimuli and rules associated with 
these two shifts were identical. However, the groups differed in their experience of 
dimensions before the ED shift. It was anticipated that subjects in the PE group would 
make more errors at the ED shift or have longer decision times than the NPE group.
Both groups completed the same number of trials before the ED shift. The NPE 
group received 160 trials of preexposure to two dimensions that were not involved in 
the ED shift, as represented in Table 3.1. This group then received 40 trials of 
preexposure to the relevant and irrelevant dimensions to allow acquisition of this 
discrimination before the ED shift (‘acquisition’ (AQ) shift. Table 3.1). In contrast, the 
PE group experienced a single dimension (‘pattern’ - Table 3.1) as irrelevant from the 
beginning of the test up until the ED shift, entailing 200 trials of preexposure. Eighty 
trials elapsed after the ED shift for both groups in order to allow acquisition of this 
comparatively difficult shift.
The effect of prior ID shifting on ED shift performance was also investigated as 
a supplementary variable. Young subjects in both PE and NPE groups were randomised 
into two groups; one group received three ID shifts whilst responding to the two 
dimensions present in the ‘preexposure’ phase (‘3ID’ group), and the other group 
received only one ID shift in this phase (‘ HD’ group). These two groups only differed 
in the number of ID shifts that they experienced; both groups performed the same 
number of trials before the ED shift.
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NON-PREEXPOSED 
Relevant Irrelevant
PREEXPOSED 
Relevant Irrelevant
1 or 3 ID shifts
Colour Background Colour Pattern
AQ shift
Colour Background Colour Pattern
ED shift
Shape Pattern Shape Pattern
ID shift
Pattern Shape P attern Shape
Pattern Shape Pattern Shape
Table 3.1: The left column o f  this table represents the shifts that were experienced by 
both groups in the order in which they were presented. The rest o f  the table depicts the 
dimensions that were experienced as relevant and irrelevant before and after these 
shifts fo r  the NPE and PE groups.
3.1.2.5 Stimulus generation and pilot testing
In past experiments, it has been shown that young subjects perform close to ‘ceiling’ 
when required to make ID and ED-style shifts with simple stimuli and unlimited display 
times (Study 1, unrepoifed data). These subjects made an average of around one error to 
criterion on all shifts, indicating that they are equally able to use optimal hypothesis 
testing to solve all types of shift. In this study, the aim was to create ID and ED shifts 
which were solvable, but on which young subjects generated errors. Display time and 
stimulus discriminability were manipulated to achieve this. The features that 
differentiated the stimuli were subtle and hard to detect when stimuli were only 
displayed briefly.
Stimuli for use with young subjects were piloted as pairs of exemplars from a 
single dimension - for example, two shapes. These pairs of exemplars were presented to 
young subjects in a two-choice visual discrimination task in which display time was 
restricted to one second. As pilot testing proceeded, exemplar pairs that were ‘too easy’ 
or ‘too hard’ were noted and adjusted accordingly. Piloting stopped when it was judged 
that most subjects could solve each discrimination within fifteen trials, yet seldom
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solved them with only one error. The finalised exemplars were combined to form the 
compound stimuli used in this study. A pair of stimuli created from the dimensions 
‘shape’ and ‘pattern’ are shown in Figure 3.1, Panel A.
Stimuli for the elderly subjects were developed from the stimuli described 
above. The exemplars developed for young subjects were altered by slightly 
exaggerating the salient difference between each pair of exemplars. Pilot testing was 
then carried out with elderly subjects in an identical fashion to that described above, but 
with a stimulus display time of two seconds. An example of compound stimuli made 
from the dimensions ‘shape’ and ‘pattern’ can be seen in Figure 3.1, Panel B.
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Figure 3.1: Representative stimulus pairs fo r  young and elderly subjects. Each pair 
differs in both shape and pattern. The salient differences are the postition o f  the 
protniberance on the top edge o f  the shape (to the left or right) and the 
angle/smoothness o f  the pattern (either towards vertical and smooth or away from  
vertical and crinkled).
3.1.2.6 Data analysis
Subjects were excluded from the analysis if they made fewer than eight correct 
responses in the ten trials before the ED shift. These individuals were excluded because 
it is meaningless to measure ‘attentional set-shifting’ unless it can be demonstrated that 
subjects have not successfully formed an attentional set before the shift.
Subjects were considered to have learned a rule, or ‘reached criterion’, when 
they had made ten correct responses in a row. In this study it was not uncommon for
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subjects to make six correct responses and subsequently ‘lose’ the rule again, therefore 
a criterion of six consecutive correct responses (as used in Study 1) was not used. Both 
‘errors to criterion’ and ‘trials to criterion’ were calculated for the ED shift. Errors to 
criterion was considered to be the principal dependent variable, and a measure of trials 
to criterion was required for Life Tables analysis (see below). Both of these measures 
were bimodally distributed, as subjects tended either to learn the rule early after a shift 
or to fail to learn it at all. Thornton et al. (1996) noted that conventional parametric or 
nonparametric analyses are inappropriate for these data, due to the fact that neither 
‘errors’ nor ‘trials’ to criterion take any account of whether or not a subject ultimately 
succeeds in learning a rule. For example, if the rule is not learned after an ED shift in 
the 80 trials available, the ‘trials to criterion’ score will be 80, despite the fact that 
criterion was never reached. To overcome this problem, Thornton et al. (1996) used a 
Cox’s Proportional Hazards Regression procedure that allowed entry of both trials to 
criterion data and a variable indicating whether or not the subject ultimately reached 
criterion. In this study, a more simple approach was used, involving the creation of Life 
Tables (SPSS for Windows v. 6.0, Norusis 1994). This allows entry of trials to criterion 
data (values between 10 and 85), and also a variable indicating whether criterion was 
eventually achieved (0 or 1), and yields a Wilcoxon (Gehan) statistic. This procedure 
was used in all of the between-group analyses in this study. Subjects who did not reach 
criterion at the ED shift were allocated trials to criterion scores of 85 to differentiate 
them from subjects who achieved criterion on the last trial of that shift (who would 
score 80).
It is possible that two subjects could require the same number of trials to solve 
an ED shift, yet one subject could have required much more ‘thinking’ time on each 
individual trial to achieve the solution. In order to account for this, ‘decision time’ was 
also used as a dependent variable. This was the mean response time for all of the trials 
completed before the subject was judged to have learned the rule. Mean response time 
was calculated from the second trial after the ED shift (the first was always a guess) 
until the trial where subjects achieved criterion. Trials were excluded in which RT was 
under 150 ms or over 5000 ms. If an MT of over 3000 ms was recorded, this was 
thought to reflect a subject’s failure to make a decision before releasing the space bar; 
such trials were also excluded.
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3.1.3 Results
3.1.3.1 Absohite levels o f  errors
Figure 3.2 depicts mean errors to criterion for the ED shift for young and elderly 
subjects. Optimum performance of the ED shift would have resulted in group mean 
error scores of 1. Alternatively, if all subjects in a group failed to acquire a shift the 
group score would have been around 40. Mean error scores for the young and elderly 
PE and NPE groups all fell between 12 and 20 errors to criterion, indicating that 
subjects’ performance should not have been affected by ‘floor’ or ‘ceiling’ effects.
3.1.3.2 Effect o f  preexpositre 
Learning to criterion
Visual inspection of Figure 3.2 indicates that there is no difference in errors to criterion 
between the PE and NPE groups in either young or elderly subjects. This was verified 
using a Life Tables analysis which revealed no effect of preexposure for either young 
(Wilcoxon (Gehan) p = 0.96) or elderly subjects (Wilcoxon (Gehan) p = 0.47). 
Preexposure did not exaggerate errors for the PE groups; indeed, the absolute error 
scores for the PE groups were lower than for the NPE groups. Survival functions were 
also plotted for these data, which represent the proportion of subjects in each group that 
had not yet learned the rule at each of the 80 trials after the ED shift (Figure 3.3). This 
allows inspection of the distribution of the trials to criterion data, and confirms that 
there was no overall difference in rate at which subjects in the PE and NPE groups 
solved the ED shift.
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Figure 3.2: Mean errors to criterion fo r  the young and elderly subjects at the ID and 
ED shifts. Error bars represent the standard error o f  the mean.
Decision times
Decision times were calculated for each subject. There was no effect of preexposure on 
decision times for either young (?(16) -  0.22,p = 0.83) or elderly (r(16) = 1.09,p  = 
0.29) subjects. However, the use of short display times in this study may have restricted 
the variability of the RT data. If subjects had not made a decision after one second (two 
seconds for elderly subjects), the stimuli disappeared and subjects could gain no further 
information by delaying their response. In practice, when subjects had not yet learned 
the rule, they tended to respond immediately after the disappearance of the stimuli. This 
would act to reduce any differences between decision time scores for subjects in PE and 
NPE groups, and indicates that errors and ti'ials to criterion remain the most important 
dependent variables.
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Figure 3.3: Survival functions fo r  the PE and NPE gi'oups at the ED shift. Some 
survival functions do not reach zero at 80 tinals; this reflects that fac t that some 
subjects did not reach criterion at this shift.
3.1.3.3 Effects o f  experiencing prior inti'adimensional (ID) shifts 
ED shift performance did not change as a consequence of the number of prior ID shifts. 
The 3ID group acquired the ED shift at the same rate as the IID group (Wilcoxon 
(Gehan) p  > 0.5).
In summary, preexposure of the irrelevant dimension did not retard acquisition 
of the ED shift in either young or elderly subjects when learning was measured in terms 
of errors and trials to criterion. Decision times were also the same between PE and NPE 
groups, although this may have been a consequence of using restricted stimulus display 
times.
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3.1.4 Discussion
The effect of preexposiire of the irrelevant dimension on ED shifting was studied by 
comparing the ED shift performance of two groups that had experienced different levels 
of preexposure. Greater preexposure of the irrelevant dimension did not cause any 
change in ED shift performance in either young or elderly subjects. It had been 
anticipated that greater preexposure would retard ED shifting, either by increasing the 
number of errors committed before the solution of the ED shift, or by increasing the 
‘thinking time’ that subjects required on each trial. However, there was no trend 
towards increased errors or trials to criterion in the data; mean errors for the two PE 
groups were actually lower than for respective NPE groups. Decision times were also 
found to be equal across PE and NPE groups.
The failure to find any effect of preexposure on ED shifting was not anticipated, 
and must be accounted for. In particular, it is important to determine whether the 
manipulation of preexposure was adequate.
3.1 A ,1 Can experimental factors account fo r  the failure to fin d  an effect o f  
preexposure?
A number of experimental factors could have limited the ability of this study to detect a 
preexposure effect, even though the study was designed to minimise these. 
Randomisation into groups ensured that the PE and NPE groups were demographically 
homogeneous within young and elderly subjects, indicating that subject factors could 
not account for the failure to find a preexposure effect. A substantial manipulation of 
preexposure was used (the preexposed group received five times as much preexposure 
as the non-preexposed group), and the size of this manipulation was based on that used 
in a past study of latent inhibition (De la Casa et al., 1993). Any effect of preexposure 
could have caused an increase in errors without this measure encountering a ‘floor’ 
effect, and the decision times measure should have been sensitive to any minor change 
in ED shift difficulty. As there were no obvious experimental factors preventing the 
detection of an effect of preexposure, other interpretations must be considered.
3.1.4.2 Were the correct levels o f  preexposure used?
Prior studies have shown that some levels of preexposure are ineffective at producing 
an effect of latent inhibition. Only one study has explicitly manipulated preexposure to 
study its effects on latent inhibition in humans (De la Casa et al., 1993). De la Casa et 
al. (1993) found no latent inhibition after 3 minutes of preexposure, but an effect of 
latent inhibition was present after 6 minutes of preexposure and was maximal after 15 
minutes of preexposure. The current study used a similar ratio of preexposure between
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non-preexposed and preexposed groups (1 : 5), although the absolute times used were 
around 2 and 10 minutes, respectively. If  the size of a learned irrelevance effect 
increases continuously with mounting preexposure (as for latent inhibition in De la Casa 
et al.’s (1993) study) the levels of prexposure used should have differed sufficiently to 
detect a learned irrelevance effect. As no other studies exist that relate level of 
preexposure to the size of a learned irrelevance or latent inhibition effect in humans, 
there was no a priori reason to assume that the levels used were not optimal.
It is possible that an effect of learned irrelevance may be all-or-nothing in a 
task, and its magnitude may not vary continuously with preexposure. Thus, one might 
assume that learned irrelevance could have occurred after as few as 40 trials (as in the 
NPE group) or perhaps it had not yet occurred even after 200 trials (as in the PE group). 
As a consequence, learned irrelevance might be present or absent in both the PE and 
NPE groups, in which case a difference in performance between these two groups 
would not be anticipated. Learned irrelevance must, by definition, depend on prior 
experience of a dimension as irrelevant, but this does not imply that the size of the 
effect varies as a function of the amount of preexposure received. However, both 
learned irrelevance and latent inhibition are usually described as the loss of associability 
that a stimulus incurs when it is presented either in the absence of reward or 
uncorrelated with reward (Mackintosh, 1983). This description implies that associability 
is lost incrementally and that as a consequence the disruption of learning (in this case, 
ED shifting) should increase continuously with increasing amounts of preexposure.
Prior experiments on latent inhibition support this prediction. The effects of latent 
inhibition found by De la Casa et al. (1993) in humans and by DeVietti et al. (1987) in 
rats both increased continuously (though not necessarily in a linear fashion) with 
preexposure. Latent inhibition was found after 6 minutes of preexposure in De la Casa 
et al.’s (1993) study, indicating that it is unlikely that there was too little preexposure in 
the PE group in this study (which experienced 10 minutes of preexposure). The 2 
minutes of preexposure experienced by the NPE group in this study was well below the 
6 minutes required to induce latent inhibition in De la Casa et al.’s (1993) study, so it is 
also unlikely that latent inhibition / learned irrelevance was present in the NPE group.
3.1.4.3 Is perseveration the more important mechanism in slowing ED shifting?
It was anticipated that learned irrelevance would retard ED shifting in this study, but it 
is possible that perseveration is a more important determinant of ED difficulty than 
learned irrelevance. In this case, only exaggerated preexposure of the relevant 
dimension would retard ED shifting. The current study was therefore followed up with
an experiment in which both the irrelevant and relevant dimensions were preexposed 
(Study 2). More subjects were tested in this followup study in order to increase 
statistical power, and therefore to maximise the likelihood of finding an effect of 
preexposure.
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3.2.1 Introduction
Study 1 failed to find any effect of preexposure of the irrelevant dimension on ED 
shifting. However, it remains possible that preexposure of the relevant dimension could 
retard ED shifting by means of a mechanism such as perseveration. In order to test this 
hypothesis, a study that was similar to Study 1 was carried out, but in which a non­
preexposed group was compared to a group that had experienced preexposure of both 
the relevant and irrelevant dimensions. Comparison of the results of this study with 
those of Study 1 allows examination of the role of preexposure of the relevant 
dimension in ED shifting. Preexposure of both dimensions also maximised the 
possibility of finding any effect of preexposure at all, by exaggerating the effects of 
both of the mechanisms that are postulated - perseveration and learned irrelevance. 
Thus, this study can answer the more general question of whether preexposure of 
dimensions can affect ED shifting when the amount of preexposure is similar to that 
used in latent inhibition experiments. This study also extends Study 1 by including 
manipulation checks that verify that subjects are successfully using selective attention 
in the experimental task. The ED shift and the subsequent ID shift were compared, as 
slower acquisition of an ED shift compared to a similar ID shift is considered to be due 
to the differential effect of selective attention on the two shifts, with selective attention 
benefitting an ID shift and retarding an ED shift.
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3.2.2 Method
3.2.2.1 Subjects
34 subjects were tested, drawn from the undergraduate and postgraduate community at 
the University of St. Andrews. This group consisted of 21 females and 13 males with a 
mean age of 21 years (range 18-28). All subjects claimed to have intact colour vision. 
Informed consent was obtained from all subjects prior to the experiment, and subjects 
were paid at a rate of £3.50 per hour. Some of the data used in this study was originally 
collected for use in Study 2, as the NPE group in this study completed identical shifts to 
the NPE group in Study 2. Data from nine subjects in the NPE group in this experiment 
were previously used in Study 2.
3.2.2.2 Materials and procedure
The materials and procedure used in this study were identical to those used in Study 2.
3.2.2.3 Stimulus composition and types o f  shift
Stimuli and shifts were structurally identical to those used in Study 2.
3.2.2.4 Design
This study used an identical between-subjects design to that used in Study 2; subjects 
were randomised into ‘preexposed’ (PE) and ‘non-preexposed’ (NPE) groups, which 
were then compared to assess the effects of preexposure on ED shifting. The sequence 
of shifts and the allocation of dimensions to shifts used in this study was almost 
identical to that used in Study 2 (see Table 3.2). As in Study 2, the last two shifts that 
the subjects in both groups experienced were an ED shift and an ID shift that were 
identical across groups. Thus, the PE and NPE groups only differed in their experience 
of dimensions before the ED shift.
The NPE group experienced exactly the same dimensions, shifts and stimuli in 
the same order as the NPE group in Study 2. The first 160 trials experienced by the NPE 
group involved two dimensions that were not involved in the ED shift (see Table 3.2). 
This was followed by 40 trials of exposure to the dimensions involved in the ED shift to 
allow acquisition of the discrimination before the ED shift (‘acquisition’ shift, see Table 
3.2). In contrast, the PE group experienced the dimensions involved in the ED shift 
from the beginning of the study, entailing 200 trials of preexposure. Thus, the PE 
groups experienced five times more preexposure of both the relevant and irrelevant 
dimensions than the NPE group before completing an identical ED shift.
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As in Study 2, the number of ID shifts completed before the ED shift was also 
manipulated. Subjects were assigned a ‘IID’ or a ‘3ID’ group that received either one 
or three ID shifts before the ED shift respectively. The total number of trials completed 
before the ED shift did not differ between these groups.
NON-PREEXPOSED 
Relevant Irrelevant
PREEXPOSED 
Relevant Irrelevant
1 or 3 ID shifts 
AQ shift. 
ED shift 
ID shift
Colour Background
Colour Background
Shape
Pattern
Pattern
Pattern
Shape
Shape
Shape
Shape
Shape
Pattern
Pattern
Pattern
Pattern
Pattern
Shape
Shape
Table 3.2: The left column o f  this table represents the shifts that were experienced by 
both groups in the order in which they M>ere presented. The rest o f  the table depicts the 
dimensions that were experienced as relevant and irrelevant before and after these 
shifts fo r  the NPE and PE groups.
3.2.2.5 Data analysis
Data from this study were analysed in a similar fashion to that used in Study 2. All of 
the dependent measures used in this study were the same as in Study 2; errors and trials 
to a criterion of ten consecutive correct responses were used, and decision times were 
calculated using the same post hoc RT and MT cutoffs. Life Tables analysis was 
performed on trials to criterion data for all between-groups comparisons; within-group 
analyses were carried out on errors to criterion data using the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks 
test. This study differed from Study 2 due to the fact that shifts other than the ED shift 
were examined, and different exclusion criteria were used for subjects and individual 
data points.
Subjects were excluded from data analysis if they did not reach criterion (ten 
consecutive correct responses) before the ED shift. In previous studies (Studies 1 and
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2), subjects were included if they scored eight or more correct out of the ten trials 
before the ED shift. However, when data from this study were inspected, it became 
apparent that some subjects had achieved eight correct responses out of the ten trials 
before the ED shift whilst having never attained a criterion of ten correct responses in a 
row. These subjects were excluded, as ten consecutive correct responses was thought to 
be good evidence of learning, and ED shifts were considered to be invalid of subjects 
had not acquired the rule before the shift.
The final three shifts completed by subjects were analysed in this study: the 
‘acquisition’ (AQ) shift, the ED shift and the subsequent ID shift. As for the ED shift, 
the AQ and ID shifts were also only thought to be valid if subjects had acquired the rule 
preceding the shift. Data from these shifts were excluded if subjects had not reached 
criterion in the phase before the shift. This led to different numbers of data points being 
analysed at each shift; the number of points included in each analysis is recorded in the 
text.
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3.2.3 Results
Figure 3.4 represents mean errors to criterion for the last three shifts that the PE and 
NPE groups completed. As in Study 2, the absolute level of ED shift errors ensures that 
this measure should not be affected by floor or ceiling effects. Visual inspection of the 
results for the ED shift indicates two main findings; more errors are committed at the 
ED shift that at the AQ and ID shifts, and there is no effect of preexposure on errors 
committed at the ED shift.
3.2.3.1 Relative difficulty o f  ED and ID shifting
If  an ED shift is found to be more difficult than a comparable ID shift, this is usually 
taken as evidence that subjects are selectively attending to the relevant dimension 
before both shifts; such attention facilitates the performance of ID shifts but retards the 
performance of ED shifts (Slamecka, 1968). In this study, subjects made more errors at 
the ED shift than at the ID shift (« for ED = 34, for ID = 3 1; z = 2.68,/; < 0.01).
3.2.3.2 Ejfect o f  preexposure on the ED shift
However, despite this evidence for the presence of selective attention, the difficulty of 
the ED shift was not altered by preexposure. The PE and NPE groups acquired the ED 
shift at the same rate (Wilcoxon (Gehan) p  > 0.5), as indicated by the survival function 
(Figure 3.5). No effect of preexposure was seen in the RT data; decision times did not 
differ for PE and NPE groups (?(32) = 0.25,/? > 0.5). The greater difficulty of the ED 
shift compared to the ID shift is thought to represent the difficulty of shifting attention 
between dimensions, as in all other respects ED and ID shift make the same cognitive 
demands; these data indicate that ease of shifting attention between dimensions is not 
affected by preexposure of those dimensions.
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Figure 3.4: Mean errors to criterion fo r the last three shifts completed fo r  the PE and 
NPE gi'oups. '* ’ signifies a significant difference between PE and NPE groups a t p >
0.05. Error bars represent the standard error o f  the mean.
3.2.3.3 Effect o f  preexposure on the AQ shift
Further evidence for the presence of selective attention conies from examination of 
performance of the AQ shift. Subjects in the PE group acquired this shift more rapidly 
than those in the NPE group {n ~ 24; Wilcoxon (Gehan)p  < 0.05, Figure 3.5 Panel B). 
The PE and NPE groups were both required to shift to the same exemplars and stimuli 
at this shift, but differed in the dimensions that they were responding to before the shift 
(see Table 3.2). The PE group were responding to the same dimensions before and after 
the shift, making the AQ shift an intradimensional shift. The same dimensions were 
relevant and irrelevant before and after the shift, and subjects were only required to 
acquire a response to a new exemplar of a dimension that was already relevant. In 
contrast, the dimensions that the NPE group encountered after the AQ shift were 
completely different to the dimensions that they had been responding to before the shift. 
Subjects were required to learn the new rule with no indication as to which of the two 
new dimensions might be relevant. The fact that the PE group was already responding
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to the dimension that was relevant after the AQ shift explains this group’s superior 
performance at that shift.
ED shift AQ shift
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Figure 3.5: Survival fim ctiom  fo r  the PE and NPE grotips at the ED and AQ shifts. 
Where the curve does not reach zero at 80 trials, this signifies that some subjects failed  
to reach criterion.
3.2.3.4 Effect o f prior ID shifting on ED shift performance
In contrast to Study 1, ED shift performance was affected by the number o f ID shifts 
completed before the ED shift. A greater number of prior ID shifts facilitated 
performance; the 3ID group solved the ED shift more rapidly than the IID group 
(Wilcoxon (Gehan) p < 0.01).
3.2.3.5 Summary
Evidence from both the AQ shift and the comparison of ID and ED shifts shows that 
subjects could selectively attend to one of two dimensions in this study. However, 
comparison of the PE and NPE groups indicates that preexposure did not affect the 
strength of this selective attention.
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3.2.4 Discussion
This study recorded the consequences of increased preexposure of the relevant and the 
irrelevant dimension for the performance of an ED shift. Increased preexposure did not 
slow learning or increase decision times at the ED shift. It was hypothesised that an 
increase in preexposure would cause an exaggeration of the mechanisms of learned 
irrelevance and perseveration, which are thought to govern selective attention to a 
perceptual dimension. These mechanisms are thought to retard acquisition of the new 
rule after an ED shift by maintaining attention to the previously relevant dimension and 
preventing a shift of attention to the newly relevant dimension. However, ED shift 
performance was not disrupted by increased preexposure, despite evidence from the 
examination of other shifts that a strong effect of selective attention was present. It was 
not the case that ED shift performance was generally insensitive to the effects of prior 
learning, as greater ID shift experience prior to the ED shift facilitated ED shift 
performance; the manipulation of preexposure alone failed to change ED shift 
performance. Thus, it appears either that learned irrelevance and perseveration were not 
affected by the manipulation of preexposure that was used, or that these mechanisms do 
not play a significant role in determining the difficulty of an ED shift.
ED shifts were originally used to demonstrate that organisms could pay 
attention to perceptual dimensions as well as acquiring responses to discrete stimuli 
(Slamecka, 1968). More recently, ED shifts have been used to investigate impairments 
of attentional shifting in clinical populations (e.g. Owen et al., 1991, 1992; Elliott et al., 
1995; Lange et al., 1995). It is clear that humans can shift their attention between 
perceptual dimensions, but despite the large amount of research on ED shifting, the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying such shifts have not been characterised. A plausible 
account was given by Owen et al. (1993b), and this study aimed to extend Owen et al.’s 
(1993 b) hypothesis by inducing learned irrelevance and perseveration in healthy young 
adults.
3.2.4.1 Choice o f method
The method that was used to enhance learned irrelevance and perseveration in this study 
was based on that used to induce latent inhibition. As learned irrelevance is a better- 
understood mechanism than perseveration, and closely resembles latent inhibition, it is 
the failure of preexposure to enhanve learned irrelevance in this study that must 
principally be accounted for. The decision to use a preexposure paradigm similar to that
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used to induce latent inhibition was based on three factors. First, dimensional shifting 
paradigms involving ED shifts closely resemble the paradigms used to induce latent 
inhibition in adult humans. Second, subjects’ accounts of ED shifting strongly imply 
that some mechanism of Teamed inattention’ (Lubow 1997) - either learned irrelevance 
or latent inhibition - is at work. Subjects reported that a failure to consider the newly- 
relevant dimension was a major factor in slowing their acquisition of the ED shift; 
typical statements included “I just wasn’t looking at the stripes [the newly-relevant 
dimension] after the shift”, and “it’s quite easy when you know what you’re looking for 
- as soon as you see the difference in the stripes, you’ve got it”. The final factor in 
selecting a latent inhibition-like paradigm was that recent animal work suggests that 
learned irrelevance effects in animals may in fact be misattributed latent inhibition 
effects - there may be no separate mechanism of Teamed irrelevance’ (Bonardi and 
Hall, 1996). If  this were the case, any effect of Teamed irrelevance’ in this study 
should act in an identical fashion to latent inhibition. Similarly, in the literature on 
latent inhibition on humans, Lubow (1997) now refers to latent inhibition as an instance 
of a more general concept of Teamed inattention’, which would subsume both learned 
irrelevance and latent inhibition.
In this study, subjects were able to selectively attend to a dimension, as shown 
by the greater difficulty of ED shifts over ID shifts, and the superiority of the PE group 
in performing the AQ shift. As described above, subjects reported the effects of Teamed 
inattention’ on their ED shift performance, yet increased preexposure did not change 
ED shift performance and therefore did not enhance learned irrelevance. As in Study 1, 
either an account must be given of why the levels of preexpoosure chosen were not 
appropriate to detect learned irrelevance, or it must be concluded that learned 
irrelevance was not a significant mechanism in determining ED shift performance in 
this study.
3.2.4.2 Was the correct amount o f  preexposiire used?
De la Casa et al. (1993) found a maximal effect of latent inhibition after 15 minutes of 
preexposure, and Graham and McLaren (1998) induced a latent inhibition effect in 
students with 20 minutes of preexposure. From these instances, it could be argued that 
the level of preexposure used in the PE group in this study was too low, being only 
around 10 minutes. However, a brief survey of the literature show that latent inhibition 
to visual stimuli can also be induced by relatively brief preexposure - for example, 15 
trials (Salzman et al. 1993, cited in Lubow 1997), 30 trials (Dressier et al., cited in
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Lubow 1997) and 80 trials (Lubow et al. 1992, Expt 2, cited in Lubow and Gewirtz 
1995), compared to the 200 trials used in this study. These studies indicate that it is 
unlikely that tlie PE group in this study was ' under-preexposed’, but they raise another 
possibility; perhaps a latent inhibition effect was present in both the NPE (40 trials of 
preexposure) and the PE (200 trials of preexposure) groups. 40 trials of preexposure 
may have delivered sufficient preexposure for the creation of a latent inhibtion effect in 
the NPE group; if a latent inhibition effect were present in both the NPE and PE groups, 
a difference in ED shift performance between these groups would not be expected. If 
this were the case, a comparison of the NPE group with a group that had received even 
less preexposure might reveal poorer ED shift performance in the NPE group due to 
latent inhibition in the NPE group. However, a consideration of the literature on the 
effects of overlearning on ED shifts indicates that it is unlikely that there was an effect 
of latent inhibition in the NPE group. Subjects in the NPE group experienced on 
average 24 trials between reaching criterion at the AQ shift and experiencing the ED 
shift. Studies of overlearning indicate that these ‘extra’ 24 trials are more likely to have 
facilitated ED shifting due to an overlearning effect than to have retarded ED shifting 
through latent inhibition. W olffs (1967) excellent review of the overlearning literature 
cites studies that show that between 10 and 48 trials of overlearning facilitate ED 
shifting in college students. One study in particular shows that the level of preexposure 
experienced by the NPE group in this study should aid ED shifting. Guy et al. (1966, 
cited in Wolff 1967) showed that 20 trials of overlearning (compared to 24 in the NPE 
group) after a criterion of 10 consecutive correct respsonses (as in the NPE group) 
facilitated ED shifting in college students. This represents a beneficial effect of 
preexposure in an experimental condition that is highly similar to that of the NPE group 
and it therefore indicates that latent inhibition is unlikely to have been present in the 
NPE group. Thus, there was sufficient preexposure in the PE group to generate latent 
inhibition, but the NPE group should have been free from latent inhibition. Therefore, 
the choice of inappropriate levels of preexposure does not appear to account for the 
absence of a learned irrelevance / latent inhibition effect in this study.
3.2.4,3 Implications o f  the overlearning literature fo r  learned irrelevance and 
perseveration
It is informative to consider the implications of the literature reviewed by Wolff (1967) 
for the proposed mechanisms of learned irrelevance and perseveration. Overlearning 
has consistently been shown to facilitate ED and reversal performance, and in one study
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it improved performance on ED and ID shifts that used a ‘total change’ of exemplars 
(Eimas, 1966). It is impossible to account for a facilitation of ED and ID shifting in 
terms of changes in the strength of learned irrelevance and/or perseveration. Increases 
or decreases in the strength of these mechanisms can only have opposing effects on the 
difficulty of ID and ED shifts. Indeed, the attractiveness of the learned irrelevance / 
perseveration hypothesis was that it could account for deficits in ED shift performance 
in the presence of relatively intact ID shift performance in patients witli frontal lobe 
damage and Parkinson’s disease (Owen et al. 1991, 1992). Consideration of the 
overlearning literature complicates any account of mechanisms underlying ED shifting, 
as it appears that ED and ID shifts can be influenced in the same direction by a simple 
experimental manipulation (overlearning) or separately by brain damage (selective ED 
shifting deficits).
3.2.4.4 Implications o f  this study combined with the overlearning literature 
When the overlearning literature is considered alongside the results of this study, it 
becomes clear that neither learned irrelevance nor latent inhibition can affect ED 
shifting. Latent inhibition is usually described as the loss of associability that a stimulus 
incurs each time it is presented without consequence. Learned irrelevance, if it is in fact 
a separate effect, is a similar reduction in associability that occurs whenever a stimulus 
is presented uncorrelated with reward. Both effects are incremental. Neither of these 
effects can account for an improvement of ED shifting performance with small amounts 
of preexposure (as shown by the overlearning literature) that is followed by stable ED 
shift performance despite further preexposure (40 vs. 200 trials of preexposure in this 
study). This study combined with the overlearning literature shows that at no point does 
increased ‘preexposure as irrelevant’ retard ED shifting; indeed, at brief preexposure 
levels ED shifting is facilitated. Learned irrelevance can therefore have no effect on 
two-dimension ED shifting tasks.
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3.3.1 Introduction
The results of Study 3 cast doubt on the hypothesis that the mechanisms of learned 
irrelevance and perseveration affect ED shifting performance. Whilst Study 3 cannot 
‘prove’ that learned irrelevance does not affect ED shifting (indeed, neither can any 
study), there is now a strong case for considering other accounts of the parkinsonian ED 
shifting deficit. Any new hypothesis must be able to account for the presence of an ED 
shifting deficit in the context of unimpaired ID shifting, as this is the pattern of results 
most commonly seen amongst patients with PD (Downes et al. 1989, Lange et al. 1992, 
Owen et al. 1993b, Study 1). One study has found impaired ID shifting amongst patients 
with PD (Owen et al., 1992), but even in this study the magnitude of the deficit seen at 
the ID shift was smaller than that present at the ED shift in two out of three groups of 
patients with PD. In general, a selective ED shift deficit is seen in patients with PD 
rather than a general problem of ‘shifting aptitude’ (Cools et al. 1984); the cause of this 
deficit is currently unknown.
Channon et al. (1993) carried out a study of hypothesis-testing and 
discrimination learning that revealed a deficit amongst patients with PD that could 
account for a selective ED shifting deficit. The experimental task used in Channon et 
al.’s (1993) study involved working out a ‘rule’ in a similar fashion to the requirements 
of an ED shift, but the overall methodology was sufficiently different to that used in 
Studies 1 to 3 to require detailed description. Channon et al. (1993) modified a task 
developed by Levine (1970) for use in their study. Subjects were required to work out a 
rule that defined one of two stimuli as correct, as in a classical dimensional shifting 
task. The rule was always to choose one exemplar taken from one of four dimensions; 
the dimensions were size (large / small), letter (A / B), colour (black / white) or position 
(right / left). Channon et al. (1993) were able to observe which rule subjects were 
responding to by using a ‘blank trials’ method developed by Levine (1970). This 
technique involves requiring subjects to respond for a number of trials without 
feedback. During this ‘no-feedback’ period, the location of stimuli are arranged such 
that response to a particular rule will be associated with a unique and identifiable 
pattern of responses to the left or right stimulus. For example, if subjects were 
responding to the rule ‘black’, their responses might be left - right - left - right; if they 
were responding to the rule ‘large’ their pattern of responses would be quite different 
but also unique and identifiable. Observation of these response patterns allows 
investigators to analyse how subjects respond to the information received on ‘feedback’
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trials, particularly on those trials at which feedback is negative. Channon et al. (1993) 
required patients with PD and healthy elderly controls to complete eight discrimination 
problems whilst analysing their responses to feedback using the ‘blank trials’ method.
If  healthy subjects receive negative feedback whilst responding to the rule 
‘small’, they will reject this rule and test another hypothesis (Levine, 1970). However, 
as well as rejecting the rule ‘small’, they will reject rules relating to other aspects of the 
stimulus that incurred negative feedback. For example, if a ‘small’ ‘black’ ‘A ’ on the 
‘right’ was shown to be an incorrect stimulus, a subject who was hypothesis-testing 
perfectly would reject all of these rules. In practice, only a minority of subjects show 
this ‘perfect’ hypothesis-testing, but most subjects reject more than one rule after a 
negative feedback trial (Levine, 1970). Channon et al. (1993) showed that the response 
of patients with PD to negative feedback was subtly different to that of controls. After a 
negative feedback trial, patients correctly rejected the rule that they had been 
responding to as often as controls. However, patients were more likely to go on to test 
one of the other rule that had been ruled out by negative feedback. For example, if 
patients were responding to the rule ‘large’, and received negative feedback after 
pressing a ‘large’ ‘black’ ‘A’ on the ‘right’, they would correctly reject the rule ‘large’ 
but would be more likely than controls to go on to test either the rule ‘black’, ‘A’ or 
‘right’ which had also been shown to be incorrect by the feedback. This result implies 
that patients with PD are less able to gather or use information about ‘untested’ 
dimensions than controls.
If the deficit seen in Channon et al.’s (1993) study were present in a two- 
dimension ED shifting task, it would impair performance at an ED shift but not at an ID 
shift. Immediately after both and ED and an ID shift, subjects report testing rules that 
relate to the dimension that had been relevant before the shift. In the case o f an ID shift, 
the dimension that subjects are testing will be the dimension from which the new 
correct rule is taken. In this case, the ability to gather information about the other, 
‘untested’ dimension does not affect performance as this dimension is and remains 
irrelevant. In contrast, this ability can aid ED shifting. Immediately after an ED shift, 
subjects will test a rule from the dimension that was relevant before the shift. However, 
the new correct rule will not be taken from this dimension; rather, it will be taken from 
the other, ‘untested’ dimension. Therefore, the ability to gather information about this 
‘untested’ dimension will be an advantage, as it allows subjects to acquire information 
about the newly-relevant dimension. If  patients with PD were less efficient at gathering
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information from the ‘untested’ dimension than controls, this would lead to impaired 
pei-formance at the ED shift, but unchanged performance at the ID shift.
In this study, an attempt was made to induce a ‘deficit’ in normal subjects 
similar to that found by Channon et al.’s (1993) in patients with PD. An experimental 
manipulation was created that aimed to reduce subjects’ ability to acquire information 
from the ‘untested’ dimension. If  the manipulation used leads to a selective ED shifting 
deficit in young subjects, this implies that the deficit found be Channon et al. (1993) is a 
good candidate for the cause of the parkinsonian ED shifting deficit. If, however, the 
manipulation impairs both ID and ED shifting it is unlikely to be the cause of the 
problems displayed by patients with PD. This study compared one group that completed 
ID and ED shifts in normal conditions (‘Standard’ group) with another in which the 
ability to acquire information about the ‘untested’ dimension was restricted by the 
experimental manipulation (‘Mask’ group).
The ability to acquire information about the ‘untested’ dimension was restricted 
in this study by reducing stimulus display time and including a masking stimulus. This 
manipulation was developed on the basis of subjects’ descriptions of the process of 
hypothesis-testing after a shift. Subjects report that they explicitly test only one 
hypothesis at a time after a shift, and there is evidence for this from Levine’s (1970) 
studies. However, it is clear that subjects can reject more than one rule when they 
encounter negative feedback, as described by Levine (1970). This apparent 
contradiction is resolved by considering subjects’ descriptions of the process of 
hypothesis-testing. After an ED shift, a subject might test the rule ‘green’ by pressing a 
green square. If  a subject receives negative feedback as a consequence of this response, 
s/he will reject the rule ‘green’ and will also recall the stimulus (a green square) and 
from this reconstruction of the stimulus will reject both the rules ‘green’ and ‘square’. 
The manipulation used in this study acts at two stages of this hypothesis-testing process. 
Shortening display time forces subjects to direct their attention towards the dimension 
that they believe to be relevant. The stimuli used in this study were not easy to 
discriminate, and if attention was not directed towards the salient features of these 
stimuli then discrimination within the brief display time allowed would have been 
impossible. Thus, shortened display time minimised the time available to inspect the 
‘untested’ dimension and derive information from it by forcing subjects to attend to the 
dimension that they assumed was relevant. The introduction of a masking stimulus was 
intended to disrupt the reconstruction of a stimulus after feedback that allowed 
retrospective conclusions to be drawn about the untested dimension. The masking
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stimulus resembled the salient stimuli, and was intended to decrease the clarity of any 
mental reconstruction of the stimuli.
To summarise, young subjects were tested in this study to test the hypothesis 
that masking and restricted display time would lead to a selective ED shifting deficit, 
rather than an global slowing of ED and ID shifting due to increased task difficulty. If 
such a selective deficit were found to be present, it would add plausibility to the 
hypothesis that the deficit found by Channon et ah (1993) is also the deficit that causes 
the selective impairment of ED shift performance seen in patients with PD.
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3.3.2 Methods
3.3.2.1 Subjects
40 subjects were tested (29 females and 11 males), all of whom were undergraduates or 
postgraduates at the University of St. Andrews. The mean age of these subjects was 
21.9 years, and all claimed to have intact colour vision. Subjects were paid at a rate of 
£3.50 per hour, and gave informed consent before taking part in the study. Some data 
used in this study was originally collected for Study 3, as the PE (3ID) group from 
Study 3 and the ‘Standard’ group in this study (see ‘Design’ section, below) completed 
exactly the same shifts using the same stimuli. Data from 9 subjects in the ‘Standard’ 
group were previously used in the PE group of Study 3.
3.3.2.2 Materials and procedure
Subjects were split into two groups in this study, as described in the ‘Design’ section 
below. Subjects in the ‘Standard’ group experienced the same procedures that were used 
in Study 3. However, the experimental procedure differed for the ‘Mask’ group. Stimuli 
were only displayed for 750 ms to the Mask group, in contrast to a stimulus display 
time of 1000 ms for the Standard group. For the Standard group, stimuli disappeared 
after the stimulus display time had elapsed, leaving empty ‘stimulus boxes’. In the 
Mask group, each stimulus was instead replaced with a masking stimulus (described in 
the ‘Stimulus composition’ section below) at the end of the stimulus display time. The 
masking stimulus persisted until subjects made a response by touching the screen; at 
that point, the screen was cleared and the feedback stimuli were displayed as in Study 3. 
The instructions given to the subjects in the mask group were altered to reflect the 
changed experimental procedure; instructions for the Standard group were as for Study 
3. The instructions for the Mask group are reproduced here in full:
“This is the main program. The format is basically the same as the practice program that 
you’ve just completed. You press down the space bar and two shapes appear - one is 
right, one is wrong, and you job is to press the one that is correct. There is a rule telling 
you which shape is correct. This rule will be something like ‘always press the red 
shape’, or ‘always press the triangle’. A number of different rules are possible, as the 
shapes can differ in four ways. They can be different colours or different shapes, they 
can have different striped patterns on them, or there can be a different colour behind the 
shape. The shapes can differ from each other in more than one way at once, so they may 
look complicated. However, there is always one simple rule that tells you which shape 
is correct. Your job is to work out this rule and press the correct shapes.
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Although I have said that the rule is simple, this does not mean that the task is 
easy. The differences between the shapes may be very subtle, and quite hard to see. For 
example, there may be a small difference in the outline of the shape, or a slight 
difference in the shading of the colour. As a consequence, I suggest that at first you hold 
down the space bar for long enough to give yourself time to look at the shapes. After a 
few trials, you will be confident that you know what the rule is, and then you can speed 
up and treat this as a reaction time task.
There are two additional factors that make this task difficult. First, the rule will 
change as you go through the task. For example, the shapes will change and you will 
realise that the old rule can no longer apply. If this happens, I suggest that you slow 
down and give yourself time to look at the shapes, and when you are confident that you 
know the rule you can speed up again and treat it as a reaction time task. The second 
difficulty is that you only ever get less than a second to look at the shapes. That is, after 
the shapes have been on the screen for just under a second they will disappear, and they 
will be replaced by another shape that is irrelevant and has nothing to do with the task. 
This shape has a red background to help you to distinguish it from the shapes that are 
important for the task. If you have not decided which shape to press by this time, you 
will have to press one of the boxes anyway. One final point - there are no hidden rules. 
The rule always has something to do with the shapes, colour, stripes or background 
colour, although it might be hard to see. You can start the test now.”
3.3.2.3 Stimulus composition and types o f  shift
The stimuli used in this study were taken from the set used in Studies 2 and 3, with one 
exception. One additional stimulus was used in this study; a ‘masking’ stimulus, 
experienced only by the Mask group. This was a complex stimulus created by the 
superposition of a number of exemplars from the dimensions ‘shape’ and ‘pattern’ that 
were used in this study (the masking stimulus is depicted in Figure 3.6 alongside a 
typical relevant stimulus). The mask was designed to be visually similar to the relevant 
stimuli, as the replacement of a stimulus with a mask after a brief display period was 
intended to retard or confuse the memory of that stimulus.
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Figure 3.6: The shape on the left is a sample o f  a typical stimulus fi^om this study. The 
shape on the right is the masking stimulus - the background colour fo r  this stimulus 
(here in gi^ey) was red.
3.3.2.4 Design
This study set out to examine the consequences of decreasing display time and 
introducing a masking stimulus for the performance of both ED and ID shifts. Subjects 
were therefore randomised into two groups, a ‘Mask’ group and a ‘Standard’ group. 
These two groups experienced exactly the same stimuli and shifts in the same order as 
each other, the only difference between the groups being shortened stimulus display 
time and the presence of a masking stimulus in the Mask group.
Subjects experienced the same shifts and stimuli as those in the PE group of 
Study 3 who experienced three ID shifts before the AQ shift (‘3ID’ group). Table 3.3 
depicts the order of the shifts. Two dimensions, ‘shape’ and ‘pattern’ were present 
throughout the study, ‘shape’ being relevant at the beginning. After the initial 
discrimination, subjects experienced four ID shifts in which ‘shape’ remained the 
relevant dimension. 40 trials elapsed after each ID shift. These shifts were followed by 
an ED shift in which ‘pattern’ became the relevant dimension; 80 trials occurred after 
the ED shift, which were followed by a final ID shift.
3.3.2.5 Data Analysis
Selection o f  an appropriate ID shift 
As the principal goal of this study was to compare the effects of masking upon ED and 
ID shifts, it was thought to be important to select an ID shift that involved shifting to 
stimuli of comparable difficulty to those present after the ED shift. Most ED shifts are, 
of course, harder than ID shifts due to the influence of subjects’ experience before the
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shift. However, the stimuli present after both ED and ID shifts can be considered 
without reference to experience before the shift, and it is clear that some stimuli will be 
easier to discriminate than others. For example, if the stimuli present after an ID shift 
have highly salient differences they will be relatively easy to discriminate and as a 
consequence hypothesis testing will be relatively simple. However, if such stimuli are 
quite similar, with only subtle differences between exemplars, hypothesis testing will be 
relatively difficult; exemplars may be confused with each other and there will be greater 
need to selectively attend to salient features. As a shift’s absolute difficulty can vary as 
a consequence of stimulus difficulty as well as its nature (ID or ED), it was felt to be 
important that this study did not compare an ID shift involving ‘easy’ stimuli with an 
ED shift involving ‘difficult’ stimuli. I f  masking caused a selective ED shift deficit in 
such a case, it could be argued that this result could be explained by reference to task 
difficulty; the increase in task difficulty caused by masking might have further 
complicated the ‘difficult’ ED shift by left the ‘easy’ ID shift undisturbed. It was 
therefore decided to select an ID shift that was appropriate for comparison with the ED 
shift before the experiment began. Subjects completed five ID shifts in this study. It 
would have been easy, but misleading, to ‘trawl’ through the data for these ID shifts 
until an ID shift was found that most closely confirmed the experimental hypothesis. By 
choosing an ID shift before the study began on principled grounds it was hoped to avoid 
this inappropriate selection of data.
Shift Relevant Irrelevant
ID
Shape Pattern
ID
Shape Pattern
'Comparable ’ ID
Shape Pattern
ID
Shape Pattern
ED
Shape Pattern
ID
Pattern Shape
Pattern Shape
Table 3.3: Order ofshifts and dimensions fo r  both groups
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All appropriate ID shift was selected by examining data from the PE group from 
Study 3. All of the subjects from this group had completed four shifts that were 
associated with the same order of presentation and the same exemplars as shifts in this 
study, and all of these shifts were analysed; two ID shifts before the ED shift, the ED 
shift itself, and one ID shift after the ED shift. There are no direct measures of the 
‘difficulty’ of the stimuli present after a shift,so in order to select an ID shift that was 
comparable to the ED shift, a response time measure was calculated that was thought to 
index the absolute discriminability of the stimuli present after these shifts. After 
learning the rule after a shift, a subject should respond to easily discriminable stimuli 
with a more rapid response time than to ‘difficult’ stimuli that are hard to discriminate. 
To reflect this, the response time measure used was the mean response time for the 
eight trials after a subject reached criterion. This measure was calculated for the three 
ID shifts and the ED shift. For the ED shift, the group mean response time was 691 ms, 
compared to ID shift response times of 695, 579 and 803 ms. The ID shift with a 
response time of 695 ms was therefore chosen as the most appropriate comparison for 
the ED shift. This ID shift was the second shift before the ED shift, and is the shift used 
in all comparisons with the ED shift.
Dependent measures
Subjects were included in the analysis only if they reached criterion at the shifts that 
preceded both the ID and ED shifts. The dependent measures that were used in Studies 
2 and 3 were also used in this study; errors and trials to criterion were calculated for all 
shifts and decision times were calculated for the ID and ED shifts. Two additional 
dependent measures were taken that were not used in Study 3. As masking was 
expected to have a differential effect on ID and ED shifts, a ‘difference’ score was 
calculated for each group by subtracting ID errors from ED errors. Also, ‘discrimination 
times’ were calculated for the ID and ED shifts. This measure was the same as that used 
above (see ‘Selection of an appropriate ID shift’ above) to index the absolute 
discriminability of stimuli - the mean response time was calculated for the eight trials 
after subjects reached criterion. Data were analysed in a similar fashion to Study 3. 
Wilcoxon (Gehan) statistics were calculated from trials to criterion data for between- 
group comparisons of performance at the ID and ED shifts. Difference scores were 
compared using Mann-Whitney tests, and within-group comparisons of errors to 
criterion scores were made using the relevant nonparametric tests (Wilcoxon or 
Friedman).
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3.3.3 Results
33,3.1 Manipitlation checks
Errors to criterion were calculated for all of the ID shifts in this study to test the 
hypothesis that some ID shifts might be more difficult than others due to the presence of 
less discriminable stimuli after the shift. The four ID shifts that were carried out before 
the ED shift were analysed; despite the fact that the dimension ‘shape’ was relevant 
before and after all of these shifts, performance differed between them (%^  (3) = 62.63, p 
< 0.001). The errors to criterion data for these shifts are plotted in Figure 3.7 alongside 
the ‘discrimination times’ for the same shifts. The more difficult shifts appear to be 
associated with longer discrimintion times, as predicted. However, it appears that the ID 
shift that was chosen for comparison with the ED shift involved stimuli of comparable 
difficulty to the ED shift. Discrimination times were calculated for the ID and ED shifts 
to confirm that the absolute difficulty of the stimuli used in the two shifts did not differ; 
discrimination times did not differ for the ED and the comparable ID shift (/(26) = 1.72, 
p  > 0.05). The ED shift was, as anticipated, more difficult than the ID shift; subjects 
generated significantly more errors at the ED shift (Z= 4.78, jî? < 0.001) indicating a 
strong effect of selective attention.
Errors to criterion and discrimination times 
for the first four ID shifts
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Figure 3.7: Errors to criterion (left axis, bar chart) and discrimination times (right axis, line and 
scatter plot) fo r  the first four ID shifts (labelled ID l to ID 4 in order ofpresentation).
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33,3.2 Effects o f  Masking
Learning to criterion
Figure 3,8 shows mean errors to criterion for the Mask and Standard groups at the ED 
shift and at the ‘comparable’ ID shift (see Section 3.3.2.5). Inspection o f this graph 
suggests that masking did have an effect on shifting performance, though it appears to 
have acted by slightly reducing the number of errors generated at the ID shift and by 
elevating errors at the ED shift. This is confirmed by the ID-ED difference scores, 
which are significantly larger for the Mask group than for the Standard group (C/= 
136.5,/? <0.05, one-tailed). Although masking had a differential effect on the ED and 
comparable ID shifts, subjects in the Standard and Mask groups did not differ in the rate 
at which they solved either the ED or the ID shift (Wilcoxon (Gehan) /? > 0.1 for both 
shifts). Suiwival functions for the ED and ID shifts are plotted in Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3..8: Mean errors to criterion fo r  the ED and comparable ID shifts fo r  the 
Standard and Mask groups. Error bars represent the standard error o f  the mean.
Decision times
Decision times were also calculated for all subjects, and can be used to assess the 
differences in ‘thinking time’ between Standard and Mask groups. However, there is an 
a priori reason to doubt the validity of this measure. Decision times for the ED shift for
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both groups were over 800 ms, but stimulus display time for the Mask group was 750 
ms; restricted display time in the Mask group might have spuriously reduced decision 
times for this group. Despite these reservations, decision times did not differ between 
the Standard and Mask groups for either the ID or ED shift. Presumably, this indicates 
that subjects in the Mask group made their decisions within the 750 ms display period at 
the ED shift, the extra time before response initiation being accounted for by movement 
initiation processes.
In summary, the effect of masking in this study was to increase the difference in 
errors between the ED and ID shifts by slightly increasing errors at the ED shift and 
decreasing errors at the ID shift.
ID shift ED shift
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Figure 3.9: Survival functions fo r the Standard and Mask groups fo r  the ED and 
comparable ID shifts. Curves which do not reach zero represent groups in M>hich not all 
subjects reached criterion.
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3.3.4 Discussion
This study compared the effect of masking and restricted display time on the 
performance of ED and ID shifts. Masking increased the difficulty of the ED shift 
relative to the ID shift. However, this effect was achieved both by a small reduction of 
errors at the ID shift and by increased errors at the ED shift. Masking influenced 
performance at the ID and ED shift in opposite directions, despite the fact that the ID 
shift was chosen such that the stimuli present after this shift were of a similar difficulty 
to those present after the ED shift. The effect of masking found in this study was small, 
but it influenced ID and ED shifts in a way that was predicted, rather than causing a 
global increase in the difficulty of both the ID and ED shifts. The change in 
performance caused by masking resembled that which would be caused by an increase 
in selective attention; a speeding of ID shifting and slowing of ED shifting.
3.3.4.1 Influence o f  stimulus 'difficulty ’ on shift performance 
Comparisons of ID and ED shift difficulty have been important in the literature on 
dimensional shifting and selective attention. The greater difficulty of ED shifting over 
ID shifting was originally used to demonstrate that subjects could attend to perceptual 
dimensions as well as discrete stimuli (Slamecka, 1968). More recently, the presence of 
selective ED shifting deficits amongst patients with PD has been used to argue that 
these patients do not have general problems with shifting or hypothesis testing, as ID 
shifting is preserved, but rather that their deficit is confined to shifts of selective 
attention. However, this study has shown that the absolute difficulty of different ID 
shifts can vary substantially, even when these shifts involve the same dimensions (see 
Figure Q.l). The difference in the difficulty of these shifts appears to be due to the 
differing ‘difficulty’ of the stimuli that subjects are required to discriminate after the 
shift. Stimuli that are more similar, and therefore less discriminable and more easy to 
confuse, are more difficult and subjects will make more errors at shifts that involve such 
stimuli. It follows that ED shifts should be compared with ID shifts that involve stimuli 
of similar difficulty, to avoid confounding an ID-ED difference that is due to selective 
attention to one that is caused by stimulus difficulty.
33,4.2 Effect o f  masking
In this study ED shift performance was compared to performance on an ID shift that 
had been selected as an appropriate comparison shift before the study began. Masking
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had opposite effects on these comparable shifts, as opposed to increasing the difficulty 
of both shifts.
A significant deficit in ED shift peiformance was not found in the Mask group, 
although the results are supportive of the experimental hypothesis in that masking had 
differential effects on ID and ED shifts. It is possible that an experimental manipulation 
that caused a greater increase in the ID-ED difference could magnify this difference to 
the extent that a statistically significant ED shift deficit would be seen in the Mask 
group. There is reason to believe that the manipulation used in this study was not 
strong. For example, subjects’ decision times indicate that selection o f a response after 
the ED shift occurred well within the display time of 750 ms. Also, the presence of a 
masking stimulus did not ensure that subjects could not engage in mental reconstruction 
of the stimulus after feedback. The masking stimulus should have disrupted any visual 
afterimage of the stimuli, but stimulus reconstruction could only be reliably prevented if 
subjects were required to engage in an attentionally demanding task after a response 
was made. A future experiment that compared display times that differed by more than 
250 ms - for example, 700 ms vs. 1400 ms - and required subjects to complete a 
distracting task after making a response might create a larger effect and achieve a 
significant selective ED shift deficit in the masking group.
3.3,4.3 Comparison with Study 1
Further supportive evidence for the experimental hypothesis can be obtained by 
comparing the results of this study with those of the healthy young subjects in Study 1. 
The results for this group were not reported but can be briefly summarised; 11 students 
were tested whose mean errors to criterion at both ID and ED shifts were all very close 
to 1. This can be compared with ID and ED shifts errors scores of 4 and 20 respectively 
in this study. The principal methodological differences between Study 1 and this study 
were that Study 1 used simple, easily discriminable stimuli and imposed no restriction 
on stimulus display time; the subjects for both studies were drawn from the same 
population (undergraduate and postgraduate students). Thus, restricting display time 
and using ‘difficult’ stimuli in this study elevated ID shift errors from 1 to 4 and ED 
shift errors from 1 to 20. It can be argued that restricting stimulus discriminability and 
display time in this study acted in the same fashion as masking was thought to act, and 
affected ED shifting much more than ID shifting. The first stage in this argument is to 
explain why there was no ID-ED difference in Study 1.
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Young subjects in Study 1 were performing at a ‘ceiling’ for both ID and ED 
shifts. It appears that they could carry out perfect hypothesis-testing at both types of 
shift. For example, a subjects could test the rule ‘green’ by pressing a green square that 
s/he had studied for an unlimited time; after receiving negative feedback s/he could 
easily reject the rules ‘green’ and ‘square’, recalling the stimulus if necessaiy. Subjects 
could acquire information from both dimensions and if they were using this ‘perfect’ 
method they should have been able to solve any shift in 0, 1 or 2 errors. 96.4% of shifts 
were completed in 2 errors or less by young subjects in Study 1, providing empirical 
confirmation that perfect hypothesis-testing was present for both ID and ED shifts. In 
comparison to Study 1, this study shows a small increase in ID shift errors (from 1 to 4) 
and a large increase in ED shift errors (from 1 to 20). The increase in ID shift errors in 
this study can be attributed to subjects occasionally confusing the ‘difficult’ exemplars 
and to the fact that lapses of attention cause errors when stimulus display time is 
limited. However, both of these factors also apply to the ED shift and therefore cannot 
account for the mean error score of 20 at this shift. The increased errors at the ED shift 
are likely to have arisen from the increased difficulty of carrying out perfect hypothesis- 
testing at the ED shift in this study, due to restricted display time and stimulus difficulty 
acting similarly to the ‘masking’ manipulation in this study. These conditions restricted 
attention to the dimension that was being explicitly tested and made mental 
reconstruction of stimuli difficult. In summary, subjects in this study showed a selective 
ED shift deficit compared to those in Study 1.
3.3.4.4 Accounting fo r  the absolute level o f  ED shift errors
The introduction to this study (Section 3.3.1) suggested that an inability to 
gather information from the ‘untested’ dimension could account for a selective ED shift 
deficit An analysis of the process of hypothesis-testing reveals that whilst such a deficit 
would slow ED shifting, it cannot account for the performance of a subject who makes 
20 errors before reaching criterion. As discussed above, if subjects are using perfect 
hypothesis-testing they can solve a shift in 0, 1 or 2 errors depending upon which 
stimulus pairs appear and what responses they make. This ‘perfect’ performance 
depends upon subjects being able to gather information from both dimensions that are 
present, that is, to be able to draw conclusions about the rules ‘green’ and ‘square’ after 
responding to a green square. If  subjects could only draw conclusions about one 
dimension (for example, ‘green’ from a green square) this would indeed be a 
disadvantage for ED shifting. However, even in this case all ED shifts could be solved
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within 3 errors. After an ED shift, there are 4 exemplars that could be present - for 
example, green, red, square and circle - and even if subjects tested the correct exemplar 
last they would only commit 3 errors. Therefore, an inability to learn about the untested 
dimension cannot account for an ED shift error score of 20.
Analysis of the data from this study cannot reveal the source of the ‘extra’ 
errors that elevate group mean error scores to 20. However, subjects’ accounts of 
hypothesis-testing after the ED shift were consistent and point to a probable 
explanation. It appears that restricted display time and the use of difficult stimuli caused 
some subjects not to notice that there was variation in the dimension that they were not 
testing after the ED shift. For example, subjects might respond to the dimension ‘shape’ 
(the previously relevant dimension) after an ED shift but not notice that there was any 
difference between the two ‘patterns’ being displayed. This is particularly surprising as 
subjects were informed of all the possible dimensions before testing started. Pilot 
testing ensured that the two patterns on display were consistently discriminable, but 
subjects had to ‘notice’ that they differed before these exemplars could be included in 
hypothesis-testing. The ‘extra’ ED shift errors found in this study can be accounted for 
by the time taken for subjects to notice variation in the untested dimension. This 
account of the ‘extra’ errors is speculative and based on the subjective impressions of 
the participants in this study, but the subjects’ descriptions of ED shifting were very 
consistent. Subjects did not report ‘noticing’ the difference in the patterns and 
disregarding it; they reported that they only started to solve the ED shift after noticing 
variation on the untested dimension.
33.4.5 Conclusion
This study found that masking and restriction of stimulus display time had a 
differential effect on the performance of ID and ED shifts. Masking did not simply 
cause an increase in task difficulty, as this would have elevated errors at both the ID and 
ED shifts. A comparison of the results of this study with those of the healthy young 
group in Study 1 reveals that different experimental conditions can permit qualitatively 
different styles of hypothesis-testing. In attempting to create ID and ED shifts that were 
free from ‘ceiling’ effects in Studies 2 to 4, a task was created that differed substantially 
to a superficially similar task in Study 1. The comparison of this study with Study 1 did 
support arguments about the importance of gathering information from the ‘untested’ 
dimension, but this cannot explain the level of errors committed at the ED shift in this
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study. All account of the generation of these errors has been suggested on the basis of 
subjects’ accounts of their performance of the ED shift.
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4.1 Introduction
As noted in Section 1.2, one of the most disabling features of PD is an impairment of 
voluntary movements. Clinically, this is apparent as “akinesia” (inability to initiate 
movement) and “bradykinesia” (slowness of movement). In the laboratory, an initiation 
impairment has been quantified by measuring reaction time (RT) to unpredictable stimuli. 
Patients with PD have frequently (but not always) been shown to have longer RTs than 
controls. It has recently become apparent that this slowing of RT is dependent on the 
particular sensory and motor parameters of the testing. What is not clear is the behavioral 
aspects of the tasks which make them vulnerable to the effects of the disease. Identifying 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for parkinsonian impairment (that is to say, the 
critical parameters of impaired tasks) is an important goal of research into PD in particular 
and the functions of the basal ganglia in general. In order to do this, a variety of behavioural 
tasks are required in which some features of testing are held constant while other 
parameters are varied. These tasks may then be compared to dissociate processes that are 
spared and impaired in PD. RT tasks take two basic forms. In a choice RT task, a response 
is selected from two or more alternatives, conditional on the nature of the imperative 
stimulus. In contrast, the same response is made across all trials in a simple RT task. One of 
the first studies to use a variety of RT tasks to study patients with PD was that of Evarts et 
al. (1981). They identified a group of patients with RT deficits but normal movement times 
and showed that parkinsonian RT impairments were specific to initiation and not merely 
due to bradykinesia. Despite the promise of using RT tasks, there is little consensus about 
which tasks are sensitive to deficits in PD. Most investigators would agree that patients 
with PD show a deficit in simple RT, but deficits in choice RT are unpredictable and the 
effect of dopaminergic medication on RT measures is also unclear.
In this review, three issues will be addressed that relate to RT deficits in PD. The 
first is whether there is a deficit in motor preprogramming, the second concerns the effects 
of dopaminergic medication on RTs and the third is the existence of deficits in simple RT 
tasks. Studies will be reviewed under each of these headings and a quantitative analysis of 
the past literature will be carried out.
In the first section, the literature concerned with a deficit in motor pre­
programming will be reviewed. It has been suggested that movement initiation difficulties 
might arise from a failure of “intentional action” (Frith and Done, 1986), which might be 
manifested as an inability to use advance information about the nature of a movement to
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speed its initiation. The idea that patients have a deficit in motor preprogramming - 
specifically, that they are unable to derive a RT benefit from the provision of information 
indicating which one of a number of possible responses will be required - has been popular, 
partly due to its elegant simplicity and the ease with which it might be tested. For example, 
cues which precede the imperative can convey all, little or no information. In a fully-cued 
task, information about the nature of the required response (e.g. a left/right button press) is 
made available before the imperative signal. Control subjects respond more quickly when 
cues are available and this performance improvement is taken to reflect the benefit of being 
able to prepare the movement in advance. This movement preparation is, of course, a type 
of motor set. On both cued and uncued trials, the imperative signal is the same; however, an 
internal ‘predisposition’ speeds response initiation on cued trials. It is important to note 
that, although many investigators have assumed them to be identical, fully-cued RT tasks 
are equivalent to simple RT tasks on neither theoretical nor empirical grounds (Jahanshahi 
et ah, 1992a). For cued and simple RT tasks to be equivalent, the subject must have had 
sufficient time to use the cue to prepare the required response and the response must be 
prepared as completely as if it were the same on each trial. At short cue-imperative delays 
(for example 250 ms - Bloxham et ah, 1984), this may not be the case. Empirically, it has 
been demonstrated that movement times are faster in a simple RT condition compared to a 
fully-cued choice condition, implying different processes may be at work (Jahanshahi et ah, 
1992a). Therefore, in considering the ability of patients with PD to use advance information 
to prepare a response (the “motor preprogramming” section of this review), only those 
studies making a comparison of cued and uncued choice RT will be included, rather than a 
comparison of choice RT with a true “simple” RT. The review will be followed by a 
quantitative analysis of past results.
In the second section, the effects of medication withdrawal on RT performance is 
reviewed, with a view to determining which, if any, of the RT deficits are sensitive to levels 
of dopamine. Studies of medication manipulations can be informative in two ways. First, 
they may allow identification of dopamine-dependent cognitive and motor processes. 
Second, such studies are an essential adjunct to conventional experiments on patients with 
PD: many patients participating in RT studies have been on medication for a number of 
years and withdrawal studies can reveal how much of their performance is influenced by 
the drugs that they are taking. In a study of the effects of medication withdrawal, Harrison 
et al. (1995) conclude that much of the previous literature is methodologically flawed. For 
example, studies have frequently used low numbers, have failed to control for order-of- 
testing effects or have not included contiol groups. Furthermore, medication manipulations
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have differed radically, from overnight withdrawal to the study of spontaneous “on-off’ 
motor fluctuations in advanced patients. Harrison et al. (1995) provide a useful summary of 
mean RTs taken from past studies of medication effects, as well as a valuable 
methodological critique; this will be expanded into a full literature review and quantitative 
analysis.
Impairment of simple RT has been cited as a consistent consequence of PD 
(Jahanshahi et al., 1992a). This deficit has been associated with a failure of a type of motor 
set in patients with PD (‘attentional focussing’ - see Section 1.5). Section 4.4 will establish 
whether simple RT, and by extension attentional focussing, is consistently impaired in PD.
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4.2 Motor Preprogramming
4.2.1 Review
111 1981, Evarts et al. compared cued and uncued two choice RT tasks, using visual and 
kinaesthetic imperative signals. Although they did not invoke a deficit in motor 
preprogramming to account for their results, this study prompted many of the other studies 
described here. Evarts et al. found a significant parkinsonian impairment in the cued RT 
condition (which they refer to as simple RT), but, to their surprise, the patients’ RTs in the 
uncued condition were not selectively longer than in the cued condition. Control subjects 
were not tested in the uncued condition, but it was noted that the cued-uncued difference for 
their patients was much less than had been recorded for elderly controls in prior studies 
(e.g. Tallaiid, 1963), thus, the patients appeared to be impaired in the cued but not the 
uncued condition. This result was unanticipated, particularly as it contradicted the 
subtractive logic of Doiiders (1969), which proposes that a cued condition should be 
equivalent to an uncued condition, with the stage of “response selection” removed. This 
anomaly was noted but not investigated further by Evarts et al. (1981).
The finding of Evarts et al. (1981) does appear to rule out the possibility of 
Donderian “stage processing” - how is it possible that uncued choice RT is not impaired 
whereas cued choice RT, with all its “stages” in common with the uncued condition, but 
with fewer stages overall, is impaired? It is logical to assume that cued choice RT is not 
equivalent to uncued with a stage deleted, but rather is a qualitatively different task. 
Bloxham et al. (1984) replicated Evarts et al.’s study (testing a control group for all 
conditions) and proposed a plausible interpretation of tlieir own and the Evarts et al. data. 
They examined cued and uncued choice RT. Either a cue or a warning signal was given 250 
or 2000 ms in advance of the imperative stimulus and patients were found to be impaired 
relative to controls in the cued, but not the uncued condition. Bloxham et al. interpreted this 
result as the patients’ failure to make use of the cue to prepare (or “preprogram”) a 
response. In a separate tracking experiment, patients were shown to be capable of using 
advance information to control the direction of an ongoing movement; Bloxham et al. 
concluded that the parkinsonian deficit was an impaired ability to make use of advance 
information to initiate a movement, whereas guidance was intact.
Three studies (Bloxham et al., 1987; Heilman at al., 1976; Jahanshahi et a l, 1992a) 
have manipulated the presence of a warning stimulus in their designs, which cued subjects 
as to the imminent arrival of the imperative stimulus, but gave them no information about 
the nature of the response required. Patients and controls benefited equally from the
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presence of a warning stimulus in all of these studies, implying that Bloxham et al.’s (1984) 
results were specific to motor preprogramming and not merely an effect of arousal or 
stimulus anticipation. One inconsistent report has attempted to replicate and extend the 
effect in a study of the “on” and “o ff’ phases of late PD (Girotti et al., 1986). Patients were 
impaired on a cued, three-choice RT task, but unlike in Bloxliam et al.’s (1984) study they 
also suffered from a significant deficit in an uncued three-choice task, irrespective of the 
“on” and “o ff’ phase (Girotti et al., 1986). Instead of showing a motor preprogramming 
deficit, these results imply a simple, consistent deficit across both tasks; the parkinsonian 
(“on” phase) deficit is 109 ms in the cued condition and 106 ms in the uncued condition 
(figures from table 2 of Girotti et al., 1986).
Using Rosenbaum’s (1980) partial cueing methodology, Stelmach et al. (1986) 
assessed the performance of patients when given partial information of the parameters 
(arm, direction, extent) of a required movement. These parameters were either unspecified 
(uncued condition), fully specified (cued condition) or one or two of the three parameters 
were given. The results of this study also did not support the hypothesis of a motor 
preprogramming deficit. Patients were significantly impaired across all conditions, but 
benefited from the various levels of precueing to the same extent as controls. This study 
clearly allowed a more comprehensive analysis of motor preprogramming abilities than the 
previous work, including that of Bloxham et al. (1984) and the authors concluded that 
Bloxham et al.’s claims of a motor preprogramming deficit were “somewhat overstated” . 
Again, the possibility of a general RT deficit in PD that does not vary across experimental 
conditions is raised.
Sheridan et al. (1987) were able to replicate Bloxliam et al.’s (1984) results, in a 
study to investigate the significance of increasing the movement difficulty for patients with 
PD. An ‘index of difficulty’ (ID) is defined by Fitts’ ratio rule as a function of movement 
amplitude and target size (Fitts, 1954). The ID was varied across trials and, for some blocks 
of trials, the required movement was cued prior to target onset. Patients’ RTs were 
significantly longer than controls’, but only when the movement was cued in advance. This 
pattern of impairment is suggestive of a motor preprogramming deficit. However, Robbins 
and Brown (1990) have criticised this conclusion, noting that the effect of cueing did not 
vary with the difficulty of the movement whereas one might expect that cueing should 
provide a greater RT benefit for more difficult movements. They have also suggested that 
the movement time data in Sheridan et al.’s (1987) study indicate that responses may have 
been coming under the control of visual feedback after movement initiation, which would 
suggest that initiation times might not be an accurate measure of motor preprogramming.
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Some of the anomalous data on motor preprogramming abilities might be 
accounted for by medication effects. Pullman et al. (1990) partially replicated Bloxham et 
al.’s results; RTs (as in Girotti et al., 1986; Stelmach et al., 1986) were lengthened in 
patients relative to controls in both cued and uncued conditions. Patients show a statistically 
nonsignificant 49 ms advantage of the cueing, whereas controls show a statistically 
significant 80 ms benefit of cueing (figures estimated from Figure 1 of Pullman et al.,
1990) at clinically optimal (“high”) levodopa infusion levels). This result raises the 
possibility of two dissociable patterns of RT deficit in PD - a deficit in motor 
preprogramming, which might sometimes be masked by an additional generalised slowing 
of RT across all conditions. However, this view still does not account for all the data. 
Lichter et al. (1988) incorporated cued and uncued two-choice RT tasks into their 
investigation into the relationship between motor, cognitive and computed tomographic 
variables in PD. No significant parkinsonian deficit was found in the cued tasks, but a 
deficit was found in the uncued condition. This is clearly contrary to previous results and 
resistant to any interpretation involving deficits of motor preprogramming. Interestingly, 
both Alzheimer’s disease and closed head injury may result in slowed choice RT, and 
simple RT has been found to be spared in these conditions (Gordon and Carson, 1990; 
Miller, 1970). Lichter et al.’s patient group were particularly severely impaired (one third 
of the patient group were in Hoehn-Yahr stages four and five) and therefore might be more 
representative of generalised neurological trauma.
Two recent studies have used designs to test explicitly the hypothesis of a deficit in 
motor preprogramming. Jahanshahi et al. (1992a) controlled for delay between preparatory 
and imperative signals and also the type of advance information provided. The study 
included a simple RT task and four choice tasks with uncued, partially cued (2 types) and 
fully cued conditions. There were also conditions involving a noninformative warning 
stimulus and all conditions made use of unpredictable foreperiods from 0 to 3200 ms. The 
results do not support the presence of a deficit in motor preprogramming in PD. The 
clearest example of this comes from comparing the Parkinsonian deficit in the fully cued, 
partially cued and uncued four-choice RT conditions, where the group by condition 
interaction did not reach significance. Jahanshahi et al. (in agreement with Stelmach et al.,
1986) conclude that patients can make full use of advance information to preprogram their 
responses. They suggest that the parkinsonian impairment may be found at a different stage 
in processing, such as response initiation. Using similar methodology, Brown et al. (1993a) 
drew the same conclusion in the course of their study of stimulus-response compatibility in 
PD. Willingham et al. (1995) tested patients with Huntington’s disease and those with PD,
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to allow comparison between two degenerative disorders of the basal ganglia; both patient 
groups showed normal use of advance information to speed their reactions, but with a 
significant overall deficit.
The initial finding of Bloxham et al. (1984), although it has been replicated a 
number of times, is unlikely to be due to a deficit in motor preprogramming per se, as 
numerous studies designed specifically to reveal such a deficit have failed to do so. Below, 
alternative possibilities that might account for these data are considered.
4.2.2 Comment
The replications of Bloxham et al.’s results do appear to rule out the possibility of 
Donderian “stage processing”. It is logical to assume that the cued RT is not equivalent to 
deleting stages from an uncued choice RT but rather is qualitatively different. Once a 
psychological dissociation is accepted, it is not unreasonable to suggest that there may also 
be a neural dissociation. Frith and Done (1986) provide one possibility, that there are 
multiple “routes to action” and that these routes are differentially dependent upon internal 
control. The ‘fast route’ governs responses which are completely prespecified (as in a 
simple RT task): in this case, the required movement is ‘held in mind’ until the imperative 
signal. When it is not possible to select the response until after the imperative (a choice RT 
task) either the ‘slow’ or the ‘direct’ route will govern the RT. If the associations between 
the stimuli and the responses are compatible, such that it is not necessary to consult an 
internal mapping to select the response, the ‘direct route’ governs the RT. On the other 
hand, the slow route will be navigated whenever the stimulus-response associations must be 
‘held in mind’ to be consulted. Thus, in the operation of both the fast and the slow routes, a 
response or a stimulus-response mapping is ‘held in mind’, and these routes to action are 
therefore particularly dependent upon internal control and, consequently, particularly 
vulnerable to striatal dopamine depletion. In the direct route, the stimulus implies the 
response and no such internal control is required and, consequently, the operation of this 
route is not impaired by striatal dopamine depletion. This account is intuitively plausible 
and fits well with observations both from the clinic (e.g., patients showing less impairments 
when given visual cues to guide their movements - Martin, 1967; Schwab, 1972) and from 
neuropsychological experimentation that patients are more impaired when their actions are 
under “internal control” (Stam et al., 1993). However, one of the problems with this 
formulation is that it is vulnerable to post hoc interpretation of the data: it is not always 
obvious whether an action is “internal” or “external” and it is tempting to use the presence 
or absence of a deficit in the patient group as the defining feature. For example, in the
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discussion of their Experiment III, Frith and Done (1986) state that "when there was no 
precue subjects would use the ‘slow’ route” but ‘‘when a precue was given... in advance 
subjects would use the ‘fast’ route” (p. 173). In either case, both the slow and the fast routes 
are described as "strategic” and involving “will” or “internal intention”. They go on to say 
(p. 175) that “problems in the control of action observed in patients with PD are consistent 
with an impairment in the route by which internal acts of will control responses”, which 
would appear to suggest that patients should be impaired in both the slow and the fast 
routes. However, Bloxham et al. (1984) use what appear to be the same RT tasks, involving 
the fast (precued condition) and slow (uncued condition) routes. However, they found 
impairments only in the precued and not in the uncued condition. This implies that the task 
has been incorrectly assigned a route and the uncued condition is not a slow route task but 
is a “direct route” task, as Bloxliam et al. (1984) claim. This ambiguity indicates that the 
“routes” approach might not be predictive of a deficit in PD and thus diminishes its 
explanatory power.
An alternative to the “internal-external” dichotomy has been raised in two papers 
(Hallett, 1990; Robbins and Brown, 1990). They suggested that the assumption of 
psychological and neurological dissociation between actions controlled internally and those 
guided by external stimuli might be premature. Hallett (1990) proposed that one might 
assume that all RT tasks involve an initiation stage, which has a fixed value. This value 
would result in a “floor” on the most rapid response (for example, 200 ms for the normal 
system). This movement initiation stage is the main determinant of minimum RT in simple 
RT tasks. I f  the initiation stage were lengthened in PD, this would result in an impairment 
on all simple RT tasks. In choice RT tasks, Hallett proposed that the initiation stage runs in 
parallel with processes of response selection. Lengthened movement initiation would 
therefore result in a choice RT deficit in patients only in those tasks where the intiation 
stage takes longer than response selection. One would expect to see a choice RT deficit in 
patients in tasks where response selection can be achieved rapidly, as the movement 
initiation stage is then the rate-limiting step for patients and controls. A RT deficit in 
patients with PD would therefore be seen in tasks where RTs are rapid, and approaching the 
minimum latency imposed by the movement initiation stage. No RT deficit should be seen 
amongst patients in tasks which result in slower RTs, as here the principal determinant of 
RT is the process of response selection which is presumed to be unimpaired in patients. 
Thus, this hypothesis allows for differential deficits in different tasks, but the probability of 
an impairment in a particular task will depend upon the speed with which the task is 
normally performed, with faster tasks being more vulnerable to the effects of the disease
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than tasks with slower RTs. This would predict the differential slowing of cued choice RTs 
seen in patients with PD, as cued tasks are usually performed more quickly than uncued 
tasks. Robbins and Brown (1990) suggested that dopamine is a “limited resource” needed 
for response initiation, with more dopamine needed for fast RTs. When this resource is 
depleted, as in the case of PD, fast RTs (requiring more dopamine) will be impaired first 
with slower RTs impaired as the disease progresses. Conversely, dopamine replacement 
therapy will restore dopamine levesl sufficient for normal performance of slower RTs and 
gradually restore the deficits in ever faster RT tasks as dose is increased. This hypothesis 
would also predict a differential parkinsonian deficit in cued RT tasks, as well as making 
clear predictions about the effects of medication.
4.2.3 Quantitative analysis
4.2.3.1 General method.
A  database of studies which reported the RT performance of patients with PD and 
control subjects was constructed. Studies were found using online literature databases 
{BIDS 1982-1996, Medline 1985-1996), and also by searching leading journals that publish 
behavioural studies of PD (such as Brain; Journal ofNettrologyf, Neurosurgery and 
Psychiatjy; Neuropsychologia; Neurology; Movement Disorders). The following types of 
study were excluded:
1. Those in which initiation times were obtained from EMG recordings or eye 
movements, as these studies resulted in RTs for patients and controls which were 
particularly fast and outliers with respect to the bulk of the data set.
2. Those in which the RTs corresponded to “thinking” times for “cognitive” tasks 
such as memory scanning, planning etc. These studies also resulted in outliers, being 
particulai'ly slow, and potentially would have conflated measures of movement initiation 
with the cognitive deficits of PD.
3. Those which involved serial RT tasks (e.g. Ferraro et al., 1993) or sequence 
learning or repetition tasks (e.g. Rafal et al., 1987). Although the dependent measures in 
these studies are speeded responses to an external stimulus, they are dissimilar to the 
simple, rapid responses to imperative stimuli required in conventional RT studies.
If the studies included data which were collected under conditions of varying 
medication, only the conditions in which patients were on their normal medication regime 
were included, except when looking specifically at the effects of medication. 44 studies 
were included, from which mean or median RT values were taken (measured from
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magnified graphs or, where available, from data presented in tables) from as many different 
conditions as were presented in the individual studies.
The use of raw RT values for our quantitative analysis requires some justification, 
as meta-analytical techniques usually call for effect sizes to be used when summarising the 
results of past studies. The use of effect sizes is inappropriate here, due to the well- 
established fact that variance increases proportionally to mean RT (see Luce, 1986). This 
effect would lead to spuriously low effect sizes in studies with long RTs, due to increased 
variance in patient and control groups. This relationship is particularly significant, as past 
research has led us to suspect a relationship between the size of the parkinsonian RT deficit 
and control group RT (Brown et al., 1993b; Robbins and Brown, 1990).
4.23.2 Are patients impaired in the use o f  advance information?
Studies which tested the hypothesis that patients are differentially impaired in the use of 
advance information to select and prepare a response (Appendix 2) were selected. In these 
studies, a comparison was made between a two (or more) choice RT and a task in which 
there was a precue to indicate the correct choice prior to the imperative signal. If patients 
with PD are impaired in using advance information to program their responses, it would be 
expected that there would be a greater difference between control and patients’ RT in the 
cued compared to the uncued condition.
The studies were carefully screened to ensure that a comparison was made between 
cued and uncued choice RT and not between simple and choice RTs. Only completely 
uncued and fully cued conditions were included; partial cueing conditions, or those in 
which cues were sometimes invalid (as in the “covert orienting” paradigm - Posner, 1978), 
were not used. Table 4.1 shows the mean group RTs for two choice RT tasks. In support of 
this hypothesis, the patient groups were, on average, more impaired in cued compared to 
uncued choice RT.
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Control PD PD deficit
CUED
Mean 358.00 463.89 105.89
S.E.M. (26.63) (24.31)
UNCUED
Mean 439.33 508.00 68.67
S.E.M. (36.67) (25.82)
Effect of cue: 81.33 44.61
Table 4.1: Mean RTs fo r patient groups and control groups fo r the cued and uncued 
conditions o f  the 2 choice RT studies listed in Appendix 2. The right-hand column show the 
mean RT deficit fo r  patients with PD in cued and uncued conditions. Values in parentheses 
represent the standard error o f  the mean.
However, in some studies, the number of choices used in a choice RT task was greater than 
two. In these cases, it might be expected that an inability to use advance information would 
result in patients showing an even greater impairment relative to controls in the cued 
condition as the number of choices increased; presumably tlie benefits of precueing should 
be greater as the number of potential responses increases. However, this was not found to 
be the case. Figure 4.1 shows the effects of advance information on RT of patients and 
controls as a function of number of choices in the task. It is clear that for the multiple (>2) 
choice RT tasks the average patient impairment in the uncued condition is at least as great, 
if not greater, than in the cued condition. Like control subjects, patients show a greater 
benefit of cueing in tasks that include more than two possible responses. Furthermore there 
is absolutely no evidence of a greater parkinsonian deficit in these tasks. This was 
confirmed by an ANOVA on the means of conditions (Cueing x Number of choices x 
Group, F{\, 24) = 4.83,/? < .05). This is hard to explain in terms of a deficit in motor 
preprogramming; patients appear to have an overall deficit in the use of cues, but do not 
have a greater deficit where cues are more useful (>2 choice tasks).
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Figure 4.1: Means o f  patient ("PD") and control group RTs taken fi'om studies in Appendix 
2. Open circles are patients andfilled circles are controls performing fully cued and 
uncued RT tasks. The filled  lines connect points representing two-choice RT tasks (2 CRT), 
and points on the dotted lines represent conditions in which there were more than two 
response choices (2+ CRT).
The data were then examined in a different way: control group RT was plotted against 
patient RT. A general RT impairment in the patients would result in a linear relationship 
(with a slope of 1) between control and patient RT, but with the patients having a generally 
longer RT (i.e., a greater intercept). If, however, there were a differential deficit in the use 
of advance information, there would be a discontinuity in the data, with cued RTs being 
more impaired than uncued RT (i.e., parallel lines with slopes of 1 but with a greater 
intercept for the cued tasks). Neither were found to be the case; when regressions were
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fitted to the relationship for both preened and uncued choice RT, the slopes were 
remarkably similar and both were less than 1. The best predictor of the degree of deficit in 
the patients was the RT of the control group such that faster control group RTs are 
associated with greater patient deficits, as shown in the inset graph (regression coefficient: 
slope = -0.17 ms deficit/control ms, intercept = 163.2 ms, = 0.15, r{26) = 0.381,/? < .05).
Thus, it appears that there is a relationship between RTs of control subjects and 
patients with PD, such that in tasks where control subjects react most quickly, patients are 
most likely to be impaired. In tasks with longer control group RTs, patients are less likely 
to be impaired or the degree of impairment is less severe.
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Figure 4.2. Patient ( “PD ”) versus control group RTs, perforining cued and uncued choice 
R T tasks (Appendix 2). Filled circles and the unbroken regression line represent gi'oup 
performance on uncued conditions, open circles and the broken line represent fully cued 
conditions. INSET: Parkinsonian deficit (patient RT minus control group RT; “PD deficit”)  
plotted against conti^ol group RT. The regi'ession line shown is fo r all data on the plot. 
Inclusion and symbols are the same as fo r the main plot.
This significant relationship is all the more remarkable given the fact that the 
patient groups between studies were heterogeneous: clinical ratings (most often, Hoehn 
and Yahr) are given in most of the reports and the degree of impairment within and between 
studies reflects a wide range on this rating scale (patients ranged from Hoehn-Yahr stages 
one to five). In all of the studies included in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the patients were optimally 
medicated, with medication including levodopa alone or in combination with 
anticholinergics, dopamine agonists and/or MAO-B inhibitors. The effect of levodopa
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medication on RT of patients with PD is another controversial area in the literature and 
therefore this issue is examined in the following section.
135
4.3 Effects of medication
4.3.1 Review
Patients who participate in studies of RT are usually on long-term dopaminergic medication 
(in particular, levodopa). It is unclear how this medication affects their performance and 
this can be studied by manipulating their medication status. Some studies have directly 
examined the effects of dopaminergic medication on RTs and some have included a 
medication withdrawal condition in experiments designed to test a different hypothesis. 
Withdrawal of medication may reveal the mechanisms behind the deficits of PD; levodopa 
medication does not alleviate all symptoms equally (Velasco and Velasco, 1973) and 
associations and dissociations of symptoms allow inferences about both underlying 
processes and the role of dopamine in the symptoms of the disease. These data could also 
be used to support theories of normal function.
Notwithstanding significant alterations in clinical status after medication 
administration/withdrawal, a number of studies have found no statistically significant 
change in RTs. As a result, some authors have argued that RT is a poor index of disease 
status (Harrison et al., 1995). This raises the question of what is being measured in studies 
that do show a significant RT deficit when medication is withdrawn and also why most 
studies reveal some measurable, if statistically non-significant, slowing of RT when 
patients are off medication (see Table 1 of Harrison et al. 1995). The failure to find a 
significant RT deficit may be due to limitations of these studies. Harrison et al. have made a 
valuable methodological critique of most of the studies published to date, citing low 
numbers, failure to counterbalance order of testing and lack of control groups as possible 
causes of low statistical power and nonsignificant effects.
A further source of error may lie in the medication manipulations chosen. Four 
methods have been used (and mixed): (a) spontaneous “on-off’ fluctuations in motor status, 
(b) patients going onto medication for the first time, (c) withdrawal of medication and (d) 
direct intravenous infusion of levodopa. These methods are clearly not equivalent and 
consequently may not generate comparable results. In this section, the approach will be to 
review the studies in detail, citing their designs and medication manipulations and then to 
look for general trends witli a quantitative analysis of past results.
4.3.1.1 Studies that have failed to find  a significant effect o f medication
Rapid fluctuations (“on-off’) in motor state are common in advanced PD. As patients fall 
into the debilitating “o ff’ state, it appears as if the beneficial effects of their medication
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have been abruptly removed. Two studies have tested patients in on and off states. Rafal et 
al. (1984) studied six patients whilst experiencing both on and off states and four before 
and after taking levodopa for the first time. Use of a covert orienting paradigm (Posner,
1978) allowed separation of cognitive and motor processes and patients showed no 
disruption of selective attentional mechanisms when off medication. Despite the dramatic 
alterations of clinical status between on and off states, however, the slowing of RT was 
nonsignificant. Although Rafal et al. (1984) did counterbalance the order of testing o f the 
on-off patients, their patient group was heterogeneous. The patients with motor fluctuations 
were presumably in the later stages of PD (although described as cognitively intact) and 
those never previously medicated were presumably only mildly affected (although two 
were described as having “early dementia”). Lack of a significant effect on RT may have 
been due to highly variable subject characteristics, a limited number of subjects (on-off, n = 
6; first medication, n = 4) and the mixture of two different medication manipulations.
Girotti et al. (1986) studied 21 patients in on and off states and an elderly control 
group. Being in an off state produced a nonsignificant slowing of similar size in precued 
and uncued three-choice RT tasks. Although Girotti et al. counterbalanced the order of 
testing (on-off, off-on), high variance may have resulted in the failure to find a significant 
RT deficit: despite the relatively large subject sample, patients’ RTs in the off state had a 
standard deviation of 189 and 156 ms compared to 67 and 82 ms in controls (from Tables 2 
and 3 of Girotti et al., 1986). Although on-off fluctuations cause large and frequently 
distressing changes in motor symptoms, it appears from both sets of results reviewed so far 
that they do not cause consistent changes in RT (Girotti et al., 1986; Rafal et al., 1987). It is 
important to note that the majority of patients in both of these studies were still medicated 
(although Rafal et al. (1987) sometimes delayed a dose in order to keep individuals in an 
off state) and inferences about dopaminergic function are not based on direct manipulation 
of medication status.
Two studies have recorded RTs from patients before and after starting levodopa 
therapy. Velasco and Velasco (1973) recorded simple RTs before and after putting patients 
on huge doses of levodopa (averaging 5.5g per day). Monthly follow-up assessments were 
made seven times whilst patients were on levodopa, but despite selecting “the study 
[follow-up] that showed maximal improvement for each patient” (p. 93), no significant 
improvement in simple RT was found (a speeding of 66 ms was seen). It is surprising that 
no significant increment in RT could be found despite large medication doses, selective use 
of data and no control for practice effects.
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Where order of testing cannot be counterbalanced, control groups are clearly 
needed. Jordan et al. (1992) assessed age-matched controls twice for comparison with off- 
on medication testing in patients. Patients were randomised to either bromocriptine, 
benzhexol or levodopa monotherapy. Jordan et al, report significant clinical improvements 
for all three groups, but only a nonsignificant improvement in simple and go/no-go choice 
RT. It is impossible to assess the role of levodopa specifically here; no significant 
differences were found for RTs for patients on the three different therapies, but with only 
seven patients in each group, this may be due to lack of statistical power. The authors also 
do not report the interval between testing off and on medication, making comparisons with 
other studies problematic.
Overnight withdrawal of medication allows substantial time without drugs to elapse 
with least distress to the patient. Patients are usually asked to delay their morning dose of 
levodopa until after testing has been completed. A related method is asking patients to skip 
a dose, as used in one study of simple RT (Bloxham et al., 1987). Patients were tested after 
a medication fast of, on average, nine hours and, subsequently, one hour after taking 
medication. Administration of medication after the fast produced only a nonsignificant 
speeding of RT, which did not interact with the presence of either a temporal warning 
signal or a secondary task. Controls were tested twice to account for their fixed (off-on) 
order of testing, which makes the design of this study robust (Bloxham et al., 1987). The 
authors attribute their failure to find a significant RT effect to their medication 
manipulation, particularly retesting only one hour after administration of levodopa, an 
interval which allowed only a “variable” improvement in clinical condition. One other 
study (Montgomery and Nuessen, 1990) has used a similar manipulation and found a 
significant RT effect, but it suffers from a number of methodological problems that will be 
discussed in the following section.
Starkstein et al. (1989) used a longer withdrawal period and more severely disabled 
patients. All seven patients experienced severe on-off fluctuations and stopped taking 
medication at least 24 hours before testing. Simple RTs to auditory stimuli were tested after 
the medication was stopped and again after medication had restored patients to their “best” 
motor state (established before the study). Changes in clinical status between off and on 
states were dramatic, but no significant improvement in RT performance was seen.
Two further studies have failed to find any effect of medication on RTs using 
overnight withdrawal. .Tahansliahi et al. (1992b), using the same design as their 1992a study 
described above, used a relatively long withdrawal period (average 14.4 hours) and 
compared data from this session with another when patients were fully medicated.
Withdrawal produced no deficits in either simple or choice RT, nor did it affect patients’ 
ability to use advance information to speed movements. This provides a replication of 
Girotti et al. (1986)’s study, which indicated that patients showed equal benefits of 
precueing a response in both on and off states. Neither Girotti et al. (1986) nor Jahanshalii 
et al. (1992a) found a deficit in using advance information, but it is now clear that their 
prior results were not simply a consequence of testing long-term medicated patients. 
Jahanshalii et al. used a fixed on-off order of testing (1992b). They did not include a control 
group and cannot adequately rule out practice effects masking a deficit in the off stage. 
Labiitta et al. (1994) did test control subjects, but only once, which fails to provide any 
information about practice effects in their on-off design. Patients could successfully store 
and use advance information about a movement for up to eight seconds, both when 
medicated and after an overnight fast. Labutta et al. (1994) withdrew medication from only 
five of their ten subjects and gave no information about the disease severity of these five - 
the original group of ten varied from Hoehn-Yahr stages 1.5 to 4. Once again, low subject 
numbers, high subject variability and practice effects might have made even a strong 
medication effect hard to detect, thus, this negative result cannot be used to draw any strong 
conclusions.
The work of Pullman et al. (1988, 1990) stands apart for its highly sophisticated 
manipulations of medication levels. Levodopa was infused intravenously at levels 
calibrated to provide each patient with maximal (high, on), minimal (low, off) and a 
medium (mid) clinical response. With increasing levels of levodopa, simple RTs showed a 
clear, although statistically nonsignificant, speeding and directional 2-choice RTs were 
significantly faster (1988). Two years later, Pullman et al. (1990) found no significant 
effects of levodopa on cued and uncued 2-choice RTs using movement amplitude as the 
response. This led them to propose a distinction between amplitude and directional choice 
RT tasks, but this hypothesis has since been tested and not supported (Jones et al., 1993). 
Pullman et al. (1988, 1990) tested only five patients and five controls. Furthermore, the 
controls were tested only once and there is no information provided about the order in 
which the patients were tested at the three levodopa levels. These aspects of the design limit 
the effectiveness of their superior pharmacological manipulation. A greater number of 
subjects may have resulted in statistically significant effects and avoided the 
direction/amplitude dissociation.
The studies described above are consistent in that they report that obvious clinical 
changes caused by medication manipulation are not necessarily accompanied by a 
statistically significant alteration in RT. Another consistent aspect of these studies is
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inadequate design: seven out of ten have ten or fewer patients and six out o f ten fail to 
counterbalance testing order or include two tests of a control group.
4.3.1.2 Studies that have found a statistically significant effect o f  medication 
Pullman et al. reported significant differences in two-choice RT in patients at different 
levels of plasma levodopa, using the methods described above (1988). There was a large 
RT deficit for both simple and choice tasks when patients on the low (off) dose were 
compared with controls; optimal levels of levodopa almost completely “medicated away” 
the choice RT deficit, but had less of an effect on simple RTs. Two other studies compare 
the effect of medication on simple and two or more choice RTs. Jahanshalii et al. (1992b) 
did not show a similar effect; uncued four choice RTs were found to be fractionally faster 
when patients were off medication. As practice effects were not controlled, this result is 
ambiguous. Harrison et al. (1995) found no statistically significant differences between the 
medication effects recorded for simple or two-choice RTs, but although the difference was 
not statistically significant the withdrawal deficit was almost twice as great in the choice 
compared to the simple condition (32 ms and 17 ms, respectively).
The remaining five studies all report a RT deficit after medication withdrawal. 
Zappia et al. (1994) used the most complete withdrawal method yet reported. Medicated 
patients had their dose of levodopa gradually reduced and ultimately stopped. Patients 
(including a never-medicated group) were then tested after reaching “baseline” motor 
conditions, defined as when clinical and RT measurements were similar on two consecutive 
days. Six-choice RTs were recorded for each hand at baseline, then at 1, 1.5, 2 ,4  and 24 
hours after administration of a single 200 mg dose of levodopa. RTs were significantly 
faster than baseline at 1, 1.5, 2 and 4 hours after medication. However, maximal clinical 
benefit and RT speeding were attained two hours after administration of levodopa. This 
finding may account Bloxham et al.’s (1987) failure to detect a significant RT benefit of 
medication, as subjects were tested just one hour after administration in this study. A 
control group was tested once in Zappia et al. (1994)’s study, but practice effects were 
eliminated simply by overtraining; the RT task was performed daily during the gradual 
withdrawal until performance had stabilised at baseline.
Montgomery and Nuessen (1990) studied tradeoffs between speed and accuracy in 
the movements of PD patients, reporting a significant effect of medication withdrawal on 
RT. Medication was withdrawn overnight and simple RTs were tested before and one hour 
after administration of the patients’ normal dose. An analysis of movement times led the 
authors to conclude that the “speed-accuracy operator” was abnormal in patients off
140
medication. RTs were also longer when patients were off. However, the RTs reported in the 
paper are unusually fast for whole arm movements; one patient off medication records a 
mean simple RT of 192.5 ms. Typical simple RTs, involving a button press, of healthy 24 
year-olds have been reported as 222 ms (Goodrich et al., 1990). This raises questions about 
the methods used for recording RT in this experiment.
The last three studies that report RT changes after medication withdrawal do not 
find gross alterations in mean RT. Significant slowing whilst off medication are only seen 
in certain conditions. One study investigated two-choice, left/right RTs where the 
imperative signal had varying degrees of compatibility with the response (Brown et al., 
1993b). Medication withdrawal for at least 24 hours produced no significant changes in 
mean RT, but caused a significant shift in the RT distribution for the tasks with greater 
stimulus-response compatibility.
Malapani et al. (1994) set out to discover whether the parkinsonian deficit in 
performing simultaneous motor acts (Benecke et al., 1986) also applies in the cognitive 
domain. Patients were tested after at least 18 hours of withdrawal and again 90 minutes 
after administration of levodopa. No withdrawal deficits were seen for basic go/no-go RTs 
to visual or auditory stimuli. A deficit was seen in the “concurrent” condition; this was a 
three-choice task required no-go, unimanual or bimanual responses dependent on the 
appearance of visual and/or auditory stimuli. Both unimanual and bimanual responses to 
auditory stimuli were significantly slowed by withdrawal and the authors concluded that 
concurrent processing of information (here visual and auditory) requires adequate 
dopaminergic transmission. This is premature, however. The slowing of unimanual 
responses is a sound result, but bimanual responses were not required in any other condition 
of the experiment and simultaneous motor acts are known to be sensitive to different 
medication levels (Benecke et al., 1987b). Motor demands have therefore not been 
equalised across tasks and inferences about cognitive function (“concurrent processing”) 
must be provisional. A medication-dependent, auditory choice RT deficit was certainly 
present.
Harrison et al. tested in a fixed on-off order after overnight withdrawal; they also 
test a control group of patients with PD at the same times without withdrawal, these being 
matched for age and disease duration and severity (1995). This is preferable to testing an 
elderly control group, as it accounts for the fact that practice and fatigue effects may differ 
between patients and controls. This study found a simple RT deficit when intervals between 
the previous response and the stimulus onset were very short (50, 100, 200 ms). A slowing
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is usually seen in normal subjects at short response-stimuius intervals (“refractoriness”) and 
this is exaggerated after medication withdrawal in patients.
4 .3J  Comment
The studies that have found significant speeding of RTs with medication administration are 
characterised by strong medication manipulations and good designs. The withdrawal in 
study (Zappia et al., 1994) is complete and two other studies (Brown et al. 1993b; Malapani 
et al. 1994) withdraw for at least 24 and 18 hours respectively. Two studies (Brown et al. 
1993b; Malapani et al. 1994) counterbalanced their order of testing and two others 
(Harrison et al., 1995; Zappia et al., 1994) contiol for practice effects using a control gioup 
and overtraining. The ideal time to test after administration of medication appears to be two 
hours. The significant effects appear to be task-specific and even modality specific 
(Malapani et al., 1994). Jahanshalii et al. (1992b) have suggested that clinical changes and 
reaction and movement time deficits will appear at different levels of dopamine depletion. 
Results from a number of studies suggest that as dopamine levels fall, clinical deficits will 
appear first, followed by movement time and then RT slowing (Jahanshalii et al., 1992b). 
This review is also tentatively suggesting that there may be different thresholds between 
different RT tasks. There is a trend for choice RT to be affected by medication withdrawal 
more than simple RTs, and those studies reporting significant medication-dependent RT 
deficits tend to be using choice RT tasks.
Although correlated with disease status (Zappia et al., 1994), RT is not a measure 
of the severity of PD. The best index of disease severity is attained by use of a clinical 
rating scale, such as the Webster (1968) and Universal Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale 
(UPDRS, Langston et al., 1992). RTs incorporate such nonmotor variables as stimulus 
registration and identification and response selection and initiation. There is a large 
literature covering the stages of processing involved in RTs in normal subjects (Luce, 1986) 
and bringing these concepts to bear on PD is the most productive use of RT studies. If such 
studies can demonstrate a dissociation between medication effects on simple and choice 
RTs, a whole new area of research into dopamine’s role in decision processes might be 
initiated.
4.3.3 Quantitative Analysis
4.3.3.1 Effects o f  medication 
Harrison et al. (1995), considering the literature on the effect of levodopa medication on RT 
performance, concluded that the data were inconclusive, with only 6 of the 13 studies they
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reviewed reporting a statistically significant RT benefit of levodopa medication and the 
remaining studies showed no significant effect of levodopa on RT. However, from the table 
of means they present (see Table 1 of Harrison et al. 1995), it is apparent that, 
notwithstanding the failure of some studies to find statistically significant effects, in only 
one of the 13 studies is there a condition which does not show some improvement in mean 
RT with medication. If there were no effect of medication on RT performance, one would 
expect that on average studies would show no benefit and that an equal number of studies 
would report a decrement in RT as report an improvement.
The literature on the effects of medication on RT was reexamined, including only 
those studies in which RTs were reported for patients with and without levodopa 
(medication withdrawn, controlled infusions of levodopa or patients showing “on-off’ 
fluctuations - see Appendix 3) and for controls. Two possible candidates for this analysis 
were specifically excluded; (a) one combined data for patients going on to levodopa, 
benzhexol and bromocriptine for the first time, allowing no analysis of the effect of 
levodopa alone (Jordan et ah, 1992), and (b) another in which the graphs are unclear and in 
which the RTs are anomalous, with some patients having an unmedicated RT (which is not 
EMG) of under 200 ms (Montgomery and Nuessen, 1990). Studies included in the previous 
“advance information” analysis were also excluded, (Girotti et ah, 1986; Pullman et ah,
1990) in order to examine an independent set of data. RT values for the patients were 
plotted against control group RT for both medicated and unmedicated conditions in Figure 
4.3. The regression line for the medicated patients showed a similar slope (slope = 0.77 
ms/control ms) as seen previously (Figure 4.2; slope of the overall regression = 0.83 
ms/control ms) even though all these studies were unique to this analysis and no study was 
included in both analyses. However, for the non-medicated conditions, the slope of the 
regression line approached 1 (0.92), with an intercept of 115.4 ms: that is to say, the deficit 
in the non-medicated patients was, on average, equivalent to 115 ms, regardless of the 
control group RT.
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Effect of medication
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Figure 43. Patient ("PD ”)  and conti^ol gi'oup RTs in studies manipulating medication state 
(Appendix 3). Filled circles and the broken regression line represent levodopa medicated 
patients, open circles and the unbroken line show values fo r  the same patients o ff 
medication.
There are two particularly important features of Figure 4.3: (a) the relationship 
demonstrated in Figure 4.2, between contiol group RT and degree of patient deficit, is 
replicated in an independent data set for medicated patients; (b) medication does have an 
effect on RT of patients with PD, but the effect of the medication is dependent upon control 
group RT, with there being little effect of medication on tasks in which control performance 
is fast and a greater effect when control performance is slower. Put another way, 
medication can mask a deficit in RT in those conditions when control group RT is long. 
Robbins and Brown (1990) have predicted that medication will ameliorate deficits found on 
“slow” RT tasks first, which is consistent with the data in the literature.
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4.33.2 Two-choice RTs 
Out of twenty studies in which 2-choice RTs are reported, seven studies were specifically 
examining the use of advance information or the effects of medication and are reviewed 
above. Thus, there remain a further 13 studies in which 2-choice RT is measured (see 
Appendix 4). These 13 studies were examined to replicate the relationship between control 
group RT and parkinsonian deficit on another independent data set. There is a relationship 
between control and patient RT that is similar to the overall regression of the data in Figure
4.2 (slope = 0.84, compared to 0.83 in Figure 4.2). The relationship is less strong, 
accounting for only 41% of the variance (r-2 = 0.41, compared to = 0.80 in Figure 4.2), 
but this is not surprising given that these 13 studies are very heterogeneous with regard to 
the experimental purpose and design and the patients’ characteristics. There is a great deal 
of variation in the types of responses (ranging from key presses and releases to wrist 
flexion) and in the types of stimuli (visual, tactile etc.) and in their compatibility with 
responses. Nevertheless, these studies provide an additional demonstration of a relationship 
between control group RT and patient deficit on a third set of data.
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4.4 Simple RTs
4.4.1 Review
Simple RT tasks (a single, predefined response to an imperative signal) provide important 
information about the parkinsonian deficit. Because they are straightforward, intervening 
cognitive processes are few and deficits can be examined without the need for complex 
psychological theories. Jahanshalii et al. (1992a) cite five studies before 1992 that compare 
the simple RTs of controls and patients with PD; a statistically significant parkinsonian 
deficit was found in all five. In fact, eleven studies before 1992 and seventeen after, have 
included such comparisons for conventional, non-EMG tasks (see Appendix 5). Of these, 
twenty studies have reported a statistically significant simple RT deficit for patients. As is 
evident from previous sections of this review, this level of consistency is unusual. The 
remaining eight studies do not report straightforward nonreplications and so these will be 
described more fully below.
The failure of two studies (Finim et al., 1994; Reid et al., 1989) to find statistically 
significant slowing of simple RT amongst patients with PD can perhaps be explained by 
patient characteristics. The “untreated” group of Fimm et al. (1994) were 6 ms faster than 
controls on the simple RT task; they were also 5.5 years younger than controls. The 
“treated” group (age-matched with controls) showed a statistically significant deficit, Reid 
et al. (1989) studied patients with early- and late-onset PD. The late-onset group showed a 
clear (50 ms), but nonsignificant, simple RT slowing. The early onset group were only 10 
ms slower than controls, but were again on average more than five years younger than 
controls.
Two studies also report significant simple RT slowing in one, but not all of their 
patient groups (Mayeux et al., 1987; Talland, 1963). Mayeux et al. (1987) divided their 
patients {post hoc) into subgroups with and without “bradyphrenia” on the basis of scores 
on the continuous performance test. The “with bradyphrenia” group showed a dramatic 
simple RT deficit, but the “without” group showed no statistically significant slowing. 
Without this post hoc division, there is a 240 ms deficit for the patient group as a whole. 
Talland (1963) showed a simple RT speeding for his mildly and moderately affected patient 
groups (71 and 39 ms, respectively), but a clear slowing for his “severe” group. These 
speedings are anomalous and hard to explain.
Nakashima et al. (1993) report no statistically significant slowing of premotor 
(EMG) simple RT. If their measure of “movement time” is added to this figure, however, a 
standard button press RT latency can be produced and patients show a 114 ms deficit.
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Montgomery and Nuessen (1990) find no significant simple RT deficit, but the problems 
with this study have already been described above in the “medication” section. Only two 
studies (Harrison et al., 1995; Zimmermann et al., 1992) stand apart by showing no 
quantitative slowing of any sort, with no obvious methodological reasons for this.
If all of the nonsignificant deficits reported above are averaged, (omitting 
Montgomery and Nuessen (1990) due to difficulty in obtaining figures from the graphs 
presented in the paper), a mean slowing of 17 ms is still present. If  the anomalous 
“speeding” conditions of Talland (1963) are dropped, this figure rises to 31 ms. Clearly, 
these studies do not significantly detract from the overall picture of simple RT slowing in 
PD. A t-test, comparing means of control and patient simple RT across all studies, confirms 
a significant patient deficit (/(116) = 629 ,p  < 0.001); mean patient deficit is 71ms.
An explanation for this consistent deficit has been put forward by Goodrich et al. 
(1989). They suggest that healthy subjects can recruit some form of attention-demanding 
process to prepare and speed their simple RT performance. A simple RT task can be 
completely prepared as all aspects of the response are prespecified, whereas in a choice RT 
task, similar preparation is not possible as the response remains to be specified by the 
imperative signal. Goodrich et al. (1989) suggest that this attention-demanding process is 
not available to patients. They tested this hypothesis using a dual task method; patients with 
PD and controls performed a simple and a two-choice RT task, in the presence and absence 
of a secondary task (reading aloud). In the absence of the secondary task, the patients with 
PD were significantly impaired in the simple RT task, but their choice RT was not 
significantly longer. The secondary task slowed both simple and choice RTs for both 
groups, but the controls’ simple RTs were slowed much more than those of the patients. In 
the presence of the secondary task, a simple RT deficit was no longer present in the patients 
- reading aloud had impaired the controls’ performance such that they performed at the 
same level as patients. Goodrich et al. (1989) argued that the secondary task had removed 
the controls’ ability to recruit extra attentional resources to speed their simple RTs. This 
study was a replication of a similar experiment by Bloxliam et al. (1987) where the 
secondary task was motor - the authors note that the patients perform “as if they were 
constantly performing a motor task even though apparently at rest” (pi 182, Bloxham et al., 
1987).
Presumably, such attentional preparation takes time. Jordan et al. (1992) varied 
cue-stimulus intervals in their simple and go-nogo choice RTs, hypothesising that a deficit 
in attentional focusing should lead to a greater slowing of RTs for patients at very short 
(100 ms) cue-stimulus intervals. At these intervals there is presumably less time to prepare,
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or “focus”. No such deficit was found and Jordan et ai. concluded that the patient SRT 
deficit must be due to poor attentional focusing within the first 100 ni after the cue (100 ms 
was their shortest delay). Jordan et al. may have misinterpreted the hypothesis, however; 
Goodrich et al. would predict that short delays (if tliey interfere with attentional focusing) 
would impair controls’ performance, bringing it down to the level of patients. It is controls 
who can recruit the extra attentional resources that are inaccessible to patients to speed their 
simple RTs, so it is their performance that should be disrupted by short delays.
4.4.2 Comment
Jordan et al.’s (1992) data do not falsify the “attentional focusing” hypothesis. It is a 
potential candidate for explaining the nonspecific simple RT deficit in patients with PD. 
Goodrich et al. (1990) have found that a number of different secondaiy tasks selectively 
disrupt simple RT performance in healthy subjects and have also extended this finding to 
different stimulus modalities and responses. There is clearly some form of modality- 
independent supplementary process speeding simple RTs in healthy subjects. The 
identification of such processes in healthy subjects adds weight to Goodrich et al.’s (1989) 
hypothesis, as does the fact that a number of other “attentional” processes are disrupted in 
PD (vigilance, Mayeux et al., 1987; attentional set-shifting, Downes et al., 1989).
4.4.3 Quantitative analysis
Both of the above analyses (Figures 2 and 3), as well as the above quantitative analysis of 
two-choice RTs, show that the parkinsonian deficit is dependent on control group RT. 
However, a simple RT deficit is found in nearly all of the studies reviewed, which suggests 
that simple RT may not be subject to the same relationship with control group RT that is 
seen for choice RT.
There are 26 studies in which simple RTs are reported for patients and control 
subjects (Appendix 5). When simple RT for patients is plotted against control group RT 
(Figure 4.4), there is no relationship between patient deficit and control group RT (See 
Figure 4.4, inset). In fact, the slope of the relationship between control and patient RT is 
0.98 ms/control ms, with an overall RT deficit in the patients equivalent to 76 ms. There is 
very large range of mean RT values for the control subjects, from 215 to 455 ms.
Procedural differences are unlikely to account for this, as simple RT tasks are so basic as to 
allow for little variation. This range is most likely the result of well-known differences in 
RTs to different kinds of stimuli or involving different kinds of responses (see Luce (1986), 
p. 91), for example, the value of 215 ms was a vibrotactile study (a finger-lift response
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made to a tactile stimulus) (1989) whereas the value of 455 ms was obtained in a study in 
which a key release response was made to a visual imperative signal (Jahanshalii et a l, 
1992a).
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Figure 4.4. Simple RTs fo r  patients ( “P D ”) and controls (Appendix 5). INSET: 
Parkinsonian deficit (patient RT minus conti^ol group RT; “PD deficit”)  versus control 
group RT, inclusions are the same as fo r  the main graph.
In the case of choice RT, RT differences between tasks are, at least in part, assumed 
to be due to central processing differences (for example, compatibility of the stimulus with 
the response). However, for simple RT (defined as those tasks in which there is a single 
response and, typically, only one imperative signal) the range of control values is unlikely 
to represent central processing time, as the cognitive load of all simple RT tasks can be 
assumed to be equivalent. Therefore, it can be concluded that the relationship between 
control group RT and patient deficit seen for two-choice RT above is unlikely to be due to
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peripheral factors such as signal detection or muscular recruitment and is more likely due to 
central processing factors.
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4.5 General discussion
4.5.1 Conclusions o f the literature review
Many investigators have used RT tasks to quantify performance impairments caused by PD. 
Although RTs are a poor index of disease status, they have nonetheless allowed the 
identification and investigation of parkinsonian movement initiation deficits that are 
independent of bradykinesia. The results of the many studies of RT in PD have, however, 
been equivocal and often contradictory.
This review may have settled the controversy over the existence of a motor 
preprogramming deficit in PD, as it shows that the best-designed studies have failed to find 
such a deficit. Methodology and design have also been shown to be critical factors in 
studies of the effects of medication withdrawal on RT in PD. Specifically, the studies using 
more complete withdrawal procedures have been the most likely to find significant RT 
decrements after withdrawal, and it also appears that choice RT performance is more 
vulnerable than simple RT performance to the removal of medication.
A deficit in simple RT performance is the most consistent finding in the literature.
A minority of studies have failed to find a statistically significant simple RT deficit, but 
these often report a nonsignificant slowing or use less than optimal control groups. A 
quantitative analysis of past studies has shown that the presence of a simple RT deficit in 
PD is unrelated to the speed at which controls can perform that task; a deficit is equally 
likely to be found on tasks that controls perform with fast or slow RTs. This is in marked 
contrast to the pattern of results found for choice RT studies, implying that Goodrich et al.’s 
(1989) contention that ‘attentional focussing’ is exclusive to simple RTs may be correct. In 
three independent sets of data, a quantitative analysis has shown that patients with PD are 
more likely to show RT slowing on tasks that controls can perform with fast RTs. This may 
account for some of the ambiguities and contradictions in the literature (such as the 
presence of a cued, but not an uncued RT deficit in some studies). The mechanism 
underlying this effect may be a genuine psychological factor, or it may prove to be a 
statistical or methodological artefact. Other interpretations of this effect that do not involve 
central psychological factors will now be considered.
4.5.2 Alternative explanations o f  the results o f  the quantitative analysis
4.5.2.1 Scaling factors
As RT increases, so does variance (see Luce, 1986). Hence, as RT increases, the difference 
in RT required to reach statistical significance also increases. It is therefore possible that
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given equivalent patient deficits in two conditions, which result in similar increases in RT, 
a deficit in the slower condition might not reach statistical significance to due to greater 
variance. If  Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 plotted effect size against control group RT expect 
effect size would be expected to decrease with increased control group RT, but in fact they 
plot group mean RTs, irrespective of variance. Thus, the relationship between control group 
RT and patient deficit seen cannot be attributed to a gradual increase in variance with RT.
4.5.2.2 Truncation o f  data 
Most investigators using RT measures (and all of the studies reviewed here) report mean 
values and pay little, if any, attention to the underlying RT distribution. Furthermore, in 
many studies there is a “window” of RT, with responses outwith this window being 
considered either “anticipatory” or “late” errors and these RTs are discounted. If such a 
window were set too low, a proportion of the genuine RTs would be considered late and 
excluded, so reducing the mean value spuriously. This would be an issue particularly in 
more complex tasks, in which control performance is slower; a greater proportion of the 
patients’, longer, RTs would be excluded, so reducing the difference between the patient 
and control groups. The use of RT windows in these studies was examined. Only 12/44 
studies explicitly stated that RT windows were used and in these the maxima ranged from 
850 to 15000 ms. It is possible that other studies used, but did not report, RT windows, but 
in the absence of this information, no conclusions can be drawn about the effects of data 
truncation.
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the relationship is spurious and due to 
truncation of data; the effect of using a RT window is to place a ceiling on RT, but from the 
data plotted in Figure 4.3, it is clear that the RTs of the medicated patients were not at the 
level of an artificial ceiling, because non-medicated RTs were yet slower.
4.5.23 Spurious relationship 
Any correlation of two factors raises the issue, to what extent is the variable a causal factor 
as opposed to being itself correlated with a third, genuine, causal factor? In the case of RTs, 
there are many aspects of a task which might determine the speed of RT in that task. The 
most obvious of these is task complexity - the more complex a discrimination, the longer 
the RT is likely to be. Thus, if patients are differentially impaired as a function of task 
complexity per se, it might appear that speed of control performance was important. 
However, whereas it is not unreasonable to assume that patients would be more impaired in 
more difficult tasks, justification for the opposite hypothesis (that they would be more
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impaired in simpler tasks) is harder to find. When Evarts et al. (1981) first reported the 
difference between simple and choice RT in patients with PD, their hypothesis had been 
that the patients were more likely to be impaired in the more complex task and it was with 
considerable surprise that they reported the opposite finding and abandoned this line of 
investigation. Therefore, it is unlikely that complexity of the task is the critical variable 
which underlies the relationship shown here between control group RT and patient deficit.
4.5.3 Conclusions fi'om the quantitative analysis
4.5.3.1 Dopamine as a limited resource
It has been previously suggested (Robbins and Brown 1990) that fastRT performance 
might be differentially dependent upon dopamine, such that with progressive dopamine 
depletion there is progressive deficit in the maximum speed of response. Initially, fast RTs 
will be impaired. As depletion increases, this impairment will spread to slower RTs. 
Dopamine replacement therapy works in the complementary direction, restoring first the 
performance in the conditions which need less dopamine (slow RTs). This suggestion is 
consistent with the results of the quantitative analysis, but it requires refinement as some 
apparently falsifying instances exist.
4.5.3.2 Qualifications o f  the hypothesis
A number of individual studies explicitly contradict this “resource limitation” hypothesis; 
in these studies, control group RT does differ across experimental conditions, but the 
parkinsonian deficit is not necessarily greatest in the “fastest” condition (e.g. Cooper et al., 
1994). However, there are specific circumstances which might account for the apparent lack 
of consistency in the literature.
If  the demands of the task used interact with any of the other cognitive deficits of 
PD, the relationship seen between control group RT and parkinsonian deficit may no longer 
hold true. For example. Cooper et al. (1994) show a clear increase in parkinsonian deficit as 
control group RT increases, but there are multiple cognitive demands in their task that push 
control group RT to over 600 ms in some conditions. This is better described as measuring 
“thinking time” and their choice RT condition correlates highly (r=0.44) with digit 
ordering, a test of executive function. Cooper et al. used a go-nogo RT task in their study, 
and failed to control for réponse probability across conditions; as cognitive demand 
increased, response probability decreased. Study 5 in the next section shows that the RTs of 
patients with PD increase with decreasing response probability (see Section 5.4), and this 
factor might also account for the increase in patient deficit with control group RT.
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The pattern of results described above may also not apply in patients with more 
severe PD, involving more widespread neuropathology. The study that has included the 
most severely affected patients (Lichter et al., 1988) has shown a greater impairment for the 
slower uncued choice RTs than for fast cued RTs (see “motor preprogramming” section 
above), which resembles the greater slowing of choice compared to simple RT seen in other 
neurological conditions. Too few studies have been performed on severely affected patients 
to confirm this and quantitative analysis is precluded due to difficulties in comparing the 
various clinical rating scales that have been used to quantify disease severity. A crude 
analysis was performed, dividing our database by median split into more and less affected 
PD groups in a semi-arbitrary fashion, using rating scale data where available. When 
patient RT is plotted against control group RT, the regression line for the less affected 
group shows the characteristic slope of less than 1 (Figures 4.2 and 4.3), whereas the line 
for the more impaired group has a slope of more than 1 (a greater deficit at longer control 
group RTs). Given the variety of studies plotted and arbitrary classification, this can only 
be seen as a tentative result. Also, the measures of disease severity used were group means 
and each study included patients with a range of different severities.
4.5.33 Final conclusions 
The quantitative aspect of this review has shown that a significant deficit in the RT of 
patients with PD is more likely to be found in ‘fast’ choice RT tasks - those in which 
controls respond with a fast RT. A deficit is also likely to be found on all simple RT tasks, 
as these are all instances of ‘fast’ tasks. This is a description of a phenomenon. Although it 
has been suggested that this finding could represent a “limitation of resources”, in which 
dopamine required for fast RTs is absent or depleted, the cause of the effect has 
nevertheless not been investigated. Recognition of the effect is more important than 
immediate efforts to establish a cause. Future investigators must take care not to postulate 
complex accounts of the source of parkinsonian RT deficits without first accounting for the 
relationship of those deficits to control group RT.
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5.1 Introduction
Section 4.0 has demonstrated that patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) have slowed 
movement initiation times, which can be shown using a variety of reaction time (RT) 
tasks. An RT deficit is also seen in rats that have been rendered ‘parkinsonian’ by 
dopamine depletion of the dorsal striatum (Carli et al., 1985). The RT deficit seen in 
patients with PD is specific to movement initiation, and has been shown to be 
independent of bradykinesia (Evarts et al., 1981). Although the cause of the RT deficit 
is ultimately dopamine depletion, the functional processes that are impaired as a 
consequence of dopamine depletion are unknown.
Most RT tasks make use of a variable foreperiod (also known as ‘delay’ or 
‘stimulus onset asynchrony’) between trial initiation and the arrival of the imperative 
stimulus. This ensures that subjects cannot speed their responses by anticipating the 
time of arrival of the imperative stimulus. RTs have consistently been shown to 
decrease as a function of increasing delay in humans and other animals (Luce, 1986). 
This speeding of RT with foreperiod (‘ delay-dependent speeding’) is thought to reflect a 
readiness to initiate movement, or motor set, that is more advanced at longer 
foreperiods (Naâtânen and Merisalo, 1977). Unilateral striatal dopamine depletion 
impairs this motor readiness for contralateral responses in rats (Brown and Robbins,
1991), greatly reducing the effect of foreperiod on speeding of RT. If  patients with PD 
showed a similar reduction of delay-dependent speeding, this might account for their 
RT deficits on a range of tasks.
However, two studies which have specifically looked for an impairment in this 
regard have reported that patients with PD show normal delay-dependent speeding 
(Bloxham et al., 1987; Jahanshalii et al., 1992a). Patients’ response to a warning signal 
before an imperative stimulus also appears normal (Heilman et al., 1976; Jahanshalii et 
al., 1992a). In contrast, patients with PD do differ from controls in some aspects of their 
response to foreperiod. Bloxham et al. (1987) found that the increase in RT caused by a 
secondary task was related to foreperiod in controls but not in patients. Patients with PD 
also have more general problems in estimating and reproducing time delays (Pastor et 
al., 1992), so an altered response to foreperiod in an RT task would not be surprising.
The apparent contradiction of altered parkinsonian response to foreperiod 
(Bloxham et al., 1987) in the context of spared overall delay-dependent speeding may 
be resolved by an analysis of a typical RT task. Subjects may be responding to two 
factors when speeding their responses with delay. As delay increases, there is an 
increase in the probability of the occurrence of the imperative stimulus; if the
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imperative stimulus does not appear at shorter delays, it must appear at the longest 
possible delay. Thus, RTs would be faster as a function of increasing temporal 
probability of stimulus occurrence. Alternatively, motor set may be a more simple 
process - subjects may just become more ready to move as time passes, leading to quick 
RTs at long delays. These two factors, ‘temporal probability’ and ‘elapsed time’ can be 
separated in an RT task (Frith and Done, 1986). This approach can be used to explain 
the nature of any parkinsonian deficit. This study aims to show whether RTs vary as a 
function of elapsed time or probability of stimulus occurrence in healthy human 
subjects and in patients with PD.
There is evidence that RT varies as a function of the probability of stimulus 
occurrence at a particular location (Carpenter and Williams, 1995). Carpenter and 
Williams (1995) varied the likelihood of a left or right target to which an eye movement 
response was required. They found that median RT to a given target was predicted by 
the log prior probability of a target appearing at that location. This effect can also be 
described as the consequence of a type of motor ‘set’, as subjects’ ‘internal’ knowledge 
of probability allows them to speed their movements accordingly. As RT varies with the 
probability of stimulus occurrence at a location (‘spatial probability’), it is predicted 
that RT will change as a function of the temporal probability of stimulus occurrence, 
rather than with increasing elapsed time. If RT does vary with temporal probability, it is 
possible that a single process governs the relationship between both spatial and 
temporal probability and RT. A manipulation of spatial probability has been included in 
this study to assess whether any deficit in response to temporal probability in patients 
with PD is also seen in their response to spatial probability.
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5.2 Method
5.2.1 Subjects
5.2.1.1 Patients with PD
Eight patients with PD took part in this study. All were outpatients at Dundee Royal 
Infirmary, under the treatment of a consultant neurologist (Dr. Richard C. Roberts, 
University of Dundee). Inclusion criteria for the study were as follows: (a) diagnosis of 
mild or moderate idiopathic PD, (b) absence of dementia, (c) absence of any other 
neurological problems, (d) no history of neurosurgical intervention. Disease severity, as 
rated by a consultant neurologist (Dr. Roberts), varied between Hoehn-Yahr stages 1 
and 2.5, with an average of 2.2 (Langston et al., 1992). All patients were taking 
levodopa, and in addition four were taking benzhexol, two bromocriptine and one 
selegiline. All patients and elderly controls completed the following standard 
neuropsychological tests: the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE, Folstein et al., 
1975), the Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS, Yesavage et ah, 1982), and the National 
Adult Reading Test, (NART, Nelson 1982). Subject details are in Table 5.1.
5.2.1.2 Elderly controls
Ten elderly control subjects were recruited from the St. Andrews branch of the Royal 
British Legion and by advertisement. Subjects were excluded if they reported a history 
of neurological problems, or if they were taking drugs known to affect CNS function. 
Elderly controls did not differ significantly from patients in GDS or NART scores, or 
age. Patients scored significantly lower on the MMSE than elderly controls (U=17.5, 
p=0.032).
5.2.1.3 Young subjects
Fifteen young subjects were tested, drawn from the undergraduate and postgraduate 
community at the University of St. Andrews. All subjects gave informed consent before 
participating in the study.
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Patients Elderly controls Young controls
Age 66.3 (2.4) 68.3 (2.2) 24.1 (0.7)
MMSE 27.6 (0.8) 29.6 (0.2) -
8.9 (2.0) 7.5 (2.5) -
NART 110(4.0) 119(2.5) -
Male : Female 5 :3 8 :2 5 : 10
Table 5.1: Neuropsychological and demographic data fo r all subjects. S.E.M. in 
parentheses.
5.2.2 Materials and procedure
Testing took place in offices either in Dundee Royal Infirmary, or in the School of 
Psychology at the University of St. Andrews. The experimental tasks were administered 
using a Macintosh Powerbook computer running a Psyscope (Carnegie Mellon 
University, 1994) script, using an external button box to record responses (Carnegie 
Mellon University Mark 5 button box, 1994). After obtaining consent, subjects were 
interviewed to establish their medical history and demographic variables. They were 
then introduced to the use of the button box. On top of this box were three coloured 
buttons 5 cm apart, with an L.E.D. positioned above each button. The central button was 
the ‘home’ button, and one ‘response’ button was situated to the left, and one to the 
right of the home button.
The experimental task was a two-choice reaction time task. Subjects were 
required to press and hold down the home button with the index finger of their 
dominant hand. After a variable foreperiod of either 250, 500, 750 or 1000 ms, an 
L.E.D. was illuminated next to one of the response buttons. This was the imperative 
stimulus, and subjects were required to release the home button and press the button 
next to the illuminated L.E.D. Reaction time (RT) was defined as the time between the 
appeareance of the imperative stimulus and the release of the home button. Movement 
time (MT) was the time between the release of the home button and the response to a 
response button. On some trials (‘catch’ trials in the Falling block - see below), an 
imperative stimulus did not appear and subjects were required to maintain pressure on 
the home button until a tone sounded. The exact instructions to subjects were as 
follows:
159
“In this experiment you will use the three keys in front of you. To start each trial, hold 
down the yellow [central] button. A light will appear which signifies the start of a 
waiting period. At the end of this time, a light will turn on over the left or the right 
button. You must release the yellow button and press the button that corresponds to the 
left or the right light. A light will appear over either the left or right button on every 
trial, but after varying delays. If you press the correct key the computer will ‘beep’ but 
if you get it wrong it will ‘boop’. Please respond as quickly and as accurately as 
possible using the index finger of your writing hand. If at any time you need a break, 
just don’t press the yellow button until you are ready. Please press the centre button to 
begin testing.” In the Falling block, subjects were given the extra instructions: “On 
some trials a light will not appear over the left or right button. If this happens, keep your 
finger on the yellow key until the computer beeps, then let go of the key and press it 
again for the next trial.”
The experiment was completed in two blocks of RT ti ials, separated by an interval in 
which neuropsychological tests were completed. At the end of the experiment, all 
subjects were asked whether they had noticed if responses were required more 
frequently to one button than to the other.
5.2.3 Design
5.2.3.1 Spatial probability
The experimental task differed from a classical two-choice RT task, as the probability 
of a response being required to the left or right response button was not equal. Twice as 
many responses were required to one response button than to the other. The location of 
the ‘more probable’ button (left or right) was balanced across subjects.
5.2.3.2 Temporal probability
The experiment was completed in two separate blocks of RT trials. The relationship 
between foreperiod and the probability of imperative stimulus occurrence differed 
between the two blocks. One block was named the ‘Rising’ block, and the other the 
‘Falling’ block; the order of presentation of these two blocks was counterbalanced.
(1) Rising block: This block was a typical two-choice reaction time task. A response 
was required on each trial, and an equal number of responses were required at each 
foreperiod (250, 500, 750 and 1000 ms). As a consequence, the probability of the 
imperative stimulus appearing increased as foreperiod lengthened; if the imperative 
stimulus had not appeared at any of the first three foreperiods, it had to appear at the 
fourth. If  both the rising temporal probability and the bias in spatial probability are
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taken into account, the likelihood of the imperative stimulus appearing at each side for 
each delay can be calculated. These data are in Table 5.2.
(2) Falling block: The ‘falling’ block used the same foreperiods as the rising block. The 
number of responses required at each foreperiod was unequally distributed, however, 
such that the imperative stimulus was most likely to appear at the shortest delay, and the 
probability of its appearance decreased as foreperiod lengthened. Catch trials were 
introduced, in which the imperative stimulus did not appear and no response was 
required. Thus, the majority of responses were required at the shortest foreperiod, and 
as time increased it became less likely that the stimulus would appear, and more likely 
that the trial would in fact prove to be a catch trial. The probability and number of 
responses for each side at each delay is shown in Table 5.2.
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Foreperiod (ms): 250 500 750 1000
Rising Block:
more probable 0.167 0.333 0.500 0.667
less probable 0.083 0.167 0.250 0.333
Falling Block:
more probable 0.383 0.150 0.033 0.017
less probable 0.192 0.075 0.017 0.008
Table 5.2: Probability o f  stimulus occurrence at the more or less fi'equent target 
location at the four foreperiods (250-J000ms) fo r  the Rising and Falling blocks.
5.2.4 Data analysis
Post-hoc cutoffs were applied to both the RT and MT data. RTs of less than 150ms or 
more than 1000ms were excluded from the analysis. MTs of above 5000ms were also 
excluded. An error was recorded when a subject pressed the incorrect button.
5.2.5 Predictions
Following the findings of Frith and Done (1986), it was predicted that RT would vary 
with temporal probability of stimulus occurrence rather than elapsed time in healthy 
subjects. It was not possible to make strong predictions about the response of patients 
with PD to probability of stimulus occurrence due to the inconsistency of the past 
literature. However, it was strongly predicted that patients with PD would show an 
overall RT deficit. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 clearly show that patients with PD always have 
RTs that are similar to or slower than those of controls.
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5.3 Results
5.3.1 Young Subjects
RTs for the young control subjects are depicted in Figure 5.1. Visual inspection of this 
graph indicates that RTs fall as foreperiod lengthens in the Rising block and increase 
with lengthening foreperiod in the Falling block (Block x Foreperiod interaction (F(3, 
42) = 24.42, j? <0.001). This indicates that RTs cannot be changing solely with elapsed 
time when they change with foreperiod, as the temporal distribution of foreperiods was 
identical across blocks. The temporal probability of stimulus occurrence at each 
foreperiod is noted in parentheses in Figure 5.1; it is clear that RTs vary with the 
temporal probability of stimulus occurrence rather than elapsed time. The effect of 
spatial probability on RT also varied across blocks. RTs were faster to the more 
probable target in both blocks (main effect of Target ^ (1, 14) = 11.2,/? <0.01), but this 
effect was more pronounced in the Falling block. (Block x Target interaction F(l,  14) = 
5.36,/? <0.05). The Falling block also differed from the Rising block in absolute levels 
of RT; RTs were generally slower in the Falling block than in the Rising block. This 
was further confirmation of the effect of temporal probability on RT. The probabilities 
associated with stimulus occurrence at each foreperiod were generally lower in the 
Falling block than in the Rising block (Table 5.2, and Figure 5.1 values in parentheses). 
Thus, if RT is speeded by greater probability of stimulus occurrence, slower RTs would 
be predicted in the Falling block. The RTs of the young control group clearly show that 
RT varies with both temporal and spatial probability in healthy young humans.
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Figure 5.1: Mean RT fo r young subjects ’ responses to the more and less probable 
buttons at each foreperiod. The temporal probability o f a stimulus occurring at a given 
forepeiod is in parentheses below that foreperiod.
5.3.2 Patients with PD and elderly controls
5.3.2.1 Reaction times 
Figure 5.2 shows that the RTs of the elderly controls and the patients with PD followed 
a similar pattern to those of young subjects. As in young subjects, RTs fell with rising 
temporal probability and lengthened with falling temporal probability, indicating that 
subjects responded to temporal probability rather than elapsed time (Block x Foreperiod 
interaction (i^(3, 39) = 33.48, ji? <0.001). Patients’ and controls’ RTs showed similar 
changes as a result of changing temporal probability, indicating that the response of 
patients with PD to temporal probability was normal (Group x Block x Foreperiod 
interaction F(3, 39) = 0.62). However, neither patients with PD nor elderly controls 
showed faster RTs to the more probable response location in any part of the experiment 
(main effect of Target and all interactions with Target n.s.). This occured in spite of the 
fact that all patients and controls correctly reported the location of the more probable 
target. Although patients with PD did not differ from elderly controls in their response 
to temporal or spatial probability (all interactions with Group n.s.), their RTs were 
generally slower than those of the elderly controls. The patients initiated their
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movements on average 49 ms more slowly than elderly controls (main effect of Group, 
F (l, 13) = 3.4,;; <0.05, one-tailed).
In summary, patients with PD responded normally to temporal probability. 
Neither patients nor elderly controls showed an effect of spatial probability, in marked 
contrast to the results found for young subjects. In the absence of an effect of spatial 
probability, it is impossible to assess the response of patients with PD to this variable. 
Patients initiated their movements more slowly than elderly controls, showing a global 
RT deficit.
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Figure 5.2: Mean RTfor patients (broken line) and elderly controls (unbroken line) to 
the more and less probable response buttons at each foreperiod. Values in parentheses 
represent the temporal probability o f  stimulus occurrence at each foreperiod.
5.3.2.2 Movement times and errors 
Mean MTs were calculated for each subject. Patients with PD showed significantly 
lower MTs than elderly controls (?(8.84) = 3.54,p  <0.01, d.f. corrected for unequal 
variances). It was not possible to carry out a statistical analysis of the difference in error 
rates between the two groups, as subjects made very few errors. Controls made a total 
of 3 errors (out of around 4800 trials), and patients with PD made 16 errors.
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5.4 Discussion
This study aimed to establish whether the delay-dependent speeding of subjects’ RT is 
due to their response to the temporal probability of stimulus occurrence, or the amount 
of time elapsed after trial initiation. Patients with PD were tested to assess their 
response to these two factors, and to establish whether an altered response to foreperiod 
could account for the parkinsonian RT deficit. Healthy young subjects’ RTs varied as a 
function of the temporal probability of stimulus occurrence rather than elapsed time, 
higher probabilities leading to faster RTs. Young subjects also responded to a 
manipulation of spatial probability, showing faster RTs to a more probable target. 
Patients with PD and healthy controls responded to temporal probability rather than 
elapsed time, but showed no response to spatial probability, in contrast to young 
subjects. Although patients with PD did not diftcr from elderly controls in their 
response to temporal probability, they did initiate their movements more slowly than 
controls, showing an overall RT deficit.
The performance of young subjects in this study replicates Frith and Done’s 
(1986) finding that delay-dependent speeding is due to a response to the temporal 
probability of the occurrence of the imperative stimulus. The increase in RTs seen with 
lengthening foreperiod in the Falling block is clear confirmation that subjects’ response 
to temporal probability was far stronger than any response to elapsed time. Variations in 
spatial probability also altered young subjects’ RTs. Carpenter and Williams (1995) 
observed a similar response to spatial probability to that seen in this study, finding that 
eye movement RTs were faster to a more probable target. They went on to speculate 
that increasing temporal probability might also speed RTs, and that this speeding might 
be governed by the same process that mediates response to spatial probability. The role 
of temporal probability in determining RT has been confirmed in this study, and the fact 
that young subjects responded to both spatial and temporal probability raises the 
possibility that a single process governs RT variation with spatiotemporal probability. 
However, data from healthy elderly subjects and patients with PD suggest that RT 
response to spatial and temporal probability are dissociable.
Healthy elderly subjects and patients with PD showed clear changes in RT with 
changing temporal probability, but showed no response to a manipulation o f spatial 
probability. As young subjects responded to both spatial and temporal probability, the 
data from elderly subjects suggest that response to spatial probability is differentially 
vulnerable to aging, and that responses to spatial and temporal probability might be
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dissociable. However, this finding is only a single dissociation. It is possible that a 
single process governs response to spatial and temporal probability, but that this process 
is diminished or weakened in elderly subjects compared to young subjects. If the 
manipulation of spatial probability used in this experiment was weak compared to the 
manipulation of temporal probability, any reduction in a subject’s response to 
probability would abolish the effect of spatial probability first. However, a 
consideration of the elderly subjects’ response to temporal probability suggests that this 
interpretation of the results is not appropriate. If  a single process governing response to 
both spatial and temporal probability were being diminished by aging, some reduction 
in response to temporal probability would be caused by aging. However, elderly 
subjects’ response to temporal probability was at least as great as that of young subjects. 
For example, in the Rising block increasing temporal probability caused healthy elderly 
subjects’ RTs to drop by as much as 84 ms; the same changes in temporal probability 
caused the RTs of young subjects to drop by a maximum of 54 ms. Similar results are 
seen in the Falling block (115 ms vs. 54 ms). This comparison of young and healthy 
elderly subjects indicates that aging causes a loss of response spatial probability in the 
presence of preserved or accentuated response to temporal probability. This dissociation 
provides evidence that the processes mediating RT change to alterations in spatial and 
temporal probability are functionally distinct. Thus, it appears that two types of motor 
set can be active in an RT task. Both types of set involve the internalisation of 
information about the probability (spatial or temporal) of a response and the use of this 
information to speed movement. These two types of motor set will be referred to as 
‘temporal set’ and ‘spatial set’.
The response of patients with PD to spatial probability cannot be assessed as 
neither the patients nor the healthy elderly control group showed any response to a 
manipulation of spatial probability. However, patients’ response to temporal probability 
“ that is, temporal set - was normal. Their response to rising and falling temporal 
probability mirrored that of elderly control subjects, although the RTs of patients were 
generally longer than those of controls. The existence of a normal response to temporal 
probability in the presence of the well-replicated parkinsonian RT deficit indicates that 
altered response to temporal probability cannot be the source of the parkinsonian RT 
deficit. Specifically, patients with PD have no problems with acquiring information 
about the relationship between foreperiod and probability of stimulus occurrence, and 
this information plays a part in speeding their responses.
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In order to maximally speed their RT, subjects must acquire information about 
the relationship between probability of stimulus occurrence and foreperiod. For 
example, information about the duration of the longest delay is important; if subjects 
acted as if the longest delay on this task was 750 ms, speeding at the 1000 ms delay 
would be attenuated. This learning is presumably implicit, as subjects do not usually 
report explicit strategies of time and probability estimation. Despite reports of impaired 
implicit ( ‘procedural’) learning amongst patients with PD in serial RT tasks (Ferraro et 
al., 1993), patients learn the relationship between probability and foreperiod as 
successfully as controls. Implicit learning of response sequences may be impaired in 
PD, but learning of temporal probability information is clearly intact. A comparison of 
the results of this study and of those of serial RT tasks also completes a double 
dissociation between implicit and explicit knowledge in RT tasks. In this study, elderly 
subjects and patients with PD could correctly report the bias in spatial probability 
towards one target, but this did not lead to a RT speeding towards this button. In 
contrast, individuals performing serial RT tasks show an RT benefit when responding to 
a repeating sequence of targets despite being unaware of the existence of this sequence 
(Nissen and Bullermer, 1987).
Once information about time and probability of stimulus occurrence has been 
acquired, it must be used to speed responses. Some researchers have proposed that 
patients with PD have problems using advance information to speed movements 
(Bloxham et al., 1984), or more generally in the use of ‘internal’ information that is 
unsupported by external cues (Brown and Marsden, 1990). This study shows that 
patients with PD have no problems using the kind o f ‘internal’ ‘advance’ information 
required for delay-dependent speeding of RT. Intact delay-dependent speeding also 
implies that patients are successful in estimating time delays, in contrast to previous 
reports (Pastor et al., 1992). Previous studies have identified deficits of absolute time 
estimation, however, whereas delay-dependent speeding only requires assessment of 
relative length of delay.
As the acquisition and use of temporal probability information is intact in 
patients with PD, the anatomical substrate of these processes is presumably extrastriatal. 
Putaminal dopamine metabolism correlates with locomotor disability in patients with 
PD (Holthofi-Detto et al., 1997), and dopamine depletion of the dorsal striatum in the 
rat causes an RT deficit (Caiii et al., 1985). An RT deficit is present in patients in this 
study, and is presumably striatal in origin - the intact temporal set seen in patients must 
be anatomically as well as functionally distinct.
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In conclusion, this study has shown that the change of RT with foreperiod is 
due to subjects’ response to the temporal probability of the arrival of the imperative 
stimulus. Although both spatial and temporal probability of stimulus occurrence can 
alter young subjects’ RTs, different processes appear to mediate the réponse to these 
variables. Patients with PD respond normally to foreperiod, and therefore have normal 
temporal set. This replicates previous findings of normal response to foreperiod or a 
warning signal in patients with PD (Bloxham et al., 1987; Heilman et al., 1976; 
Jahanshahi et al., 1992a), and indicates that an abnormal temporal set cannot be the 
cause of the parkinsonian RT deficit. The processes that mediate the perception of 
temporal probability information and its use to speed RT must be intact in PD, and are 
presumably dependent on areas outwith the dorsal striatum.
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6.1 A review of studies up to the end of 1997
The neuropsychological consequences of pallidotomy for PD are not well understood. A 
rich literature has emerged on the clinical and motor improvements seen after 
pallidotomy, but pre- and postoperative neuropsychological testing has been neglected 
in comparison. The current surge of interest in pallidotomy was started by Laitinen et 
al.’s paper in 1992, yet Baron et al. (1996) were the first to mention neuropsychological 
testing in a full-length paper, and papers concentrating on neuropsychological followup 
only started to appear in 1997 (e.g. Soukup et al. 1997), five years and over one 
thousand operations later. This neglect of pre- and postoperative neuropsychological 
assessment is shocking. Transient declines in cognitive function were frequently 
reported after pallidal surgeries for PD performed in the 1950s, which strongly indicates 
a need for neuropsychological assessment of the pallidotomies performed in the 1990s 
(McFie 1960; Riklan et al. 1960). Even if this literature did not exist, 
neuropsychological followup would seem essential to assess the safety of any procedure 
that involves ablating part of an elderly patient’s brain.
This section reviews the reports of neuropsychological followup of pallidotomy 
that were published up to the end of 1997. The majority of these articles were published 
in abstract form, and describe the pre- and postoperative assessment of patients using a 
large battery of neuropsychological tests. There are methodological and practical 
limitations to some of the published research that must be considered before the results 
are reported, however.
6.1.1 Limitations o f  the review
(a) Publication in absti'act form  
10 of the 15 studies reviewed are reported in abstract or letter form (see Table 6.1). 
These studies have not been subject to peer review, and so their results must be treated 
with caution. The limitations of the abstract format mean that the names of the 
neuropsychological tests used are often not specified, and results are sometimes 
reported by cognitive domain (e.g. “no deficits were seen in visuospatial ability”). 
Methodological details are often omitted, such as the use of alternate forms to minimise 
practice effects in the postoperative testing session
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Authors Form at Patient
numbers
Lesion Controls
lacono et al. ‘94 Abstract 15 ? Unilateral 10 healthy
Cole et al. ‘95 Abstract 14 Unilateral None
Baron et al. ‘96 Paper 15 Unilateral None
Ghika et al. ‘96 Abstract 4 Bilateral None
Green et al. ‘96 Abstract 13 Unilateral None
Bowers et al. ‘97 Abstract 21 Unilateral None
Lang et al. ‘97 Letter >40 ? - Unilateral None
Manning et al, ‘97 Abstract 10 Unilateral None
Masterman et al. ‘97 Abstract 24 Unilateral None
Narabayashi et al. ‘97 Paper 12 Unilateral plus Thalamotomy
thalamotomy patients
Soukup et al. ‘97 Paper 14 6 left 8 right None
Stebbins et al. ‘97 Abstract 9 Unilateral None
Troster et al. ‘97 Paper 9 6 Left, 3 Right - None
stimulation
Uitti et al. ‘97 Paper 9 9 left None
von Falkenhayn et al. Abstract 10 ? - Stimulation None
'97
Table 6.1: This fable shows all o f  the studies that are reviewed in this section. A “? ” in 
the lesion column indicates that the type o f  lesion is not explicitly stated. It is assumed 
that these lesions are unilateral.
(b) Variability in measurement 
There is little agreement in the studies reviewed as to what constitutes “significant” 
postoperative improvement or deterioration. Most studies test the difference between 
pre- and postoperative group mean test scores, but levels of a  vary. Some studies adopt 
a conservative a  of j; < 0.01 to allow for multiple comparisons in a battery of tests (e.g. 
Uitti et al, 1997), yet Stebbins et al. (1997) report a/> < 0.1 reduction in digit span as a 
“decline in performance”. Unless stated otherwise, this review will only report changes 
of;? < 0.05.
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The use of group means to assess performance can conceal clinically significant 
information. If  pallidotomy leaves 10% of patients with significant deficits of executive 
function, this may not alter the group mean performance sufficiently to register a 
difference at /? < 0.05. Troster et al. (1997) maximise the information provided in their 
table of results by listing the number of patients who improve or deteriorate on a test by 
more than one or two S.D.s, as well as group means. This format still omits 
information; for example, it is impossible to determine if the three patients showing a > 
1 S.D. decline in phonemic fluency are the same as those three that show a similar 
deficit of delayed free recall. A minority of deteriorated patients may, or may not, 
account for deficits seen across a number of cognitive domains. Future outcome studies 
must address individual patient outcomes, and the constellation of deficits in 
individuals.
(c) Variability o f  surgical procedure
This review includes assessments of both unilateral and bilateral pallidotomies, and 
studies often treat left and right hemisphere pallidotomies as a single group (for an 
exception, see Lang et al. 1997). Electrophysiological recording has been used to 
identify the target site in some studies, but not in others. There is insufficient data in the 
published studies to separate the effects of these factors. The results of all of these types 
of pallidotomy are reported together, and variability will be added to the data as a 
consequence.
(d) Methodological issues surrounding repeated testing
Pre- and postoperative testing requires that patients perform exactly the same 
neuropsychological test twice. Individuals’ scores differ between ‘test’ and ‘retest’ 
phases in some tests due to practice effects. For example, once an individual has 
completed the WCST, s/he will be aware of the test’s requirement to shift rule, which is 
unanticipated in the first presentation. Lezak (1995) describes the WCST as a “one 
shot” test (p. 623), yet three studies use the WCST pre- and postoperatively to assess 
changes in executive/attentional function (Soukup et al. 1997, Troster et al. 1997, Uitti 
et al. 1997). None of these studies use controls to rule out practice/retest effects on the 
WCST, and only Soukup et al. (1997) concede that the lack of a control group 
represents a “significant limitation” to their study. In the absence of a control group, 
provision of alternate forms and consideration of the test-retest reliability of the 
instruments used is critical.
None of the 15 studies reviewed malce and reference to the test-retest reliability 
of the components of their neuropsychological batteries. Some of the instruments used
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will doubtless have a high reliability, but the fact that this is never referred to implies 
indifference. Two studies (Bowers et al. 1997, Soukup et al. 1997) specify that alternate 
forms of a test were used, but the remaining studies either do not use alternate forms or 
do not mention it. For example, Uitti et al. (1997) use components of the Wechsler 
Memory Scale - Revised (WMS-R) pre- and postoperatively; the WMS-R has no 
alternate form, so at ‘retest’, patients are relearning items that were novel at ‘test’. 
Where alternate forms are available, there may still be a “test sophistication effect” 
(Soukup et al. 1997) that leads to improved scores at the second administration of the 
test. The provision of an appropriate parkinsonian control group, tested at similar 
intervals to the surgical patients, can effectively control for this. Only one out of the 15 
studies reviewed here used a control group, and it consisted of age-matched healthy 
volunteers.
In summary, many important methodological details are not provided in the 
studies reviewed, and where these details are available, the methods used are often not 
ideal. As a consequence, only limited conclusions can be drawn from this review. The 
review can inform us about which domains of cognition and which neuropsychological 
tests are most sensitive to pallidotomy. It cannot provide clinically important 
information such as the percentage rate of significant negative or positive 
neuropsychological outcomes. This information is critical if the full potential risks and 
benefits of pallidotomy are to be assessed. Fully informed consent cannot be given by 
patients in the absence of this data. The methodological limitations of the studies 
reviewed also mean that basic science questions about the function of the globus 
pallidus and basal ganglia-thalamocoitical loops cannot be conclusively answered. The 
ideal neuropsychological followup of pallidotomy would distinguish between bilateral, 
and right and left hemisphere unilateral lesions. A best medical care control group 
would be used, and there would be long term follwup, both to differentiate transient and 
chronic deficits and to assess the rate of progression of cognitive deficits in the surgical 
group. Future studies should identify any features in the preoperative 
neuropsychological profile that are risk factors for cognitive deterioration, and 
functional imaging techniques should be used to identify the neural substrates of 
cognitive deficits or improvements.
6.1.2 Review
The results of the studies reviewed are summarised by cognitive domain 
(measures of overall competence, memoiy, attentional/executive function, language.
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visuospatial/visuoconstructive ability). A category is included for 
mood/neuropsychiatric change, as the onset or relief of (for example) depression will 
influence scores on many neuropsychological tests. The categories used are inclusive; 
as most neuropsychological tests require multiple cognitive abilities, some tests will 
appear in more than one category. For example, verbal fluency tests will appear in both 
the ‘language’ and ‘executive fimction’ sections.
6.1.2.1 Measures o f  overall competence
Some studies have reported the effects of pallidotomy on global measures of cognitive 
ability, such as IQ and dementia rating scales. Predominantly, no change is reported. 
Narabayashi et al. (1997) report no postoperative change in WAIS score, and Uitti et al. 
(1997) find no significant alteration in WAIS verbal IQ. Manning et al. (1997) are 
presumably referring to a full scale IQ test when they report unchanged “overall 
intelligence”, just as they are probably referring to the MMSE or Mattis Dementia 
Rating Scale (DRS) when they find unchanged “dementia”. Three further studies find 
unchanged total DRS scores (Baron et al. 1996, Troster et al. 1997, Uitti et al. 1997), 
though change on one DRS subscale was found by Troster et al. (1997), and is reported 
in the ‘visuospatial’ section below.
6.1.2.2 Memory
A range of instruments have been used to test immediate and delayed memory for 
verbal and pictorial material after pallidotomy. The most commonly used format for 
verbal material is that of the Rey Auditory-Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT), which has 
been developed into the California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT). This procedure 
requires the subject to learn a list of words over several presentations, and can yield 
scores of immediate and delayed recall, delayed recognition and interference. None of 
these measures changed after pallidotomy in the studies reported by Baron et al. (1997), 
Troster et al. (1997), Uitti et al. (1997) (all using the CVLT) or Soukup et al. (1997) 
(using the RAVLT). Baron et al. (1996) found a decrease in delayed recognition 
menioiy scores between their postoperative and 1 year assessment, but disease 
progression may account for this deterioration. The final two studies that use the CVLT 
report contradictory results. Bowers et al.’s (1997) study is unique in finding 
improvements in delayed cued recall and recognition memory after pallidotomy; it is 
also the only study to report the use of alternate CVLT forms in the postoperative phase. 
In contrast, Lang et al. (1997) found an unspecified (“serial list learning”) deficit in
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patients with left pallidotomy that resolved after 6 months. The WMS-R logical 
memory subtest was also used to index verbal memory, but it showed no change after 
pallidotomy (Uitti et al. 1997, Troster et al. 1997).
Digit span is a special case of verbal memory, due to the high attentional 
demands of the task. Uitti et al. (1997) found unchanged WAIS digit span scores, but 
Baron et al. (1996) found significant improvement in backward digit span between pre- 
and postoperative assessments. One year after surgery, Baron et al. (1997) found that 
this improvement had disappeared. In the absence of a control group, it is impossible to 
know whether to describe this as a ‘transient improvemenf that fades, or an 
improvement that is subsequently affected by normal disease progression.
The principal paradigm for testing memory for pictorial material has been to 
test recall of a complex figure, such as the Rey figure. The results arising from the use 
of this test are again inconsistent. Soukup et al. (1997) report no change in recall after 
pallidotomy, yet Lang et al. (1997) report a deficit in patients with right pallidotomy 
that resolves after six months. Most convincingly, lacono et al. (1994) report that 
patients improve more than controls at the second (post-surgery) administration of the 
test. This is the only report of an improvement in pictorial memory, however; the 
WMS-R visual reproduction and figurai memory subscales have been found to be 
unchanged after pallidotomy (Troster et al. 1997, Uitti et al. 1997), and recognition 
memory for faces (Warrington Recognition Memory Test, Soukup et al. 1997) is also 
unaffected.
Procedural memory has only been tested in one study. Von Falkenhayn et al. 
(1997) used a four choice reaction time task, in which a ten-item sequence was 
embedded. When patients were not undergoing globus pallidus stimulation, normal 
implicit learning was seen in the form of decreased reaction time with increased 
exposure to the embedded sequence. With the stimulator switched on, however, reaction 
times became generally faster, but there was no implicit learning of the sequence. This 
is an interesting result, particularly as recent studies suggest the substrate of procedural 
learning to be the cerebellum, not the basal ganglia (Pascual-Leone et al. 1993). Despite 
this interesting result, however, there is no consistent, replicated evidence for 
improvement or deterioration of any aspect of memory after pallidotomy.
6.1.2.3 Attention and executive function 
Tests such as the WCST and the Stroop test are often described as both tests of selective 
attention and executive function. A number of tests described in this section will fall
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into both categories. This section of the review will proceed from the tests that are most 
‘attentional’ and least ‘executive’ to executive tasks with minimal attentional 
involvement.
Soukup et al. (1997) administered the Bell test to detect problems with visual 
scanning or neglect, and the WAIS-R picture completion subtest which can be seen as 
testing attention to visual detail. No change was seen on either test after pallidotomy. 
Part A of the Trail making test also tests visual scanning, as subjects are required to 
connect numbered dots on a sheet in order; part B of the test introduces a ‘divided 
attention’ component as subjects are required to connect dots on the basis of two 
sequences that must both be kept in mind. Neither Bowers et al. (1997) or Uitti et al. 
(1997) found any postoperative change in either the ‘attentional’ part A or more 
‘executive’ part B of this test.
The Stroop test and WCST are both sensitive to the effects of frontal damage, 
and both require subjects to pay selective attention to one aspect of a complex stimulus. 
The shifting component of the WCST also requires executive control, and executive 
function is needed to overcome attentional interference in the Stroop test. No changes 
have been reported in Stroop performance (Baron et al. 1996, Bowers et al. 1997, 
Troster et al. 1997, Uitti et al. 1997) or on the WCST (Soukup et al. 1997, Troster et al. 
1997, Uitti et al. 1997) after pallidotomy. Masterman et al. (1997) also report no change 
in “set-shifting”, which may refer to the WCST.
Verbal fluency tests have been used as indices of executive/frontal function, 
divergent thinking and verbal intelligence. There is certainly an executive component to 
the search for new words under specific constraints. Both letter and category (phonemic 
and semantic) fluency have been used in patients undergoing pallidotomy. Baron et al. 
(1996), Bowers et al. (1997) and Soukup et al. (1997) found letter fluency to be 
unchanged after pallidotomy. In contrast, Uitti et al. (1997) found a postoperative 
deficit in letter fluency, and Lang et al. (1997) found a deficit in left pallidotomy 
patients that resolved after six months. Category fluency appears to be even more 
sensitive to pallidotomy. Uitti et al. (1997) and Masterman et al. (1997) found 
significant postoperative decreases in category fluency, and Lang et al. (1997) found 
chronic category fluency deficits in left pallidotomy patients that were still present one 
year after surgery. Bowers et al. (1997) may have found intact category fluency, but it is 
unclear from their abstract whether unchanged “verbal fluency” includes a category 
fluency test. A full discussion of these verbal fluency results will be undertaken in the 
“Language” section below.
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Finally, the cognitive estimates test was used by Troster et al. (1997), and no 
postoperative change in score was found. If  appears that executive function is not 
affected in the majority of patients undergoing pallidotomy. The presence of decreases 
in verbal fluency in the context of generally spared executive function may imply that 
language problems are the primary cause of this deficit. A minority of patients may still 
undergo changes in executive function, however; Lang et al. (1997) observed changes 
of a “frontal/executive” nature in 20% of their patients, which emphasises the need to 
report more than just group mean performance in pallidotomy followup studies.
6.1.2.4 Language
The only tests related to language that are affected by pallidotomy are the verbal 
fluency tests described above. Performance on the Boston Naming Test is unchanged 
after surgery (Baron et al. 1996, Soukup et al. 1997, Troster et al. 1997, Uitti et al.
1997) as is vocabulary knowledge and performance on the Token test of the 
Multilingual Aphasia Examination (Uitti et al. 1997). Lang et al. (1997) note that 69% 
of patients with left hemisphere pallidotomies reported word finding complaints on 
questionnaires, however. It is unclear whether these patients were specifically asked 
about problems that had arisen after surgery, or simply about their current status (which 
may have been impaired preoperatively). It seems likely that surgery caused these 
problems, however, as only 25% of patients with right pallidotomies reported such 
complaints. It is possible that there are differences between the processes required to 
carry out an internally cued search for a word and those required to search for a word 
prompted by an external cue (as in the Boston Naming Test). If  ‘internal search’ 
processes were more vulnerable to pallidotomy, this could account for problems in 
word-finding and verbal fluency in the presence of intact confrontation naming.
6.1.2.5 Visuospatial and visuoconstrmctive function
No consistent changes are seen in visuospatial function after pallidotomy. Block design 
(Soukup et al. 1997, Uitti et al. 1997) and judgement of line orientation (Baron et al. 
1996, Soukup et al. 1997, Uitti et al. 1997) are unchanged after surgery. The Hooper 
Visual Organisation Test has been used in two studies, showing no postoperative 
change (Baron et al. 1996, Troster et al. 1997). Bower et al, (1997) make a more general 
reference to unchanged “visuospatial” abilities. Troster et al. (1997) are unique in 
finding a postoperative deficit on the construction subscale of the DRS, which was not 
seen in the other studies that used the DRS (see Section 1).
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6.1.2.6 M o o d /neuropsychiatrie change 
Depression scales are frequently used to determine whether the flmctional 
improvements seen after pallidotomy are accompanied by improved mood. Most studies 
find that levels of depression are unchanged. The GDS and Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI) have registered no significant postoperative change in four studies (Cole et al. 
1995, Baron et al. 1996, Troster et al. 1997, Uitti et al. 1997). Two studies also used the 
Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, finding levels of depression unchanged after surgery 
(Cole et al. 1995, Baron et al. 1996). Narabayashi et al. (1997) did see an improvement 
in the depression score derived from the MMPI, and Troster et al. (1997) saw a 
nonsignificant trend (p < 0.06) to improvement on the BDI, but the overall picture is of 
unchanged levels of depression. This can be used to argue, following Cole et al. 1995, 
that depression seen in patients with PD is not a reaction to physical disability, as it 
does not improve as activities of daily life improve after surgeiy. Parkinsonian 
depression may stem more from neurochemical changes than from an individual’s 
appraisal of his or her situation.
Anxiety was shown to decrease after surgery in one study (Troster et al. 1997, 
using the Beck Anxiety Inventory), but not in two others that used different instruments 
(State Trait Anxiety Inventory, Bowers et al. 1997; Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory, 
Baron et al. 1996). A drop in anxiety would be predicted intuitively; presumably, 
preoperative anxiety about surgery is high. Other reports of neuropsychiatrie change 
give disparate findings. Narabayashi et al. (1997) found reductions in the MMPI indices 
of hypochondriasis and hysteria, whereas Masterman et al. (1997) found worsening 
scores on their Neuropsychiatrie Inventory in seven out of nine patients who had 
preoperative problems. Abulia and obsessive-compulsive symptoms have been found in 
nonparkinsonian patients with bilateral globus pallidus lesions (Bhatia and Marsden 
1994, Lopez-Villegas et al. 1997). These symptoms were also found in two of the four 
patients undergoing bilateral pallidotomy in Ghika et al.’s (1996) study. Unilateral 
pallidotomy may be safer; Masterman et al. (1997) found no group mean change in 
scores on the Starkstein Apathy Scale in patients with a single lesion. There are other 
reports of poor neuropsychiatrie outcome after pallidotomy (such as Lang et al.’s (1997) 
20% with “frontal/executive” changes), but no attempt has been made to determine an 
overall percentage risk for such changes. Neuroimaging studies will determine whether 
such outcomes are due to extrapallidal damage consequent to surgery.
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6.1.2.7 Summary
Pallidotomy appears to have no serious adverse neuropsychological consequences for 
most patients. Visuospatial function is completely spared, and most tests of language 
and executive/attentional function show no change after the operation. There are some 
contradictory findings on memory function, but the reports of positive and negative 
changes would appear to ‘cancel out’ in the presence of a majority o f studies finding no 
change. Verbal fluency is the only test that records deficits after surgery with some 
consistency, and this may be due to impairment of processes that mediate internally 
cued search for words. It remains possible, however, that a number of subtle deficits are 
being masked by practice effects. For example, a surgical patient’s score might remain 
unchanged at ‘retest’, suggesting no change in cognitive function, but in fact s/he might 
not be showing the improvement due to practice seen in an unoperated patient.
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6.2 Introduction to Study 6
Ventrolateral pallidotomy is gaining increasing acceptance as a treatment for severe 
Parkinson’s disease (Favre et al., 1996 - see Section 1.7.3.5). Pallidotomy has been 
shown consistently to abolish or reduce levodopa-induced dyskinesias (Samuel et al.
1998), and some studies have reported that it also improves akinesia and bradykinesia 
(Baron et al. 1996, Lozano et al. 1995). However, there is relatively little consensus on 
the cognitive consequences of this surgery due to a relative neglect of pre- and 
postoperative neuropsychological assessment.
Studies of cognitive change after pallidotomy have generally used similar 
designs. A large battery of neuropsychological tests has been administered before and 
after surgery, and any postoperative change in test score has been attributed to the 
effects of the pallidal lesion (e.g. Soukup et al. 1997, Troster et al. 1997, Uitti et al. 
1997). The most consistent changes have been found using verbal fluency tasks, with 
Lang et al. (1997) and Uitti et al. (1997) finding postoperative decreases in letter 
fluency and three groups finding decreases in category fluency (Lang et al. 1997, 
Masterman et al. 1997, Uitti et al. 1997). A number of other neuropsychological 
changes have been reported, but there is little consistency between the results of 
different studies and the changes are usually described as clinically minor. However, the 
power of past studies accurately to detect cognitive changes has been limited by failure 
to account for practice or test sophistication effects. Patients perform the same test 
before and after surgery, yet only one study (lacono et al. 1994) has tested control 
subjects to account for the postoperative improvement in performance that might be 
anticipated due to practice. Even this study used healthy subjects as controls rather than 
patients with PD, which does not account for the fact that patients with PD may respond 
differently to practice to healthy subjects. It is clearly premature to describe 
postoperative improvements in test scores as ‘cognitive improvements’ caused by the 
surgery when there is no way to assess the positive effects of practice on performance. 
Failure to control for practice effects might also lead to a subtle postoperative cognitive 
deficit being ‘missed’. A postoperative cognitive deficit would worsen test scores, but 
this reduction might be canceled out by improvements in scores due to practice. As a 
consequence, no overall change in test score would be seen after surgery, despite a 
postoperative decline in cognitive function.
The present study differs from previous research in two ways. Only those 
domains of cognitive function that appeared likely to be affected by surgery were tested.
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This contrasts with previous studies’ attempts to provide a comprehensive assessment 
of all domains of cognitive function. A control group of patients with Parkinson’s 
disease who were not undergoing surgery were also tested, in order to account for 
practice effects. Tests were chosen for this study principally on the basis o f their 
sensitivity to frontal lobe function, particularly to the function of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Several lines of evidence suggest that pallidotomy might 
alter cognitive abilities associated with DLPFC function. The lateral dorsomedial 
segment of the globus pallidus (Idm-GPi) projects to the DLPFC via the thalamus, and 
receives projections from the DLPFC via the head of the caudate nucleus. This 
anatomical circuit is known as the ‘dorsolateral prefrontal’ or ‘complex’ loop 
(Alexander et al., 1986), and some investigators have suggested that disruption of this 
loop is the primary source of the cognitive deficits of Parkinson’s disease (Taylor and 
Saint-Cyr, 1995). There is depletion of dopamine in the caudate nucleus of patients with 
Parkinson’s disease (Kish et al., 1988) which would disrupt the dorsolateral prefrontal 
loop, and alterations in DLPFC function might explain why the cognitive deficits of 
Parkinson’s disease resemble those seen after damage to the frontal lobes (Taylor et al. 
1986). In theory, pallidotomy should not affect the function of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal loop, as the ventrolateral globus pallidus (vl-GPi) is targeted, which is within 
a separate circuit known as the ‘motor loop’. However, variations in lesion size or 
placement might lead to the surgery having an effect on the Idm-GPi or fibres that arise 
from it. There are two possible consequences of such damage. Outflow from the Idm- 
GPi could simply be interrupted, leading to ‘frontal’-style deficits of executive function 
such as those sometimes seen in nonparkinsonian patients with selective globus pallidus 
lesions (Lopez-Villegas et al. 1996). Alternatively, the damage could have a positive 
.effect on the dorsolateral prefrontal loop. Pallidotomy is thought to alleviate motor 
symptoms by decreasing pallidal inhibition of ventrolateral thalamic nuclei within the 
‘motor’ loop, allowing restoration of activity between these thalamic nuclei and 
supplementary motor cortex. It is possible that disruption of the Idm-GPi projections to 
the thalamus might have a similar disinhibitory effect, allowing increased activity in the 
ventral anterior and mediodorsal thalamic nuclei, and their projection sites in the 
DLPFC. Data from functional neuroimaging studies appear to support this latter 
possibility. Ceballos-Baumann et al. (1994) reported restored bloodflow to the DLPFC 
in a single case after pallidotomy, a finding that was replicated by Eidelberg et al. 
(1996) and Samuel et al. (1997).
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The anatomical and neuroimaging data described above strongly support the 
inclusion of tests that are sensitive to frontal function in the assessment of pallidotomy. 
The first part of the test battery used in this study consists of three tests that have been 
shown to be sensitive to both frontal lobe function and to the progression of cognitive 
deficits in Parkinson’s disease. As pallidotomy has been described as ‘reversing’ or 
‘reducing’ parkinsonian motor symptoms (Laitinen et al. 1992, Dogali et al. 1995, 
Lozano et al. 1995), tests have been included that are sensitive to the progression of 
cognitive deficits in Parkinson’s disease in order to detect any similar ‘reversal’ of 
cognitive symptoms. Two tests were taken from the CANTAB battery (Fray et al.
1996). The Stockings of Cambridge test is a variant of the widely-used Tower of 
London task , and has been shown to be sensitive to frontal lobe function by both lesion 
studies (Owen et al., 1990) and neuroimaging studies (Baker et al., 1996). Certain 
measures derived from this test can also discriminate between the cognitive deficits 
suffered by patients with moderate and severe Parkinson’s disease (Owen et al., 1992). 
Performance of difficult problems on this test has recently been shown to be associated 
with increased cerebral bloodflow in the right GPi (Owen et al., 1998) in healthy 
subjects. As the patients in this study underwent lesions in the right GPi, it was felt to 
be important to examine the consequences of these lesions for performance of the 
Stockings of Cambridge task. The spatial working memory test from the CANTAB 
battery was also used, which has been shown to be sensitive to damage to the frontal 
lobes in humans (Owen et al., 1990) and also to disease progression in Parkinson’s 
disease (Owen et al., 1992). The third test has been developed in our laboratory, and is a 
test of attentional set-shifting that includes reversal, intra- and extradimensional shifts 
(Slamecka et al. 1968). An analogous test from the CANTAB battery has been shown to 
be sensitive to frontal lobe damage in humans and monkeys (Owen et al. 1991, Dias et 
al. 1996).
Two tests were selected for the second part of the battery on the basis on past 
research into pallidotomy. Relatively consistent deficits are found in verbal fluency 
after pallidotomy, and letter, categoiy and alternating fluency tests were included in an 
attempt to replicate this. In contrast, vai'iable results have been found using verbal 
learning tasks such as the Auditory-Verbal Learning Test (AVLT) and the California 
Verbal Learning Test (CVLT). Lang et al. (1997) found a transient deficit on the CVLT 
after left pallidotomy, whereas Bowers et al. (1997) found improvements in the delayed 
cued recognition and recall component of the test. The AVLT was included (Rey 1964,
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as described in Lezak 1995) in the second part of the test battery due to its apparent 
sensitivity to both positive and negative changes after pallidotomy.
184
6.3 Method
6.3.1 Subjects
6.3.1.1 Surgical patients
A  consecutive series of three patients were tested, all of whom had been referred to 
undergo right pallidotomy at the Department of Neurosurgery at Dundee Royal 
Infirmary. One patient did not give consent to be tested postoperatively and was 
therefore not included. The two remaining patients, GM and JG, both suffered from 
advanced Parkinson’s disease complicated by fluctuating medication response (both 
Hoehn-Yahr stages IV to V in ‘o ff  phase). They both experienced rigid akinesia in their 
off phases and severe drug-induced dyskinesias in their on phases. Both GM and JG had 
been diagnosed with idiopathic Parkinson’s disease by a consultant neurologist and they 
had both initially shown a strong clinical response to levodopa.
GM: GM was a 64-year old retired carpenter, who had been diagnosed with Parkinson’s 
disease 15 years previously. He experienced severe bilateral drug-induced dyskinesias 
and was referred for right pallidotomy because he was left-handed. GM was treated 
only with Sinemet, as he had been unable to tolerate any other antiparkinsonian agents. 
JG: JG was 49 years old and had previously worked as an accountant. She had been 
diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease 14 years previously and had severe bilateral 
dyskinesias. Although right-handed, her negative parkinsonian symptoms and her 
dyskinesias were slightly worse on her left side and as a consequence she was referred 
for right pallidotomy. JG was being treated with Sinemet, Madopar CR, Pergolide and 
Tolcapone. The Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS) indicated that she was mildly 
depressed (22/30, cutoff for mild depression 15/30).
6.3.1.2 Control patients
Nine patients with mild to moderate Parkinson’s disease were tested as controls, all of 
whom were being treated as outpatients at Dundee Royal Infirmary. The ideal control 
group for patients undergoing pallidotomy would be patients on a ‘waiting list’ for this 
surgery, as such patients would presumably suffer from Parkinson’s disease of a similar 
severity to the surgical patients. However, access to such a ‘waiting list’ group was not 
available. All of the control subjects had been diagnosed with idiopathic Parkinson’s 
disease by a consultant neurologist and had no history of any other neurological 
disorder. All but one of these patients was taking levodopa and additionally two were 
taking benzhexol and two selegiline.
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All surgical and control patients gave their consent to take part in the study. 
Subjects completed screening tests for dementia and depression (MMSE and GDS) and 
also completed the NART to obtain an estimate of premorbid verbal IQ. The result of 
these tests are in Table 6.2.
GM JG Controls
Age 64 49 69.1
MMSE 24 30 27.4
GDS 22 13.4
97 113 109.9
Hoehn-Yahr W 3 3 1.7
Table 6.2: Subject charactei'istics
6.3.2 Methods and Procedure
6.3.2.1 Location and timing o f  assessment:
It was difficult to obtain the surgical patients’ best possible neuropsychological 
performance due to their severe and fluctuating levels of motor disability. An attempt 
was made to test these patients in their best possible ‘on’ state, that is, when they were 
most mobile but least troubled by dyskinesias. The most appropriate time of day for 
testing was established by discussion with the patient and by monitoring their 
movement status over the course of one day. Testing was carried out in two sessions 
before and two sessions after the surgery. Preoperative (‘preop’) testing was performed 
after the implantation of the Bennett’s sphere (see ‘Surgical methods’ section below) 
and the postoperative (‘postop’) sessions were carried out between the second and the 
sixth day after surgery. All testing sessions were carried out at the same time of day and 
at the same time after the patient’s last levodopa dose. Patients were tested in the 
quietest available room in the Neurosurgery department. Despite efforts to test patients 
when their dyskinesias were minimal, both patients had moderate to severe dyskinesias 
at the time of preop testing (score of 3 on the Modified Dyskinesia Scale (v. 2.0); Goetz 
et al., 1994).
Controls were tested in a quiet office either in Dundee Royal Infirmary or at the 
School of Psychology at St. Andrews. Two testing sessions were carried out, separated 
by an interval of around one week. For convenience, these two sessions are referred to 
as the ‘preop’ and ‘postop’ testing sessions although the control patients did not 
undergo an operation.
186
6.3.2.2 Surgical procedure 
Surgery was carried out by Mr. T.R.K. Varma (neurosurgeon) and Dr. A. Forster 
(neurophysiologist) at Dundee Royal Infirmary. A Cosman-Roberts-Wells stereotaxic 
frame was used (Radionics Inc., Burlington, MA, USA) which was coregistered with a 
preoperative MRI image. The target of the surgery was the ventroposterolateral 
pallidum. Lesioning and intraoperative stimulation was carried out with an electrode 
barrel containing five electrodes (School of Psychology, University of St. Andrews). 
Intraoperative stimulation was carried out at low (5 Hz) and high (200 Hz) frequencies 
to elicit motor and visual responses (respectively) that might indicate proximity to the 
optic tract or internal capsule. Several lesions were created within the pallidum; the 
exact location and number was determined by response to intraoperative stimulation.
63.2.3 Assessment o f  motor function 
The CAPIT committee (Langston et al., 1992) have provided guidelines for the 
comprehensive assessment of the clinical status of patients with Parkinson’s disease 
before and after a surgical operation. It would have been desirable to carry out the 
CAPIT protocol for the surgical patients in this study, but this was impossible due to 
limited access to resources and patients. The UPDRS was completed for both patients in 
their ‘best possible on’ phase, but it became apparent that scores on this scale were 
meaningless for patients with severe choreic dyskinesias. For example, it is impossible 
to assess resting tremor or rigidity in a patient who is never at rest. UPDRS scores are 
therefore not reported.
Patients were videotaped pre- and postoperatively whilst in their ‘best possible 
on’ state. Patients were recorded whilst completing a protocol devised by Poliak (Dr. P. 
Poliak, Grenoble, 1992), which included components of the UPDRS and of Fahn’s 
rating scale for tremor. However, the principal motor assessment carried out on these 
patients was a rating of dyskinesia severity. Patients’ dyskinesias were rated pre- and 
postoperatively for limbs ipsi- and contralateral to the site of the surgery by a non-blind 
observer. The Modified Dyskinesia Scale version 2.0 (MDS 2.0, Goetz et ai., 1994) was 
used, which rates a patient’s worst obseiwable dyskinesia on a five-point scale from 0 
(‘absent’) to 4 (‘violent dyskinesias, incompatible with any normal motor task’).
6.3.3 Neuropsychological tests
Subjects completed five tests at the preop and postop stages. Three of these tests were 
computer based and required subjects to respond by pressing a touchscreen. The two
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remaining tests required only verbal responses. These tests were not administered in a 
fixed order for the surgical patients due to their motor disabilities; at some points, 
surgical patients were unable to respond accurately to the touchscreen but could 
complete tests requiring verbal responses. The order of testing for surgical patients was 
therefore determined by their motor status, although priority was given to the computer- 
based tests where possible. The tests were given to the controls in a fixed order.
The three computer-based tests were the ‘Stockings of Cambridge’, an 
Attentional Set-Shifting task and a test of Spatial Working Memory. All of these tests 
were run on a portable computer (Datalux Databrick) using a touch-sensitive screen 
(MicroTouch TruePoint) to register responses. The Stockings of Cambridge test and the 
Spatial Working Memory test were taken from the Working Memory and Planning 
battery of the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB, 
Owen et al. 1990). The Attentional Set-shifting task was developed specifically for this 
study. The Stockings of Cambridge and the Spatial Working Memory tests were 
repeated in an identical format at the postop stage. Different stimuli and dimensions 
were used in the postop stage of the Attentional Set-shifting task (see below).
6.3.3.1 Stockings o f  Cambridge 
This test has been described at length by Owen et al. (1992) and is only summarised 
here. Subjects were presented with two displays, one at the top and one at the bottom of 
the screen. These displays each consisted of three containers that resembled socks or 
stockings that had three coloured balls placed at various different positions within them 
(Figure 6.1). The positioning of the balls in the stockings differed between the top and 
bottom displays; the goal of the initial ‘problem-solving’ stage was to move the balls 
within the bottom display until their position in the bottom stockings was identical to 
the position of the balls in the top stockings. Subjects could pick a ball up by pressing it 
once with their finger and could put it down in a particular location by pressing their 
finger in that location. Certain moves were ‘illegal’ and were not registered by the 
computer. Generally, the illegal moves resembled those that could not be made with a 
genuine arrangement o f ‘balls’ and ‘stockings’. Subjects were not permitted to place 
two balls in the same position and could not move a ball that was underneath another in 
the same stocking until the ball above it had been moved. Balls had to be placed in the 
lowest possible position in a stocking and could not ‘float’ above a free space. The 
difficulty of this task was manipulated by changing the number of moves that was 
required to match the bottom display to the top display. The problem became more 
difficult as a greater number of moves were required. Subjects were required to
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complete problems at four levels of difficulty, requiring either two, three, four or five 
moves to solve. The problems that required two or three moves to solve were regarded 
by most subjects as easy, as they required only direct and evident moves to match the 
bottom and top arrangements. The four- and five-move problems were more difficult as 
they required planning and the formation of subgoals for completion. Subjects were 
encouraged to ‘think through’ the entire solution to the problem before starting to move 
the balls. The time taken between the appearance of the pattern and the initiation of the 
first response was measured as it is thought to represent the time required mentally to 
‘solve’ the problem and initiate a response.
The second phase of this test did not require subjects to solve a problem and 
subjects were therefore not required to engage in planning or setting subgoals. The 
format and task requirements of this stage were the same as for the first ‘problem- 
solving’ stage. Only one move was ever required to match the bottom display to the top 
display. However, as soon as this move was made a single ball was moved on the top 
display such that another move was required. This stage of the task required only a 
simple match-to-sample response and subjects were instructed to make each move as 
quickly as possible. This stage of the test was a ‘yoked control’ condition, as each set of 
moves that was required was identical to a set of moves that the subject had made at the 
problem-solving stage. Movement initiation and completion times were recorded at this 
stage of the test. These measures were thought to represent the time required to 
complete a movement without the ‘planning’ requirements of the problem-solving stage 
of the test. The time required to initiate the first movement at each new problem in this 
yoked control stage was subtracted from the initiation time of the corresponding 
problem in the problem-solving phase. By subtracting the absolute time required to 
make the movement from the times recorded at the problem-solving phase, it was hoped 
to gain a measure of ‘initial thinking’ time that would be independent o f any 
generalised slowing of movement such as the bradykinesia seen in PD. In total, subjects 
completed two ‘two-move’ and two ‘three-move’ problems and four ‘four-move’ and 
four ‘five-move’ problems.
A number of performance measures can be taken from the Stockings of 
Cambridge, of which three were calculated for each level of problem difficulty. The 
mean moves taken above the minimum number of moves possible was calculated as a 
measure of accuracy. Two ‘thinking time’ measures were also taken. The first was the 
‘ intial thinking time’ referred to above. The second related to the time required to make 
further moves after the first and was termed ‘subsequent thinking time’. Subsequent
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thinking time was calculated by subtracting the average time taken to select a 
subsequent ball at the ‘yoked control’ stage from the equivalent time at the ‘problem- 
solving’ stage.
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COPY
Figure 6.1: Screen shots from the Spatial Working Memory test (top panel) and the 
Stockings o f Cambridge test (bottom panel) from the CANTAB batteiy. The top panel 
shoM>s the ‘boxes ’ that subjects must work through fo r  a six-move Spatial Working 
Memoiy task (diagonal stripes), one o f which contains a counter (filled square). The 
bottom panel shows a 3-move problem from the Stockings o f  Cambridge, in which the 
bottom, set o f  balls must be rearranged to match the top arrangement.
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6.3.3.2 Attentional Set-shifting
This task was veiy similar in appearance and response requirements to Study 1. It 
assessed subjects’ ability to complete ID, ED and reversal (RV) shifts. The task was 
similar to that used in Studies 1 to 4 in that it was a two-choice visual discrimination 
task involving two perceptual dimensions. The only differences in stimulus display, 
response requirements and feedback to Study 1 was that stimulus display time was 
limited to two seconds.
Subjects completed this test in two blocks, each block including an acquisition 
phase, followed by an ID, ED and RV shift presented in a different order in each block. 
The ID and ED shifts were of a ‘standard’ type, involving ‘total change’ designs (see 
Section Q). The RV shift involved no change of exemplars; subjects were required to 
cease responding to one exemplar of the relevant dimension and to acquire a response to 
the other exemplar of the relevant dimension. Each shift occurred after subjects 
achieved a criterion of six consecutive correct responses at a previous shift. If  subjects 
had not achieved this criterion after 30 discrimination trials at the previous shift, they 
were ‘informed’ of the correct rule by the computer in the same fashion as for Study 1. 
The shift the occurred when subjects were stably responding to the rule (subjects to the 
same conditions as Study 1).
The stimuli in the preop stage of this test were created from the dimensions 
shape and colour; the postop stage used shape and pattern. The dependent measure was 
errors to criterion; as subjects completed each type of shift twice at preop and postop 
stages, the mean error score for each type of shift was calculated and used in statistical 
testing.
6.3.3.3 Spatial Working Memory
This task required subjects to search through a series of boxes in order to find a 
‘counter’ that was concealed in one of them. Subjects were presented with an array of 
boxes on the touch screen such as that illustrated in Figure 6.1 and were told to find a 
counter. Subjects searched through the boxes in any order that they chose, ‘opening’ 
each box by pressing it. Once a subject found a blue counter, the subject was required to 
place it in a ‘bar’ on the right-hand side of the screen and to search for more counters 
until the bar was full, when the trial terminated. Once a subject found a counter, they 
were instructed to search again, but it was emphasised that a counter would never be 
found in the same box twice. Thus, this task was a self-ordered search task in which
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subjects were required to ‘keep track’ of where they had previously found counters in 
order to avoid searching these boxes again.
There were four levels of difficulty of this task, corresponding to the number of 
boxes displayed on the screen (three, four, six or eight). As the number of boxes became 
larger, it became harder to keep track of which boxes had previously been opened. At 
each level of difficulty, subjects completed four trials from which three dependent 
measures were calculated. The first, termed ‘between search errors’, represented the 
number of times in a trial that a subject opened a box in which a counter had already 
been found. The second measure was an index of strategy use. Subjects sometimes 
select a beneficial strategy when performing this task (Owen et al. 1990) that consists of 
searching through the boxes in a fixed sequence within a particular trial. Subjects repeat 
this sequence after finding each counter, reporting that it is easier to ‘keep track’ of 
their progress using this method. When subjects used this strategy they started each new 
search sequence by opening the same box; thus, the strategy score was a count of the 
number of search sequences started with the same box for the six and eight-move 
problems. A higher strategy score represented more consistent strategy use. The third 
dependent measure used was termed ‘within-search’ errors. This was an index of the 
number of times that a subject opened the same box twice within a particular search 
sequence; that is, during the set of moves made to find a single counter. Within-search 
errors are relatively rare as most subjects are able to keep track of the boxes that they 
have recently pressed. As a consequence, this dependent measure is regarded as less 
sensitive than ‘between-search’ errors.
The final two tasks were widely-used neuropsychological tests that did not 
require the use of a computer. In both cases, different test materials were used for preop 
and postop phases.
63.3.4 Verbal Fluency 
The verbal fluency tests used in this study were administered in the standard format of 
asking subjects to generate as many words as possible that conform to a particular rule 
in one minute. Three types of fluency were assessed. Subjects completed three 
phonemic (‘letter’) fluency trials, one semantic (‘category’) fluency trial and one 
alternating fluency trial. The alternating fluency task was taken from a study by Downes 
et al. (1993); subjects were required to alternate between producing a word from a 
phonemic rule and a word from a semantic rule. When these tests are administered in 
their traditional format, subjects are instructed not to generate proper nouns. This 
instruction was omitted in this study, following Downes et al. (1993), as the use of
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clusters of proper names can be considered as evidence of efficient strategy use and can 
be scored as such. The main dependent variable used was the total number of words 
(excluding repetitions and ‘errors’ - that is, words that breach the rule) generated in one 
minute. The mean score for the three phonemic trials was used.
The phonemic rules were taken from Benton and Hamsher’s (1989)
Multilingual Aphasia Battery, as described by Lezak (1995). The following rules were 
used, in the given order. Preop: phonemic, ‘P’, ‘R’, ‘W’; semantic, ‘towns and cities’; 
alternating, ‘B’ then ‘animals’. For the postop stage: phonemic, ‘C’, ‘F ’, ‘L ’; semantic 
‘countries’; alternating, ‘T ’ then ‘fruit and vegetables’.
63.3.5 Auditory-Verbal Learning Test (AVLT)
This classic test assesses subjects’ ability to recall items from a list of 15 words, both 
when the list is initially presented and after repeated presentation. The AVLT was 
administered in the manner described by Lezak (1995), using parallel forms at the 
postop stage. The list (list A) is read out loud to subjects at a rate of one words per 
second and subjects are instructed to recall as many words from it as possible in any 
order. After the first presentation, list A is presented a further four times with identical 
instructions to subjects. Subjects usually recall more words from the list after each 
presentation. After five presentations of list A, subjects are presented with a list of 15 
new words and asked to recall these (list B). There are two further recall stages; 
immediately after recalling list B, subjects are asked to recall items from list A and 
delayed recall for list A is tested again after tliiity minutes. The dependent measures 
were immediate recall (items recalled at the first presentation of list A), learning 
(change in score between the first and fifth presentations of list A ) and delayed recall 
(recall of list A after a 30-minute delay).
6.3.4 Data analysis
The purpose of this study was to detect any changes in cognitive performance that 
might occur as a consequence of pallidotomy. However, test scores may change at a 
‘retest’ session due to factors such as practice, so control patients were tested in order to 
account for this. In order to identify changes in performance in the surgical patients that 
were greater than those seen for the control patients, ‘difference scores’ were calculated 
for all subjects by subtracting postop test scores from preop test scores. The difference 
scores for the surgical patients were then compared to those of the control patient group 
using a one-sample t-test. For the sake of simplicity, the significant results of these 
analyses will be referred to as ‘postoperative improvements / decrements in
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performance’ in the surgical patients; in fact, of course, they refer to ‘postoperative 
improvements / decrements compared to the changes seen in control patients’. Alpha 
was set at 0.01 for all comparisons between surgical patients and controls to account for 
multiple comparisons. All surgical patients’ decrements or increments in performance 
of more than one standard deviation have also been labelled on the graphs. Positive 
values (e.g. ‘+4.0 SD’) indicate improvements in performance, negative values indicate 
decrements. Although difference scores were used for statistical testing, absolute test 
scores have been plotted on the Figures. Depiction of absolute values allows 
identification of subjects’ proximity to ‘floors’ and ‘ceilings’ in performance and allows 
comparison of surgical patients’ absolute levels of performance to those of controls.
6.3.4.1 Missing data
A number of factors placed limitations on the collection of data from surgical patients 
in this study. The amount of time available for testing was limited by patients’ short 
stay in hospital, which was further complicated by the fact that they were untestable for 
much of the day due to motor disability. Testing time was also limited by patients’ 
medical care and the normal activity of the neurosurgery ward - that is, the constraints 
of ward rounds, physiotherapy and the availability of quiet testing space. As a 
consequence of these factors, two pieces of data are missing for patient GM - the GDS 
and the spatial working memory test. Also, the ‘delayed recall’ section of the AVLT 
was not recorded for JG.
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6.4 Results
6.4.1 Clinical status
Surgery led to an almost complete abolition of dyskinesias contralateral to the lesion in 
both patients and also to a minor improvement in ipsilateral dyskinesias. Changes in 
dyskinesia severity as measured by the MDS 2.0 (Goetz et al. 1994) can be seen in 
Table 6.3. However, there appeared to be no improvement in negative parkinsonian 
symptoms. This was reflected by the fact that the surgical patients’ level of medication 
could not be reduced postoperatively; indeed, Sinemet and Pergolide doses were 
increased for GM and JG respectively, as they could tolerate higher doses o f these drugs 
without exacerbation of their dyskinesias. GM experienced postoperative dysarthria that 
had not resolved when he was discharged one week after surgery. This was the only 
complication seen. It should be noted that the surgical patients in this study were 
affected by dyskinesias that were at least as severe as those seen in other studies. For 
example, Lozano et al.’s (1995) patients were of a similar disease duration to those in 
this study (13.8 years compared to 14.5 years) but their mean MDS 2.0 scores were 
around 2. Other studies have used patients with MDS 2.0 scores of around 3 (Kishore et 
al., 1997; Samuel et al., 1998); JG and GM’s preoperative left-side dyskinesias were 
clearly disabling, and were rated 4. The relative severity of JG and GM’s dyskinesias 
compared to those of patients previously studied may account for why previous studies 
have not mentioned the practical problems of carrying out neuropsychological tests with 
subjects with severe dyskinesias.
Preop Postop
GM  Contra 4 1
Ipsi 4 3
JG Contra 4 1
Ipsi 3 3
Table 6.3: Severity o f  the worst observable dyskinesias, before and after surgery, 
measured by the MDS 2.0; 0 = absent, 4 — violent, incompatible with any motor task
6.4.2 Stockings o f  Cambridge
Considering each dependent variable in isolation for the Stockings of Cambridge task 
can be uninformative, as they are interdependent. For example, if a subject showed
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lengthened subsequent thinking times after surgery, this might appear to be evidence of 
a postoperative deficit in performance. However, if the same subject showed reduced 
initial thinking times postoperatively it would be clear that the subject had merely 
initiated solutions more rapidly and had been forced to ‘make up’ the consequent lost 
thinking time after pressing the first ball. Therefore, the results are summarised for all 
dependent variables at the end of this section, though they are first described 
individually.
The severity of GM’s dyskinesias interfered with his performance of this task to 
the extent that doubt must be cast on the validity of his thinking time data (both initial 
and subsequent). GM was severely dyskinetic when he completed the test, particularly 
at the preop stage. He was frequently forced to pause whilst completing a problem and 
substantial time sometimes elapsed as he attempted and failed to select or place a ball. 
Although the ‘yoked control’ condition in this test is intended to control for differences 
in movement status, it appears to be better suited to controlling for a generalised 
speeding or slowing of performance rather than intermittent breaks in performance. 
GM’s timing data is reported, as he did complete the test at preop and postop stages, but 
should be treated with caution. However, there is no reason to doubt the validity of his 
‘mean moves above minimum’ data.
6.4.2.1 Mean moves above minimum 
Data for all subjects for this variable can be seen in Figure 6.2. It appears that the 
Stockings of Cambridge test is not greatly affected by practice effects, as controls show 
little improvement when testing is repeated (postop stage). This is particularly 
noteworthy as this test was repeated in identical format after an interval of only one 
week. The controls appear to be performing at ‘ceiling’ for the 2- and 3-move problems 
and this is also true for surgical patients at the 2-move problems. Thus, only 3-, 4- and 
5-move problems will be considered in detail.
Inspection of Figure 6.2 suggests that results for the two surgical patients 
change in opposite directions after surgery - GM’s performance appears to worsen and 
JG’s to improve. GM showed a significant decrement in performance at 3- and 4-move 
problems (/(8) = 20.45 and 4.34 respectively, jt? < 0.01), though not for 5-move 
problems. However, the absence of a statistically significant deficit for 5-move 
problems may be an artefact; GM was performing at ‘floor’ for the 5-move problems at 
the postop stage (seven moves above minimum is the maximum possible). In contrast, 
JG showed significant improvement for the 3- and 4-move problems (/(8) = 6.82 and 
8.16 respectively,/? < 0.001) though not for the 5-move problems.
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6.4.2.2 Initial thinking times 
These data are depicted in Figure 6.3. The overall pattern of data for controls is similar 
to that seen in other studies of performance of the Stocking of Cambridge task by 
patients with PD (Owen et al., 1992); an increase in thinking times between 2- and 3- 
move problems, with 3-, 4-, and 5-move problems differing only minimally. An 
inspection of Figure 6.3 suggests that controls’ thinking times reduce with practice, 
being lower at the postop stage. However, this reduction did not reach significance 
(main effect of practice F (l, 6) = 4.77, jy = 0.07). Both controls and surgical patients 
were at a ‘ceiling’ of performance for the 2-move problems, as seen for the ‘moves 
above minimum’ data, so only the 3-, 4- and 5-move problems will be considered. The 
pattern of GM’s initial thinking times across the three levels of difficulty is not easy to 
interpret. His times at the postop stage were almost identical to those of controls, but at 
the preop stage he showed lengthened thinking times for 3- and 5-move problems 
compared to controls. This led to him showing significant postoperative improvements 
in performance at the 3- and 5-move problems (^(8) = 4.98,/? < 0.01 and f(6) = 5.94,/? < 
0.001 respectively), but not for the 4-move problems (/(8) = 1.6,/? > 0.1). A fuller 
analysis of his performance is possible when all performance measures are considered 
together in the ‘Summary’ section below.
Visual inspection of JG’s performance suggests that her initial thinking times 
became shorter postoperatively for both 4- and 5-move problems. In fact, only the 
change for the 5-move problems attained statistical significance (r(6) = 8.17,/? < 0.001); 
the change for the 4-move problems was a nonsignificant trend (/(8) = 2.62,/? < 0.05, > 
0.01). For the 3-move problems, JG showed a trend towards not making the 
performance improvements shown by controls at the postop stage (?(8) = 2.67,/? < 0.05, 
> 0.01). However, her preop initial thinking times for 3-move problems were at a 
similar level to that reached by the controls at the postop stage. Thus, there may have 
been little scope for JG to improve her performance after surgery. In summary, JG 
showed a greater decrease in initial thinking times than controls at the ppstop stage for 
the more difficult problems.
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6.4.2.3 Subsequent thinking times
Subjects’ subsequent thinking times can be seen in Figure 6.4. As for the ‘moves above 
minimum’ measure, controls’ performance does not appear to consistently improve with 
practice. GM’s results do not show a simple improvement or decrement of performance 
a the postop stage. There were three significant changes of subsequent thinking time; an 
increase for 2-move problems and a decrease for 3- and 4-move problems (all p  < 
0.001). There was also a trend towards lengthened subsequent thinking times for the 5- 
move problems (/(6) = 3.54, p  < 0.05, > 0.01). This pattern of results is difficult to 
interpret and would resemble the pattern of controls’ results more closely if GM’s 
performance had been less extreme at the 2-move postop and the 3-move preop stages. 
These isolated slowings of subsequent thinking times may have been a consequence of 
GM’s motor status.
JG’s results ai e easier to interpret and give an overall impression of shortened 
subsequent thinking times for the postop stage. JG’s change in performance at the 2- 
and 3-move problems did not differ from that of controls. Her subsequent thinking 
times were significantly shortened at postop for the 4-move problems (/(7) = 6.10, <
0.001) and there was a similar trend towards shortening times for the 5-move problems 
(/(6) = 2.65,;? <0.05, >0.01).
6.4.2.4 Summary
The effects of pallidotomy on the performance of the Stockings of Cambridge test can 
only be judged by assessing all of the outcomes variables together. The significant 
changes in GM’s and JG’s performance relative to controls on all three dependent 
variables are shown on Table 6.4 for 3-, 4- and 5-move problems. A “+” represents a 
significant improvement in performance after surgery (decreased moves above 
minimum or thinking times) and a represents a decrease in performance. JG’s 
results clearly indicate an overall improvement in performance of the Stockings of 
Cambridge test after surgery. At each level of problem difficulty there was a significant 
improvement in performance for at least one dependent variable. Also, the table does 
not show the trends towards improved performance seen for initial thinking times at the 
3- and 4-move problems and for subsequent thinking times at the 5-move problems (all 
p  < 0.05, > 0.01); these are further evidence for JG’s improved performance. GM’s 
results are more equivocal. The ‘moves above minimum’ data suggest decreased 
problem solving accuracy after surgeiy. However, the improvements in initial and 
subsequent thinking times suggest that there is no global decrement of performance. 
Although GM’s ‘thinking time’ data may not be completely valid due to his motor
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disorder, the overall impression remains that the principal change in GM’s performance 
was a change in the tradeoff between speed and accuracy; that is, his performance was 
faster but less accurate at the postop stage. Thus, there is no evidence of an overall 
change in GM’s performance of the Stockings of Cambridge test after surgery.
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GM Moves above mimmum
Initial thinking time + +
Subsequent thinking + +
time
JG Moves above minimum + +
Initial thinking time +
Subsequent thinking +
time
Table 6.4: Significant (p < 0.01) improvements (+) and decrements (-) in performance 
after surgery compared to conti^ols fo r  the three dependent variables o f  the Stockings o f 
Cambridge test.
6.4.3 Attentional Set-Shifting
The absolute number of errors committed by control subjects on this test was not high, 
as can be seen in Figure 6.5. However, the controls were not at the ‘ceiling’ of 
performance that would be indicated by scores of one errors to criterion (as seen for 
JG). Controls showed the theoretically significant ID-ED difference, making more 
errors at the ED shift than at the ID shift (Z = 2.19,/> < 0.05). Practice had no significant 
effect on performance of any of the shifts (all > 0.1).
As described in Section 6.3.3.2, mean scores were calculated for each type of 
shift at the preop and postop stages. Using these scores, it can be shown that GM 
showed significant improvements in performance for the ID and ED shifts after surgery 
(r(8) = 4.17 and 5.84 respectively,p < 0.01). He made numerous errors at the preop 
stage but followed this with perfect performance at the postop stage. However, Figure
6.5 plots the number of errors generated at each individual shift at the preop and postop 
stages. It can be seen from this graph that GM’s ID and ED shift performance at the 
preop stage was not universally poor; for both ID and ED shifts, GM made many errors 
at one shift but performed the other shift at a level comparable to controls. Thus, it 
appears that GM was capable of producing normal ID and ED shift performance at the 
preop stage, despite the impression of a preop deficit that was created by the method of 
‘averaging’ shift performance.
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JG’s performance did not change significantly for any shift after surgery. 
However, her performance at the RV and ID shifts was at ‘ceiling’ before and after 
surgeiy and her ED shift performance was close to ‘ceiling’. As a consequence, the 
attentional set-shifting test could only have revealed postoperative deficits for JG, as 
performance improvements were not possible.
In summary, there is no evidence that pallidotomy impairs attentional set- 
shifting by inducing ‘frontal’-style cognitive deficits. The improvement of GM’s 
performance suggests that pallidotomy may alleviate preoperative deficits of attentional 
set-shifting.
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6.4.4 Spatial Working Memory
The number of between-search errors made by controls can be seen in Figure 6.6 
(unbroken lines); as anticipated, the number of errors increased with the number of 
boxes involved in the problem. Controls did not commit any errors for the 3-box 
problems and for the remaining levels o f difficulty there appears to be no consistent 
effect o f practice. Inspection o f JG’s data reveals increased levels of between-sèàfch 
errors after surgeiy, despite good performance at the preop stage. JG showed a . 
significant postoperative drop in performance for the 4- and 6-box problems (?(7) = 6.43 
and 8.37 respectively,/? < 0.001) and a trend towards a decrement in performance for 
the 8-box problems (/(7) = 3.26,/? < 0.05, > 0.01). A postoperative drop in JG’s strategy 
score almost reached significance (?(7) = 3.35,/? < 0.05, > 0.01), raising the possibility 
that surgery imposed a ‘frontal-style’ cognitive deficit that inhibited strategy use and 
therefore increased between-search errors. JG also showed a marked increase in within- 
search errors after surgery, despite normal preop performance (Figure 6.6, broken 
lines). Statistical comparison of this change with that of controls was not possible due to 
the low number of errors made by controls.
Controls JG
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Figure 6.6; M ean b etw een-search  errors (unbroken lines) and within-search errors 
(broken lines) for control patients and JG for all leve ls  o f 
difficulty. Error bars represent the standard error o f the m ean.
6.4.5 Verbal Fluency
The results o f the verbal fluency tests are not shown in a figure as surgical patients 
showed no overall change on these measures after surgery. Controls performed no 
better at the task at the postop stage than at the preop stage, indicating that the ‘rules’ 
used at the two stages were o f equivalent difficulty. GM showed no significant change
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semantic fluency (/(8) = 7.09,/? < 0.001), but no change in phonemic or alternating 
fluency. However, any deficit of semantic fluency shown by JG cannot have been of 
great magnitude as it did not affect scores on the alternating fluency test. JG’s 
unchanged alternating fluency scores imply that she generated words to a semantic rule 
at the same rate before and after surgery when performing the alternating fluency task, 
as half of the words generated on an alternating fluency test are created according to a 
semantic rule. Thus, there is no compelling evidence for the presence of a semantic 
fluency deficit in JG or for any other fluency deficit in either JG or GM.
6.4.6 Auditory- Verbal Learning Test
Recall scores for the five learning trials of list A are plotted in Figure 6.7. As 
anticipated, the contiol subjects recalled more words with each repetition o f the list. The 
parallel forms used were clearly well matched for difficulty as control subjects’ 
performance at the preop and postop stages was veiy similar. Neither of the surgical 
patients appear to have been experiencing gross memoiy problems at the preop stage 
and the overall effects of surgery on performance were minimal. The only significant 
change seen for the surgical patients was an increase in the Teaming’ score for GM 
after surgery. However, this change appears to be an artefact of the method used to 
calculate the Teaming’ score. GM’s learning score at the preop stage was zero, as his 
recall at trials one and five was equal. However, inspection of Figure 6.7 indicates that 
GM’s performance improved by four words between trials one and four, but this gain 
was lost at trial five. GM was clearly capable of learning words with repeated list 
presentation at the preop stage and if a learning score is calculated by subtracting trial 
one recall from trial four recall there is no longer any postoperative improvement of 
GM’s learning score. Thus, there is no evidence for any change in immediate or delayed 
memory or learning after pallidotomy.
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6.4.7 Swnmary o f  results
Assessments of generally ‘improved’ or ‘impaired’ performance after surgery for JG 
and GM can be seen in Table 6.5. Neither GM nor JG showed any reliable changes in 
verbal fluency or in verbal memory as measured by the AVLT. However, the results of 
the Stockings of Cambridge and Spatial Working Memory tasks were less consistent. 
GM’s performance on the Stockings of Cambridge test is best described as unchanged, 
as the postoperative alterations in his performance are consistent with faster but less 
accurate performance rather than showing a global improvement or decline in 
performance. In contrast, JG’s performance of the Stockings of Cambridge test 
improved postoperatively. JG showed a clear decrement in performance of the Spatial 
Working Memory test that was apparent in both ‘error’ measures of this task. 
Pallidotomy caused no deficits in attentional set-shifting. However, there were apparent 
improvements in GM’s postoperative performance of the attentional set-shifting task 
that will be discussed in the following section.
Stockings of Attentional 
Cambridge Set-Shifting
Spatial
Working
Memory
Verbal
Fluency
AVLT
TGM
JG t :
Table 6.5: General changes in test performance after surgery fo r  JG and GM. GM  did 
not perform the spatial working memory test.
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6.5 Discussion
Two patients with advanced PD underwent neuropsychological testing before and after 
unilateral pallidotomy in an attempt to detect any positive or negative consequences of 
the surgery for cognitive function. The surgical patients completed tests that had 
previously been shown to be sensitive to the effects of pallidotomy as well as tests that 
were known to be sensitive to frontal lobe function. Unoperated patients with PD 
completed the same tests twice at similar intervals to the surgical patients in order to 
control for any effects of practice on test scores. Surgery had only a moderate effect on 
the surgical patients’ motor symptoms, abolishing dyskinesias contralateral to the 
lesion. The effects of surgery on cognitive function were also moderate. There was 
evidence of an improvement in the performance of the Attentional Set-Shifting task in 
GM and the Stockings of Cambridge task in JG; JG also showed a significant decline in 
the performance of the Spatial Working Memory task after surgery. Verbal memory and 
verbal fluency were unchanged in both patients after pallidotomy.
6,5.1 Magn itude o f changes seen
The results of this study are in agreement with the majority of studies published to date, 
which have found that pallidotomy has a minimal effect on cognitive function (see 
Section 6.1). The one cognitive deficit seen after surgery in this study was small; JG’s 
spatial working memoiy performance at the postop stage was within normal limits for 
her age group on most measures and was only a ‘deficit’ relative to her superior preop 
performance. Also, there is no data on the chronicity of the changes seen. Lang et al. 
(1997) have shown that some postoperative deficits are transient and it is possible that 
JG’s deficit resolved soon after surgery. Neither GM nor JG reported that they 
experienced any improvement in cognitive function after surgery. One month after the 
surgery, JG commented that she had noted a loss of mental ‘sharpness’ when 
performing cognitively demanding tasks but she reported no problems with spatial 
memory. Any changes in cognitive function experienced by the patients were clearly 
minimal in terms of quality of life compared to the positive or negative motor 
consequences of surgeiy. Despite reporting a loss of cognitive function, JG was hoping 
to undergo a further pallidotomy in her left hemisphere and GM found his dysarthria so 
aversive that he reported regretting having undergone the surgery. Although the 
cognitive changes seen may have been minor in clinical terms, they are theoretically 
interesting as they represent selective changes in a context of unaltered overall function.
2 1 1
Examination of dissociations in performance between different cognitive tasks may 
yield information about the cognitive abilities required to perform these tasks.
6.5.2 Results fo r  patient GM
Neither o f the two changes that were seen in GM’s neuropsychological profile 
constituted convincing evidence of a postoperative alteration in cognitive function. As 
noted above (Section 6.4.2.4), GM’s changes in scores on the Stockings of Cambridge 
task appear to have been due to faster but less accurate performance. GM also showed 
an apparent improvement in ED and ID shifting. GM’s mean performance at these shifts 
at the preop stage was poor but he made no errors at these shifts postoperatively. 
Although this would appear to be good evidence of an improvement in cognitive 
function, it was noted in Section 6.4.3 that GM’s high scores for the ID and ED shifts at 
the preop stage were created by averaging one high-error and one low-error shift. Thus, 
GM’s ID and ED shift deficit at the preop stage did not result in a consistent slowing of 
ID and ED shifts. It can be argued that when a subject can make rapid ID and ED shifts 
both before and after surgery, no true ‘improvement’ has occurred as a consequence of 
surgery. However, it may be incorrect to chaiaterise the shifting deficits shown by 
brain-injured populations as slowings that consistently retard the performance of every 
shift. As noted in Section 3.1.2.6, the distribution of error scores for attentional shifts is 
often bimodal, reflecting subjects’ tendency either to make the shift quickly or to spend 
some time searching for a solution. It may be that the nature of a shifting deficit in an 
individual subject is to reduce the proportion of shifts that a subject solves quickly and 
thereby to increase the proportion of high error solutions rather than to abolish all low- 
error solutions. I f  this were the case, group deficits would be seen if groups of such 
subjects were tested, but the characterisation of an individual’s performance in terms of 
one or two shifts could be misleading. For example, if GM’s attentional set-shifting 
abilities had been judged by his performance on a single ID and ED shift (as in the 
widely-used CANTAB battery) the results of this study would have changed radically 
depending on whether he achieved a high-error or a low-error performance at the preop 
stage. If  this account of shifting deficits were true, a multiple-shift test would be 
required to accurately assess an individual’s shifting ability. There is precedent for this; 
for example, the WCST uses six ED-type shifts. As a consequence of these 
resevervations, it cannot be confidently concluded that GM’s attentional set-shifting 
performance improved postoperatively.
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6.5.3 Results fo r  patient JG
The changes in JG’s cognitive performance after surgery were less ambiguous than 
those of GM. JG showed a deficit in the performance of the Spatial Working Memory 
test whilst her verbal fluency, verbal memory and attentional set-shifting abilities were 
unimpaired. Most significantly, her performance on the Stocking of Cambridge 
appeared to improve after surgery. The interpretation of two of these results is 
uncertain, and requires further comment. Whilst the evidence for JG’s improvement on 
the Stockings of Cambridge task is compelling, it must be noted that she was younger 
and of a higher IQ than controls; it is possible that she could show a greater ability to 
benefit from practice than conti'ols and that this could account for her postoperative 
improvements. However, there is no literature relating to practice effects on the 
Stockings of Cambridge task in late middle age, so this issue cannot be resolved. JG’s 
relative youth and high IQ make her postoperative deficits on the Spatial Working 
Memory task even more noteworthy, particularly as these deficits extended to problems 
in recalling the location of veiy recent responses. JG also performed well on the test of 
attentional set-shifting that was used in this study. As noted in Section 6.4.3, her 
‘optimal’ preop performance made it impossible for her to show any postoperative 
improvement in performance. Thus, the only conclusion that can be drawn from JG’s 
attentional set-shifting results is that pallidotomy caused no clear deficit in her 
performance of this test.
JG’s high level of performance had not been anticipated when the attentional 
set-shifting test was designed. It had been assumed that surgical patients would perform 
less well at attentional set-shifting than controls due to the surgical patients’ more 
advanced disease status (Owen et al., 1992). However, patients are often selected for 
surgery on account of their relatively intact cognitive status. This raises two issues; 
first, tests for the assessment of pallidotomy outcome must not be calibrated on the 
assumption that surgical patients’ cognitive performance will be typical of other 
patients with severe PD. Second, the assessment of cognitive improvements after 
pallidotomy is impossible if patients do not have preoperative cognitive deficits. The 
practice of excluding patients with dementia from pallidotomy is widespread and the 
consequence of testing relatively ‘intact’ patients may be to underestimate 
pallidotomy’s effectiveness in ameliorating cognitive deficits.
The differential effect of surgery on the performance of the Spatial Working 
Memory task and the Stockings of Cambridge task constitutes a dissociation; the two 
tasks clearly do not involve identical cognitive mechanisms. This dissociation is valid
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whether JG’s postoperative improvement on the Stockings of Cambridge task is a 
genuine restitution of cognitive processes or an effect of practice. The fact that there is 
impairment of performance at the Spatial Working Memory task whilst there is not even 
a trend towards an impairment of performance of the Stockings of Cambridge test is 
good evidence for the involvement of different cognitive mechanisms in the two tasks.
The dissociation between performance of the Spatial Working Memory task and 
the Stockings of Cambridge task was not unanticipated. It had been shown that some 
cognitive abilities are involved in the performance of both of these tasks, but also that 
they require different cognitive aptitudes. Robbins (1996) has demonstrated the 
existence of common abilities between the two tasks using factor analysis; there is a 
correlation between the proportion of perfect solutions achieved on the Stockings of 
Cambridge task and both the strategy and between-search error scores of the Spatial 
Working Memory task in healthy volunteers. Studies using positron emission 
tomography have also shown that the two tests share anatomical substrates. Baker et al. 
(1996) showed that attempting to solve more difficult Stockings o f Cambridge problems 
was associated with increased rCBF bilaterally in the DLPFC (areas 9 and 46). Owen et 
al. (1996b) have found activation of similar areas in subjects performing a task similar 
to the Spatial Working Memory task in this study. The cognitive abilities that are shared 
by these tasks appear to be the ‘strategic’ and ‘executive’ functions (Robbins 1996, 
Owen 1997) that can benefit spatial working memory performance and that are essential 
for Stockings of Cambridge performance. An impairment of these ‘executive’ processes 
could not account for JG’s results, as it would disrupt performance of both the Spatial 
Working Memoiy and the Stockings of Cambridge task.
The Spatial Working Memory task has also been shown to involve more simple 
processes of memory retrieval that are less strongly associated with performance of the 
Stockings of Cambridge test. The influence of these less ‘executive’ processes on 
Spatial Working Memory performance has been demonstrated by the study of a variety 
of brain-injured populations. Increased between-search errors on this test have been 
found to occur in the absence of a deficit on the strategy measure in patients with PD 
(Owen et al. 1992) and with temporal lobe damage (Owen et al. 1996c). Between-search 
errors also correlate significantly with performance of the Spatial Span test of the 
CANTAB battery (Robbins, 1996). This is a simple test that requires subjects to 
reproduce a spatial sequence of increasing length. It places strong demands on recall 
processes and involves little or no strategy use. It is possible that the retrieval processes 
associated with the Spatial Span test were impaired in JG by surgery. These processes
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are likely to play a stronger role in Spatial Working Memory performance than in 
Stockings of Cambridge performance and impairment of this mechanism could 
therefore account for the selective spatial working memory deficit.
If JG were impaired in the performance of the Spatial Span test, this would be 
evidence of an impairment of ‘memory retrieval’ processes. However, JG’s spatial span 
was tested one month after surgery and was found to be normal. This does not rule out 
the possibility of an impairment in memory retrieval, as JG’s Spatial Working Memory 
performance was also within normal limits at the postop stage; both her spatial working 
memory and spatial span performance may have declined from high preop baselines. 
However, the most important piece of evidence relating to a possible deficit in memory 
retrieval processes is anatomical. The ‘executive’ and ‘retrieval’ processes described 
above have been associated with different areas of lateral frontal cortex by Petrides 
(1996) and Owen (1997). The ‘executive’ processes that are involved in the active 
monitoring and organisation of material are thought to be associated with the DLPFC 
(areas 9 and 46). In contrast, the retrieval of material from memory is associated with 
areas in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC, areas 47, 12 and 45). Impairment of 
‘retrieval’ processes in JG would therefore be associated with disrupted information 
processing in VLPFC. This is unlikely to have occurred as a consequence of 
pallidotomy, as VLPFC (areas 47, 12,45) do not receive projections from the basal 
ganglia.
Consideration of JG’s performance in the context of basal ganglia-frontal lobe 
connections indicates that her impairment on the Spatial Working Memory task did not 
arise from either of the ‘executive’ or ‘retrieval’ processes proposed by Petrides (1996) 
and Owen (1997). A third process appears to exist that is involved in the performance of 
the Spatial Working Memory task but not the Stockings of Cambridge task. The 
existence of this tliird process has already been indicated by a study of PD. Owen et al. 
(1992) found that their patients with mild, medicated PD showed a deficit on the Spatial 
Working Memory task in the presence of normal levels of strategy use and normal 
performance of the Spatial Span test. However, characterisation of the nature of this 
process is beyond the scope of this study.
6.5Â Summary
Pallidotomy had little overall effect on cognitive performance and caused only a 
moderate improvement of motor function. Improvements in postoperative performance 
were seen on the Stockings of Cambridge test for JG, but it is possible that these were
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due to enhanced practice effects that were a consequence of her relative youth and high 
IQ. JG also showed a postoperative deficit in performance of the Spatial Working 
Memory test. JG’s performance on the Stockings of Cambridge test and the Spatial 
Working Memory test allowed identification of a cognitive process that is involved in 
the Spatial Working Memory test but is neither of the ‘lateral frontal’ working memory 
processes proposed by Petrides (1996) and Owen (1997).
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7.0 General discussion
This thesis reports the results of studies of atteiitional and motor set in patients with PD 
and healthy individuals. The final study (Study 6, Section 6.0) also reports the cognitive 
consequences of a neurosurgical procedure that is designed to benefit motor function. 
The following sections will briefly summarise the results of these studies, whilst aiming 
at minimal repetition of previous discussion sessions. The domains of atteiitional and 
motor set will be considered separately; each sumniaiy of results will be followed by a 
discussion of issues arising that are relevant for future studies. The consequences of 
pallidotomy will be considered in a further section and the final section of this 
discussion will place the studies in this thesis in a broader context and raise salient 
questions for future research.
7.1 Atteiitional set
7.1.1 Summary o f  results
7.1.1.1 Characteristics o f  the ED shift deficit in patients with PD 
Studies 1 to 4 in this thesis has investigated atteiitional set in patients with PD. A deficit 
in the performance of ED shifts has been taken as the purest expression of the deficits of 
atteiitional set seen in PD. Study 1 allows some conclusions to be drawn about the 
general characteristics of ED shift performance in patients with PD. This study showed 
that an ED shift deficit was present in patients with PD both when the newly relevant 
dimension after the shift was novel (P and LI+ shifts) and when it had been experienced 
before (LI shift, see Table 2.2). Thus, the deficit seen in patients with PD related solely 
to the requirement to shift dimensions, irrespective of patients previous experience of 
those dimensions. In accordance with previous studies (e.g. Downes et al., 1989) ED 
shifting was found to impaired, and ID shifting spared, in patients with PD. There was 
also an increase in errors after criterion in patients, which caused an apparent 
contradiction; an ED shift deficit in the presence of spared ID shifting can only be a 
consequence of exaggerated, inflexible set, yet such an exaggeration of set should 
minimise errors after criterion. This can be explained by proposing that patients form an 
excessively strong set before an ED shift - that is, they focus excessively on the relevant 
dimension. This set retards ED shifting and then disturbs discrimination performance 
after the shift by periodically intruding and causing ‘loss of set’ to the newly-relevant 
dimension. Flowers and Robertson (1985) originally proposed that patients with PD
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were diminished in their ability to inhibit a competing atteiitional ‘set’; this appears to 
be true of the patients in Study 1.
7.1.1.2 Evaluation o f  theories o f  the cause o f  the ED shift deficit in patients with
PD
Study 1 tested and rejected the hypothesis that exaggerated learned irrelevance is the 
cause of the ED shift deficit in patients with PD. The learned irrelevance (LI) shift that 
had been devised by Owen et al. (1993b) was shown to be sensitive to mechanisms that 
were not learned irrelevance. A number of other possible explanations of the ED shift 
deficit in patients with PD were also ruled out. It was shown that the ED shift deficit 
cannot arise from a basic instability of set or a failure to maintain set (see Section 
1.6.1). The presence of weak or unstable set before a shift would in fact make ED 
shifting easier, as the relative difficulty of ED shifts compared to ID shifts is caused in 
part by the requirement to abandon the set that was present before the shift. If this set 
were weak, it would be discarded easily and the ED shift would be performed rapidly. 
The ED shift deficit of patients with PD indicates that preshift set is exaggerated rather 
than diminished, as discussed above.
Brown and Marsden’s (1990) theory of atteiitional resource depletion provides 
another potential explanation for the ED shift deficit of patients with PD. Brown and 
Marsden suggested that patients with PD are impaired in all cognitive tasks that exceed 
their depleted atteiitional resources. Thus, it is possible that the cognitive demands of 
ED shifting exceed the resources of patients with PD, whereas the demands of ID 
shifting do not. This idea is plausible, as ED shifts are clearly harder for healthy 
subjects than ID shifts. However, an explanation in terms of Brown and Marsden’s 
theory cannot account for the increase in errors committed after criterion, which occur 
at an attentionally undemanding stage of the test. In contrast, these errors would be 
predicted if patients could not inhibit a strong competing set, as suggested above.
Thus, Study 1 showed that the ED shift deficit of patients with PD was due to 
an exaggeration of set; this exaggeration was caused neither by learned irrelevance nor 
a ‘depletion of resources’. When considering tlie implications of Study 1, it became 
clear that the cognitive processes underlying ED shifting were poorly understood. Study 
1 had cast doubt on Owen et al.’s (1993b) account of ED shifting, which had been the 
most contemporary and plausible account available. Therefore, Study 1 was followed by 
a series of investigations of the mechanisms underlying ED shifting in healthy subjects 
(Studies 2 to 4).
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7.1.1.3 Mechanisms underlying ED shifting in healthy subjects 
It was noted in Study 1 that the proposed mechanism of ‘ learned irrelevance’ closely 
resembles the well-established effect of latent inhibition. Also, the ‘test’ phase of 
human latent inhibition paradigms closely resembles an ED shift. As a consequence, it 
was concluded that learned irrelevance/latent inhibition might influence ED shift 
difficulty despite the conclusions of Study I . Studies 2 and 3 used ‘preexposure’ 
designs that were adapted from latent inhibition experiments to test the hypothesis that 
preexposure of the irrelevant dimension would retard ED shifting in a fashion similar to 
latent inhibition. Preexposure had no effect on ED shifting. As learned irrelevance is 
defined as a loss of associability that a stimulus (or dimension) incurs when it is 
presented uncorrelated with reward, this result shows that learned irrelevance cannot be 
involved in determining the difficulty of an ED shift. This conclusion is reinforced by 
evidence that a low level of preexposure of both dimensions often facilitates ED 
shifting (‘overlearning’ - see Wolff, 1967 and Section 3.2.4.3).
Having rejected the role of learned irrelevance in ED shifting, an entirely 
different account of the ED shifting deficit of patients with PD was proposed in Study 4. 
This account centred around an analysis of the process of hypothesis-testing after an ED 
shift. It was noted that subjects can gather information relating to both dimensions after 
receiving feedback from a response; that is, the negative feedback that is received after 
pressing a green square yields information about both the dimensions ‘colour’ and 
‘shape’. A study by Channon et al. (1993) reported that patients with PD were less able 
than controls to use feedback to gather information about the dimensions that they were 
not currently attending to and testing. Channon et al. (1993) did not demonstrate this 
effect using an ED shifting task, but it was noted in Section 3.3.1 that such a deficit 
would selectively interfere with ED shifts, but not ID shifts, in an atteiitional set- 
shifting task. Therefore, the deficits seen in Channon et al.’s study could be the source 
of the ED shift deficits of patients with PD. Study 4 tested the hypothesis that a 
restriction of the ability to gain information from an untested dimension would lead to 
an impairment only of the ED shift. Young healthy subjects’ ability to gather 
information from an untested dimension was reduced by an experimental manipulation 
involving the use of masking and restriction of stimulus display time. This manipulation 
had the predicted effect; it altered ID and ED shift performance differentially rather 
than enhancing the difficulty of both shifts. Thus, it appears possible that the ED shift 
deficit of patients with PD could be accounted for by the deficit found in Channon et
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al.’s (1993) study. However, it was also noted that the absolute level of errors found in 
Study 4 could not have been generated by an inability to learn from the untested 
dimension. The source of these errors has not been identified, but subjects’ subjective 
reports suggest that inattention to the newly-relevant dimension is involved (see Section 
3.3.4.4).
7.1.2 Issues arising fi^om these results
7.1.2.1 The nature o f  stimuli and stimulus presentation 
It is clear that the number of errors generated at an ED shift can vary substantially 
between studies, even when those studies use structurally identical shifts and the same 
dependent measures. For example, the absolute level of errors seen in Study 1 was 
different to that seen in Owen et al.’s (1993) study, which used identical shifts and 
demographically similar subjects. Stimulus differences appear to account for these 
varying error levels; different studies use stimuli and dimensions that vary in salience 
and discriminability, and these factors affect the ease of a shift. The influence of 
stimulus characteristics on shift difficulty has been show most clearly in the analysis of 
the ID shifts used in Study 4. Subjects completed four sequential ID shifts at the 
beginning of the test; all of these shifts involved the same relevant and irrelevant 
dimensions, and experimental conditions were the same throughout. Despite the fact 
that the shifts only differed in the specific stimuli used, the shifts differed significantly 
in difficulty (see Section 3.3.4.1). Errors were higher when subjects were required to 
shift to stimuli that were less discrimiiiable. This finding has clear implications for the 
design of studies that involve the comparison of ID and ED shift performance. If  ID and 
ED shifts use stimuli that are not comparable in difficulty, then manipulations that 
affect only one type of shift must be interpreted with caution.
Use of relatively simple stimuli has meant that subjects often perform at ceiling 
in studies of atteiitional set-shifting. In past studies using the CANTAB battery, both 
controls and patients are often at ceiling in the performance of ID shifts. This is not 
usually problematic, as most CANTAB studies have involved demonstrating deficits of 
ED shift performance in relation to ID shift performance, making ceiling effects largely 
irrelevant. However, there is a danger of missing a subtle patient deficit when both 
patients and controls are performing at ceiling at an ED shift. For example, a subtle 
deficit could have been missed in patients with frontal lobe damage at the LI shift in 
Owen et al.’s (1993) study, as both the patients and their control group were close to
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‘ceiling’. However, comparing control groups that are at ceiling with patient groups that 
aie not at ceiling creates more serious problems for data analysis.
7.1.2.2 Analysis o f  learning-to-criterion data f 'o m  ED shift paradigms 
Conventional parameti ic analysis of error data from ED shifting tasks is often 
inappropriate for two reasons. First, the amount of variance in the data of groups that 
are at a ‘ceiling’ or away from a ‘ceiling’ in performance can differ greatly. Second, the 
distribution of data is often bimodal, or at least positively skewed. There is little 
consensus in the past literature on ED shifting as to what is the most appropriate method 
of analysis for errors / trials to criterion data. Investigators have used ANOVAs, either 
on square-root transformed data (median errors, Roberts et a l, 1988; mean trials, 
Downes et a l, 1989) or untransformed data (means, Elliott et a l, 1995; Owen et a l, 
1993b). With the benefit of hindsight, it may be less than optimal to use parametric tests 
to compare groups of subjects between which the standard errors differ by a factor of 
five, as in Owen et al.’s (1993b) study (LI shift, MED PD patients versus controls).
Such criticisms are not serious, as the CANTAB literature has usually dealt with quite 
large, unambiguous effects. Nonetheless, this should not deter the search for more 
appropriate methods of analysis. This thesis is indebted to Thornton et a l ’s (1996) 
suggestion of data analysis via the construction of survival or hazard tables. Whilst the 
Life Tables analysis used in Studies 2 to 4 is more simple than the methods used in 
Thornton et al.’s (1996) paper, it can account for the artificial scores of subjects who 
never reach criterion as well as the bimodal distribution of data. Trials to criterion data 
from ED shifts conform to all of the assumptions of Life Tables analysis. Thus, the 
various survival / hazard tables approaches to data analysis (e.g. Life Tables, Kaplan- 
Meier Sui'vival Analysis, Cox’s Proportional Hazards Regression Analysis) may be 
optimal for analysing data from ED shift tasks.
7.1.2.3 ED shifts as a measure o f  attentional set-shifting ability
Data from GM in Study 6 raised doubts as to whether the performance of a single ED 
shift can accurately reflect a subject’s attentional set-shifting abilities. The bimodal 
distribution of ED shift data meant that GM’s error scores on his two preop ED shifts 
varied between very high and very low. It was unclear which shift reflected his ED 
shifting abilities. The distribution of ED shift error data means that testing attentional 
set-shifting ability with a single shift is similar to testing memory by requiring recall of 
a single item; the resultant score is effectively one or zero. This approach may be valid
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in the context of a group design. A higher percentage of patients with amnesia than 
controls would forget a single item and this would reflect a memory deficit. Indeed, 
investigators have chosen to report CANTAB ED shift performance in these terms; 
Lange et al. (1992) reported that only 50% of patients successfully complete the ED 
shift compared to 74% of controls. However, the recall of a single item could never be a 
good indicator of an individual’s memory performance, and neither can a single ED 
shift reflect an individual’s attentional set-shifting ability. Thus, any test involving only 
a single ED and ID shift (such as the CANTAB attentional set-shifting test) can be of no 
use in a single case design or in a clinical setting. It is to be hoped that tests 
incorporating multiple shifts will be developed in the future.
When more ‘parametric’ measures of attentional set-shifting ability become 
available, it will be possible to describe an individual’s performance with respect to that 
of a control group. Future studies will be able to report more statistics about the 
distribution of deficits in a patient group, such as the percentage of patients scoring 
more than one standard deviation below the control mean. It is no longer sufficient to 
conclude that patients are ‘impaired’ or ‘relatively impaired’ (Downes et al., 1989) at 
ED shifting on the grounds that the mean error score of a group of patients is 
significantly higher than that of controls. The population of patients with PD is likely to 
be as heterogeneous with respect to cognitive symptoms as it is to motor symptoms. 
Therefore, it is quite likely that some patients will show intact ED shift performance, 
just as some patients show no tremor. Indeed, Downes et al. (1989) reported that over 
60% of their medicated patients with PD successfully completed an ED shift. There is a 
need for multiple single-case designs in this type of research, where both group means 
and individual performance are reported (e.g. Della Sala et al., 1995; Logie et al., 1996). 
It could be the case that some patients with PD in fact show ‘loss of set’ and superior 
ED shift performance, or that there is a sharp disjunction between patients with intact 
ED shifting and those with a deficit. Until multiple single-case designs are adopted, 
none of these possibilities can be detected.
A number of methodological issues have been raised in this section. Although 
these issues are quite diverse, it is interesting to note that they are identical to the list of 
problems with latent inhibition studies reported by Lubow (1997)1.
‘ “Methodological issues in human LI research include: dichotomous data, ceiling effects, 
inappropriate data analysis, individual versus group data, and the need for within-subjects 
designs and parametric studies.” Lubow (1997), p. 75
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7.2 Motor set
7.2.1 Summary o f results
7.2.1.1 Under what conditions do patients with PD show an RT deficit?
The quantitative analysis carried out in Section 4.0 allowed the assessment of general 
hypotheses about the conditions under which patients with PD show an RT deficit. It 
was clear from this analysis that patients with PD consistently show slowed simple RTs. 
However, the presence of deficits on choice RT tasks was less consistent. The 
quantitative analysis found that the absolute speed at which controls could perform a 
choice RT task was an important variable for determining whether a PD deficit was 
present; deficits were more likely in tasks at which controls could achieve ‘fast’ (that is, 
short) RTs, but were less likely at ‘slow’ tasks. This finding was true in a range of tasks 
in which control RTs varied between around 300 ms and 550 ms. In line with this 
prediction, an RT deficit was found in Study 5, in which controls had relatively ‘fast’ 
RTs of between 320 and 390 ms. The review in Section 4.0 also found that patients 
were more likely to show an RT deficit when off medication. However, it appears that 
to be genuinely ‘o ff  medication, prolonged medication withdrawal is required - 
skipping a single dose may not suffice (see Section 4.3.2). Medication effects may 
account for spared patient performance on ‘slow’ choice RT tasks , as levodopa appears 
to improve RTs more on such ‘slow’ tasks than on ‘fast’ tasks (see Section 4.3.3.1).
7.2.1.2 Conclusions about motor set in PD
This section will consider what impact PD has on temporal and spatial set in turn, 
followed by a consideration of a third type of set that has been termed ‘attentional 
focussing’. ‘Temporal set’ and ‘spatial set’ are defined here, as in Section 5.0, as a 
readiness to respond at a particular time and to a particular location. Study 5 showed 
that the distinction between temporal and spatial set was functionally valid. There was a 
dissociation between the responses of young and elderly healthy subjects to 
manipulations of spatial and temporal probability. Healthy elderly subjects did not show 
the response to spatial probability that was seen in young subjects; however, healthy 
elderly subjects showed a response to temporal probability that was as large as that of 
young controls, if not larger. Thus, whilst the RTs of young subjects may be determined 
by both the temporal and spatial probability of stimulus occurrence, their response to 
these two types of probability is mediated by functionally and neurally separate 
systems.
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Temporal set appears to be intact in PD. Study 5 investigated the temporal ‘set’ 
that mediates RT speeding with lengthening foreperiod known as ‘delay-dependent 
speeding’. It was shown that this effect was due to subjects’ response to information 
about the temporal probability of stimulus occurrence. Patients with PD show normal 
RT variation with manipulations of temporal probability. However, they also show a 
consistent RT deficit that was unrelated to the changes in RT caused by manipulations 
of temporal probability. Thus, deficits of temporal set cannot be the cause of the RT 
deficits of patients with PD. It can also be concluded that the more ‘cognitive’ 
components of temporal set are intact. In order for patients with PD to show normal RT 
variation with temporal probability change, they must be able to estimate time delays 
accurately and show successful implicit learning of the relationship of these delays to 
temporal probability. These abilities are unaffected by PD.
Spatial set has been investigated in two sections of this thesis. First, the ‘Motor 
preprogramming’ section of the quantitative review (Section 4.2) investigated the type 
of spatial set that can rapidly be formed when a subject is cued about the direction of an 
upcoming movement. Second, in Study 5 spatial probability was manipulated such that 
a response was more likely - but not certain - to be required at one location than 
another. This was designed to create a ‘set’ that would allow more rapid responses to 
the more probable location. A quantitative analysis and literature review (Sections
4.2.3.2 and 4.2.2) have shown that the first type of set is intact in PD; patients with PD 
benefit as much as controls from being cued about the direction of a forthcoming 
movement. However, no conclusions could be drawn about spatial set from Study 5, as 
neither patients nor their age-matched controls showed changes in RT as a result of the 
manipulation of spatial probability that was used. The failure of this manipulation to 
affect RT in elderly subjects was itself of interest, as it contrasted with young subjects’ 
intact response to spatial probability and contributed to the dissociation described 
above.
The final aspect of ‘motor set’ that must be considered has not been well 
characterised, but its existence can be inferred from its effect on simple RT tasks. As 
noted above, patients with PD show a deficit on simple RT tasks that is more consistent 
than that seen in choice RT tasks. Goodrich et al. (1989) have proposed that this simple 
RT deficit derives from a failure to engage in ‘attentional focussing’ by patients with 
PD (for a full discussion of this hypothesis see Sections 1.5 and 4.4.2). ‘Attentional 
focussing’ is Goodrich et al.’s term for a type of motor readiness that can be achieved 
by healthy subjects at simple, but not choice RT tasks; as such, it can be described as a
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type of ‘set’. Goodrich et al. (1989, 1990) have supported their hypothesis with 
evidence from studies of patients with PD and healthy controls. The only other well- 
articulated theory that attempts to account for the consistency of the simple RT deficit 
in patients with PD is that of Hallett (1990) which is described in Section 4.2.2.
Hal left’s hypothesis of a ‘lengthened motor initiation stage’ could account for the PD 
simple RT deficit, but there is no evidence to support this assertion and this hypothesis 
cannot account for Goodrich et al.’s (1989, 1990) data.
The type if motor set identified by Goodrich et al. cannot be identical to either 
temporal or spatial set, as these are both intact in PD. Thus, a third type of set must be 
proposed. It appears that the phrase ‘motor set’ that was introduced in Section 1.5 
includes at least three separate psychological processes, each of which may be 
differentially vulnerable to brain damage.
7.2.2 Issues arisingfi'om these results
7.2.2.1 Understanding o f  set 
The results described above permit the continuation of Gibson’s (1941) project to define 
‘set’ precisely and to delimit different type of set. Three different types o f set have been 
identified, only one of which is impaired by PD. It has also been shown that some types 
of set are only present under certain conditions. Healthy elderly controls were no 
quicker to make a response that they knew to be twice as probable as an alternative (a 
2:1 bias - Study 5). Thus, no set had been formed to take advantage of the bias in 
probability. It is interesting to note that groups of younger healthy subjects (aged 
around 30 and 50) have also been shown to display no RT speeding towards a more 
probable target in a task that involved a 3:1 bias (Georgiou et al., 1996). The absence of 
a spatial set in Study 5 is in sharp contrast to the findings of other paradigms that 
succeed in forming spatial set in healthy elderly subjects. Healthy elderly subjects are 
able to use cues to speed their responses in studies of motor preprogramming (see 
Section 4.2.3.2). They also show speeding of RTs through implicit learning of 
sequences in serial RT tasks (e.g. Pascual-Leone et al., 1993). The failure of probability 
manipulations to alter RT must be accounted for; two related factors, response certainty 
and response probability, may account for this.
The most obvious difference between the ‘probability’ manipulation in Study 5 
and more effective manipulations is that the probability manipulation does not allow 
certainty about the location of the next response. Precueing provides such certainty (in 
most designs) and if an embedded sequence is successfiilly learned, this also allows
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certainty. Thus, it is possible either that organisms cannot form a set without certainty 
about the location of the next response, or that they judge it (implicitly or explicitly) not 
to be beneficial to form a set under such conditions. An alternative explanation may be 
that certainty is not required, but that a more substantial manipulation of probability is 
required to form a set that will alter RT. It has been noted above that a 2:1 bias of 
spatial proba bility had no effect on RT; interestingly, this level of temporal probability 
also had no effect on RT. Table 5.2 shows that for the Rising block on the more 
probable side, foreperiods of 1000 and 500 ms are associated with probabilities of 0.66 
and 0.33, respectively (a 2; 1 bias). An inspection of the relevant data points in Figures
5.1 and 5.2 shows that there is very little RT difference between these points, despite a 
2:1 bias of temporal probability. Indeed, the only major RT differences seen in these 
graphs are RT slowings associated with low probabilities, such as at the 250 ms 
foreperiod in the Rising block and the 1000 ms foreperiod in the Falling block. Thus, it 
appears that a motor set may manifest as a slowing of response to unanticipated, low 
probability times or locations rather than an incremental speeding of response with 
increasingly high probability.
The results reported above have allowed the identification of multiple types of 
set involved in RT tasks. However, it appears that the conditions required to establish a 
set may be quite specific, and intuitive ideas may be a poor guide to creating 
manipulations that elicit set. For example, all elderly subjects became aware of the 
spatial probability bias soon after starting the experiment, which led to the expectation 
that they would show corresponding changes in RT; they did not show such RT 
changes.
7.2.2.2 Implications o f  the RT deficit ofpatients with PD 
It is important to note that the mere presence of a simple or choice RT deficit in patients 
with PD signifies very little. The use of tasks involving response time measures has 
been extremely productive in investigating specific hypotheses about PD, such as the 
suggestion that patients are unable to use ‘advance information’ to speed their 
responses. However, it is unclear how to interpret the mere presence of slowed RTs in 
patients with PD. RTs are correlated with the motor symptoms of PD, but less well so 
than movement times (Zappia et al., 1994); RTs are clearly inferior to both clinical 
rating scales and movement times as an indicator of disease status. Although 
investigators have (perhaps somewhat lazily) associated RT deficits with ‘akinesia’ and 
deficits of response initiation, no attempt has been made to correlate RT with symptoms
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such as gait freezing, in which patients’ ability to initiate movements is completely 
absent, RTs must necessarily index some form of response initiation, but the type of 
response required in RT tasks - usually an externally cued, unimanual ballistic 
movement - is the type of response that is probably least impaired by PD, It has yet to 
be established that an RT deficit in patients with PD signifies anything other than the 
presence of brain damage (as in head injury - Miller, 1970; or Alzheimer’s disease - 
Gordon and Carson 1990). Indeed, Section 4.0 has shown that the RT deficit of patients 
with PD may obey quite mundane laws relating to the overall ‘speed’ of an RT task. 
The mere presence of an RT deficit in patients with PD tells us nothing about PD.
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7.3 The effects of pallidotomy on cognitive function
7.3.1 Summary o f  results
Both Study 6 and the review of pallidotomy studies in Section 6.1 indicate that 
pallidotomy has no major detrimental effects on cognitive function. JG showed a 
significant drop in performance of a spatial working memory task after surgery, but did 
not report that this created any problems in her daily life. The review in Section 6.1 
concluded that deficits of verbal fluency were a relatively consistent consequence of 
surgery; however, neither JG nor GM showed a postoperative decline in verbal fluency. 
This may have been due to the location of the surgery. It was noted in Section 6.1.2.4 
that verbal fluency deficits were more common after left hemisphere surgery, whereas 
both JG and GM underwent right pallidotomy.
Study 6 also demonstrated that performance of the CANTAB Spatial Working 
Memory task can involve at least three separate cognitive mechanisms. The 
dissociations in JG’s performance and a consideration of basal ganglia connectivity 
showed that JG’s deficit on the Spatial Working Memory task could not have involved 
either the ‘strategic’ or the ‘memory recall’ processes that are thought to be involved in 
the performance of the task (Owen, 1997). This is not an entirely novel finding, as 
patients with PD have been shown to have a spatial working memory deficit in the 
presence of intact strategy use and spatial span (recall) performance (Owen et al., 1992). 
However, the results from JG demonstrate the existence of a third process quite clearly, 
as this process is selectively impaired as a consequence of quite limited brain damage.
7.3.2 Issues arising from these results
Many of the methodological issues surrounding the followup studies of pallidotomy 
have already been discussed in Section 6.1.1. In followup studies of pallidotomy there is 
once again a need for multiple single-case designs. Reporting unchanged mean group 
performance after surgeiy can conceal the presence of consistent postoperative 
improvements and decrements in cognitive performance in individual patients.
Although pallidotomy appears to be a neuropsychological ly ‘safe’ procedure, serious 
adverse consequences have been reported (e.g. Ghika et al., 1996; Lang et al., 1997). 
Future large-scale studies should attempt to establish the percentage occurrence of these 
complications, their chronicity and their associated risk factors.
The surprising failure of most previous studies to account for test-retest effects 
was also discussed in Section 6.1.1. The need for control subjects in followup studies of
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pallidotomy is evident, and the repeated use of neuropsychological tests without 
alternate forms or controls appears to be a gross error of method. A final issue that 
arises from reviewing past studies of pallidotomy is the apparent ignorance of most 
researchers of the past literature on the topic. None of the studies reviewed in Section
6.1 cited any of the psychological followup studies of pallidotomy that were carried out 
in the 1960s (e.g. McFie, 1960; Riklan et al., 1960) despite their obvious relevance and 
publication in prominent journals. It is clear that the neurosurgical techniques used 40 
years ago differ from contemporary methods and that these older neuropsychological 
studies sometimes used tests that are now seen as antique. However, Riklan et al. (1960) 
used the WAIS and carried out a long term followup of pallidotomy patients; this must 
be relevant, and ignorance of such studies may have allowed the ‘rebirth’ of 
pallidotomy to commence without appropriate neuropsychological evaluation (Laitinen 
et al., 1992).
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7.4 Future directions for research
The research reported in this thesis has shown that understanding of a deficit such as the 
WCST deficit seen in patients with PD can be refined and clarified. Increasingly well- 
specified hypotheses can be generated and tested to explain such a deficit. A substantial 
amount of time and money has been spent in establishing and investigating the ED shift 
deficit seen in patients with PD (Downes et al., 1989; Lange et al., 1992; Owen et al., 
1992, 1993; Robbins et al., 1994). However, it has not been established that the deficit 
of attentional set-shifting revealed by ED shifting tasks has any negative impact on the 
lives of patients with PD. Results from JG have shown that an individual can undergo a 
change in cognitive performance that is statistically significant but unnoticeable. Also, 
the cause of the cognitive deficits of PD has not been clearly established. It has been 
assumed that the cognitive difficulties seen in PD are a direct consequence of the 
neuropathology of PD; however, there are other possible causal mechanisms.
The ability to attend selectively to one aspect of a compound stimulus is 
thought to be an aspect of ‘executive’ function. Tests that are thought to tap executive 
function have been shown to be sensitive to sleep disturbance in healthy subjects (Fluck 
et al., 1998) and to motor activity in patients with PD (Brown and Marsden, 1991).
Sleep disturbance is prevalent in PD (Pearce, 1992) and motor activity is a requirement 
of most cognitive tasks. Thus, it is possible that problems such as the ED shifting deficit 
are not a direct consequence of neural damage, but may instead be caused indirectly by 
one of the non-cognitive symptoms of PD. If  this were the case, then the logic of the 
many studies that use PD as a model of basal ganglia dysfunction or dopamine 
depletion would be invalid. Also, studies attempting to attribute cognitive deficits to 
particular brain regions would be misconceived. Further research is needed to establish 
whether the cognitive deficits seen in PD are directly or indirectly caused by the 
neuropathology of PD.
The ED shift deficit is a persistent and refractory symptom (see Section 1.6.4) 
that is common in patients with PD. Thus, it can be argued that that this deficit is an 
important symptom that should be investigated. However, there is a contrast between 
the results of neuropsychological tests and the subjective reports of patients. In the 
author’s experience, individuals with early PD deny the presence of cognitive deficits 
whilst freely admitting to depression and other embarrassing medical conditions. Also, 
neither medical texts (e.g. Pearce, 1992) nor information from charities (e.g. National 
Pai'kinson Foundation, 1996; Parkinson’s Disease Society, 1998) list cognitive
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impairment as a presenting symptom of early PD. Thus, a high percentage of patients 
with early PD have ED shift deficits, but neither these patients nor observers notice any 
cognitive impairment, let alone report it as a troubling symptom. Deficits of attentional 
set-shifting only become evident when neuropsychological tests are carried out. I wish 
to argue that it is essential to establish what impact ED shift deficits have on activities 
of everyday life and the quality of life of patients with PD. Currently, the ED shift 
deficit seen in PD can be compared to the anosmia seen in PD. Anosmia can be present 
from an early stage of PD and it persists and is refractory to medical treatment (Doty et 
al., 1988). As with ED shift deficits, anosmia is present in some of the supposedly 
‘healthy’ general population and can be seen in other neurological disorders. There is 
currently no evidence that either anosmia or attentional set-shifting deficits are in any 
way a serious handicap for patients with PD, in contrast to their motor symptoms. A 
similar argument has already been advanced about the RT deficit seen in patients with 
PD (see Section 1 2 2 2 ) ,  as this deficit is not the best index of disease status in PD and 
has never been explicitly associated with movement initiation impairments.
Future research relating to deficits such as the ED shift deficit in PD can be 
justified in one of two ways. First, it can be argued that research such as that reported in 
this thesis is aimed at understanding the symptoms of PD in order to improve the lives 
of patients with PD (at some point, however distant). If this is the case, it is essential to 
establish that deficits such as the ED shift deficit are significant to patients with PD. If 
such deficits have little impact, then money and time should be spent on investigating 
the other disabling symptoms of PD. Alternatively, it can be argued that PD represents 
an instance of brain damage and as such the performance of patients with PD on 
neuropsychological tests may reveal dissociations that can inform models of normal 
cognitive function. An example of this approach is the demonstration of a double 
dissociation between the performance of patients with amnesia and patients with PD on 
different memory tasks (ICnowlton et al., 1996). This thesis has found two such 
dissociations - between temporal and spatial set (Section 5.4) and between different 
processes involved in spatial working memory (Section 6.5.3). However, if the search 
for dissociations is the justification for future research, it must be accepted that patients 
with PD are only used because of their brain damage, not because PD is of interest per  
se. Therefore, funding should not be sought on the basis of the potential benefits of 
research for patients with PD. It should be noted that the two dissociations reported in 
this thesis arose from the consequences of aging and a pallidal lesion rather than PD.
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In summary, research in this thesis has investigated the source of attentional 
and motor deficits in PD. In the future, focus must shift to the impact of these deficits. 
Once the impact of these deficits is understood, it will be clear that further research on 
these topics is justified.
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Appendix 1: Program used for dimensional shifting task in Study 1
Ll.BAS
C:\USR\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\GRID.VBX
C:\USR\WIND0WS\SYSTEM\MS0LE2. VBX
C:\USR\W1ND0WS\SYSTEM\ANIBUT0N.VBX
C:\USR\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\CMDIALOG.VBX
C:\USR\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\CRYSTAL.VBX
C:\USR\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\GAUGE.VBX
C:\USR\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\GRAPH.VBX
C:\USR\W1ND0WS\SYSTEM\KEYSTAT.VBX
C:\USR\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\MSCOMM.VBX
C:\USR\W1ND0WS\SYSTEM\MSMASKED.VBX
C:\USR\WIND0WS\SYSTEM\MS0UTL1N.YBX
C:\USR\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\PICCLIP.VBX
C:\USR\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\SPIN.VBX
C:\USR\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\THREED.VBX
LIl.FRM
LI2.FRM
LI3.FRM
HOWDONE.FRM
END.FRM
ProjWinSize=80,387,248,183 
Pi‘ojWinShow=2 
IconForm="Forml "
Title=’’U"
ExeN ame=" LI .EXE"
Ll.BAS:
Option Explicit 
Declare Function timegettiine Lib "mmsysteni" {) As Long 
Global nl'ype As Integer 
Global sName As String 
Global nStage As Integer 
Global nOelay As Integer 
Global nOnetiine As Long 
Global nTwotime As Long 
Global nThrtime As Long 
Global nTrials As Integer 
Global sSide As String 
Global nCorrect As Integer 
Global iiBlock As Integer 
Dim iiRt As Long 
Dim iiMt As Long 
Global nStagecount As Integer 
Dim nSet As Integer 
Global nPiccy As Integer 
Dim sWrong As String 
Dim nLoop As Integer 
Dim nCrit(IOO) As Integer 
Dim sRight As String 
Global nExtra As Integer 
Global nSlide As Integer 
Global tiForm As Integer
Sub chi 0  
' colour spots 
' colour (green) correct 
Randomize 
nPiccy = Rnd(I) 
nSet = Rnd(l)
If nSet == 1 Then 
s Wrong = "yelstri.bmp" 
sRlght = "bluspo.bmp"
Else
s Wrong = "yelspo.bmp" 
sRight = "blustri.bmp"
End If
If nPiccy = I Then 
form2.PictureLPicture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sRight) 
form2.Picture2.Picturc = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sWrong)
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Else
lbrm2.Picturel.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sWrong) 
lbnii2.Picture2.Picturc = LoadPlclure("c:\iisr\d\vbasic\grapliics\" & sRight) 
End If 
End Sub
Sub ch2 0  
' number and spots 
' number (ONE) correct 
Randomize 
nPiccy = Rnd(l) 
nSet = Rnd(l)
If nSet = 1 Then 
sWrong =  "onesta.bmp" 
sRight =  "twoliasii.bmp"
Else
sWrong = "onehash.bmp" 
sRight = "l\vosta,bmp"
End If
If nPiccy = 1 Then
form2.Picturel,Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sRight) 
form2.Picture2.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sWrong) 
Else
forni2.PictureI.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sWrong) 
lbrm2.Picture2.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sRight) 
End If 
End Sub
Sub charm ()
' here check the stage 
' call the appropriate piccyloading sub 
Select Case nStage 
Case I 
Call novel 
Case 2 
Call ids 
Case 3 
Call chi 
Case 4 
Call ch2 
Case 5 
Call theend 
End Select 
End Sub
Sub ctr (frmForm As Form)
IVniForm.Left = 0 
frniForm.Top = 0 
frmForm. Width = screen.Widtli 
frmForm.Height = screen.Height 
' centring form I - any form, actually.
End Sub
Sub feedback ()
Ibrm2!Picture I .Visible = False 
lbrm2!Picture2.Visible = False 
' find out whether it's right or not 
' write to file
' nWait -  nOnetime - nil no 
iiRt = nTwotime - nOnetime 
uMt =  nThrtime - nTwotime
Write #1, nTrials, nCorrect, nDelay, sSide, nRt, nM t', nWait 
Unload forni2 
Load forni2
' display the appropriate piccy 
' then probably check sliding criterion 
nCrit(nStagecount) = nCorrect 
If nStagecount = 30 Then 
Call sliderl 
End If
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ir nStagecount = (30 + nExtra) Then 
Call sllder2 
End If
If nStagecount = 30 + (nExtra * 2) Then 
Call slider3 
End If 
End Sub
Sub ids 0  
' as novel, but changed exemplars 
' standard grcir rdsqr stuff 
Randomize 
nPiccy = Rnd(l) 
nSet = Rnd(l)
If nSet = I Then 
sWrong = "rdclr.bmp" 
sRight = "grsqr.bmp"
Else
sWrong = "grcir.bmp" 
sRight =  "rdsqr.bmp"
End If
If nPiccy = I Then
form2.Picturel .Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sRight) 
form2.Picture2.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sWrong) 
Else
form2.Picturel.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sWrong) 
form2.Picture2.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sRight) 
End If 
End Sub
Sub main () 
nTrials =  0 
nStagecount = 0
nExtra = Int((I2 - 8 + 1) * Rnd(l) + 8)
Load form3 
Load form 1 
End Sub
Sub novel ()
’ intial discrimination 
Randomize 
nPiccy = Rnd(I) 
nSet = Rnd(I)
If nSet = 1 Then 
sWrong = "blathi.bmp" 
sRight = "pinktri.bmp"
Else
sWrong = "pinkthi.bmp" 
sRight = "blatri.bmp"
End If
If nPiccy = 1 Then
Ibrm2.Picture I .Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sRight) 
forni2.Picture2.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\grapliics\" & sWrong) 
Else
ibrm2.PictureI.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sWrong) 
form2.Picture2.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sRight) 
End If 
End Sub
Sub premreload ()
UTiForm = 2 Then 
Unload forni2 
Load tbrm2 
Else 
Load form2 
End If 
End Sub
Sub reload ()
Unload form2 
Load forni2 
' yep, it's there all right
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End Sub 
Sub shift 0
' i'm putting this is as it is quite clear that i need to 
' do lots when shifting, here it is;
nExtra = Int((12 - 8 + 1) * Rnd(l) + 8) ' defines post-crit interval 
' clear the array for the criteria - don't know if it's necessary 
For nLoop = 1 To 70 
nCrit(iiLoop) = 0 
Next nLoop
' set the counter for this array to 1. 
nStagecount = 1
' ? put something in the results file about having shifted 
Write I, "stage shift from", nStage, "to", nStage + 1 
' advance nStage by 1 
nStage = nStage + 1 
If nStage = 9 Then 
Call theend 
End If 
nSlide = 0
' that's it, really, still the same res])onse form, but just different 
' stimuli coming up.
End Sub
Sub sliderl ()
' here goes with the sliding criterion 
' 8 out of 10 (this week.) 
nSlide = 0
' look at last 10 responses, add up number correct 
For nLoop = (nStagecount - 9) To nStagecount 
nSlide = nSlide + nCrit(nLoop)
Next nLoop 
Load forni4 
End Sub
Sub slider2 () 
nSlide == 0
' look at last 10 responses, add up number correct 
For nLoop = (nStagecount - 9) To nStagecount 
nSlide = nSlide + nCrit(iiLoop)
Next nLoop 
IfnSlide>=8Then 
Call shift 
Else 
Load forni4 
End If 
End Sub
Sub slider] () 
nSlide = 0
' look at last 10 responses, add up number correct 
For nLoop = (nStagecount - 9) To nStagecount 
nSlide = nSlide + nCrit(iiLoop)
Next nLoop 
If nSlide >= 8 Then 
Call shift 
Else
Call theend 
End If 
End Sub
Sub strl 0  
' spots colour 
' spots correct 
Randomize 
nPiccy = Rnd( I) 
nSet = Rnd(I)
If nSet = 1 Then 
sWrong = "yelstri.bmp" 
sRight = "bluspo.bmp"
Else
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sWrong = "blustri.bmp’' 
sRight = "yelspo.bmp"
End If
If nPiccy = 1 Then
forni2.PictureI.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sRight) 
form2.Picture2.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sWrong) 
Else
form2.Picturei.Picture = LoadPicture("c;\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sWrong) 
form2.Picture2.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sRight) 
End If 
End Sub
Sub str2 0  
' colour number 
' green correct 
Randomize 
nPiccy = Rnd(l) 
nSet = Rnd(I)
If nSet = 1 Then 
sWrong = "onebr.bmp" 
sRight = "twowhi.bmp"
Else
sWrong = "twobr.bmp" 
sRight = "onewhi.bmp"
End If
If nPiccy = I Then
Ibrm2.Picture I .Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sRight) 
form2.Picture2.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphlcs\" & sWrong) 
Else
form2.Picturel.Plcture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sWrong) 
form2.Picture2.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sRight) 
End If 
End Sub
Sub strict ()
' here check the stage 
' call the appropriate piccyloading sub 
Select Case nStage 
Case 1 
Call novel 
Case 2 
Call ids 
Case 3 
Call strl 
Case 4 
Call str2 
Case 5 
Call theend 
End Select 
End Sub
Sub theend ()
MsgBox "Well done! You have completed this stage of the test."
Close 
End 
End Sub
L I l . F R M
Option Explicit
Sub Command l_Click () 
nType = I
If text 1.Text = "" Then 
MsgBox "You must enter some initials!"
Else
sName = text 1.Text & "Is"
Open "c:\usr\d\vbasic\results\" & sName For Append As #I
W rite#I, sName, "strict version", "block#", nBlock, Date
Unload forml
Set fbrml = Nothing
Load form2
269
End If 
End Sub
Sub Command2_Click () 
nType -  2
If text 1.Text = "" Then 
MsgBox "You must enter some initials!" 
textl.SetFocus 
Else
sName = textI.Text & "Ic"
Open "c:\usr\d\vbasic\results\" & sName For Append As #1 
Write #1, sName, "charm version", "block nBlock, Date 
Unload forml 
Set forml = Nothing 
Load forml 
End If 
End Sub
Sub Form_Load () 
ctr forml 
form I.Show 
End Sub
Sub Optionl_Click() 
nStage = 1 
nBlock = 1 
End Sub
Sub Option2_Click () 
nBlock = 2 
nStage = 2 
End Sub
Sub Option3_Click () 
nBlock = 3 
nStage = 2 
End Sub
Sub Option4_Click () 
nBlock = 4 
nStage = 2 
End Sub
LI2.FRM
Option Explicit
Dim nZeit As Integer 
Dim nWaiting As Integer 
Dim nKey As Integer 
Dim nLoop As Integer 
Dim nClick As Integer
Sub Form_DblClick ()
' End
End Sub
Sub Form_KeyDown (KeyCode As Integer, Shift As Integer) 
tlmerl .Enabled = True 
forni2.Visible = False 
nWaiting = I
End Sub
Sub Form_KeyUp (ICeyCode As Integer, Shift As Integer)
If nWaiting = 1 Then 
Write #1, "prem response"
For nLoop = I To 50 
Beep 
Next
MsgBox "Whoops! You released the key too early"
Call reload 
End If
End Sub
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Sub Form_Load () 
nKey = 0 
nClick = 0 
If nTrials <> 0 Then 
If nCorrect = I Then 
form2.Picturc3 .Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\yep.bmp")
Else
forni2.Picture3.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\nope.bmp")
End If 
End If 
ctr form2 
forinl.Show
forni2!Picture3. Visible = True 
nWaiting = 0 
End Sub
Sub Picture l_KeyUp (KeyCode As Integer, Shift As Integer) 
nTwotime = timegettime()
picture 1 .Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\blank.bmp") 
picture2.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\blank.bmp")
End Sub
Sub Picturel_MouseDown (Button As Integer, Shift As Integer, X As Single, Y As Single) 
nThrtime = timegettime() 
nTrials = nTrials + I 
nStagecount = nStagecount + 1 
sSide = "R"
If nPiccy = 1 Then 
nCorrect = 1 
Else 
nCorrect = 0 
End If 
Call feedback 
End Sub
Sub Picture2_MouseDown (Button As Integer, Shift As Integer, X As Single, Y As Single) 
nThrtime = timegettime() 
nTrials = nTrials + I 
nStagecount = nStagecount + 1 
sSide = "L"
If nPiccy = 1 Then 
nCorrect = 0 
Else 
nCorrect = 1 
End If
Call feedback 
End Sub
Sub Picture3_DblClick ()
'End
nClick = nClick + 1 
If nClick = 2 Then 
Close 
End 
End If 
End Sub
Sub Picture3_KeyDown (KeyCode As Integer, Shift As Integer)
If nKey = 0 Then 
Pictures .Visible = False 
nWaiting = I 
If nType = 1 Then 
Call strict 
Else 
Call charm 
End If 
Randomize
timer! .Enabled = False
nDelay = Int((4 - I + 1) * Rnd(l) + 1)
Select Case nDelay 
Case 1
271
nZeit= 100 
Case 2 
nZeit = 300 
Case 3 
nZeit = 500 
Case 4 
nZeit = 700
' these are the timer settings that are required to get the correct delays (as in text) 
End Select
timerl.Intei-val = nZeit 
timer! .Enabled = True 
nKey = 1 
End If 
End Sub
Sub Timer l_Timer () 
timer 1 .Enabled = False 
picturel.Visible = True 
picture2.Visible = True 
form2.Visible = True 
nOnetime = timegettime() 
nWaiting = 0 
End Sub
L I 3 . F R M
Option Explicit
Sub Form_KeyUp (KeyCode As Integer, Shift As Integer) 
MsgBox "Whoops! You released the key too early" 
Load forni2 
End Sub
Sub Form Load () 
ctr forni3 
forni3.Show 
End Sub
H O W D O N E . F R M
Option Explicit 
Dim sPiccy As String
Sub Commandl_MouseDown (Button As Integer, Shift As Integer, X As Single, Y As Single) 
Unload tbriii4
End Sub
Sub doneright ()
' find the stage, infer the exemplar 
If nType = 1 Then ' strict 
Select Case nStage 
Case I 
sPiccy = "corrtri.bmp"
Case 2
sPiccy = "corrsq.bmp"
Case 3 
sPiccy = "corrspo.bmp"
Case 4
sPiccy = "corrwhi.bmp"
End Select 
Else ' charm 
Select Case nStage 
Case 1 
sPiccy = "corrtri.bmp"
Case 2 
sPiccy = "corrsq.bmp"
Case 3
sPiccy = "corrblu.bmp"
Case 4
sPiccy = "corrtwo.bmp"
End Select
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End If
Write #1, "well done"
End Sub
Sub donewrong ()
' find the stage, infer the exemplar '
If nType = I Then ' strict 
Select Case nStage 
Case 1 
sPiccy = "wrotri.bmp"
Case 2 
sPiccy = "wrosq.bmp"
Case 3 
sPiccy =  "wrospo.bmp"
Case 4 
sPiccy = "wrowhi.bmp"
End Select 
Else ' charm 
Select Case nStage 
Case 1 
sPiccy = "wrotri.bmp"
Case 2
sPiccy = "wrosq.bmp"
Case 3 
sPiccy = "wroblu.bmp"
Case 4 
sPiccy = "wrotwo.bmp"
End Select 
End If
Write # I , "not yet"
End Sub
Sub Form_Load () 
ctr forni4 
' indeedy
If nSlide >= 8 Then 
Call doneright 
Else 
Call donewrong 
End If
picture I.Picture = LoadPicture("c:\usr\d\vbasic\graphics\" & sPiccy) 
tbrni4.Show 
End Sub
END.FRM 
Option Explicit
Sub Command l_MouseDown (Button As Integer, Shift As Integer, X As Single, Y As Single) 
Close 
End 
End Sub
Sub Form_DblCllck ()
End 
End Sub
Sub Form_Load () 
ctr forms 
forms.Show 
End Sub
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Appendix 2
Studies included in advance information analysis
References Task Response Inclusion Source of values
Bloxliam et al. 
(1984)
Girotti et al. 
(1986)
Stelmach et al.
(1986)
Lichter et al. 
(1988)
Pullman et al. 
(1990)
.Tahanshalii et. 
al. (1992a) 
Sprengelmeyer 
et al. (1995)
Willingham et 
al. (1995)
2 CRT and cued 2 Keyrelease 
CRT
3 CRT and cued 3 Keyrelease 
CRT
8 CRT, four levels Keyrelease 
of cueing
2 CRT and cued 2 Keyrelease 
CRT
2 CRT and cued 2 Wrist flexion 
CRT
4 CRT, 3 levels of Keyrelease 
cueing, SRT
2 CRT and cued 2 Keyrelease 
CRT
2 CRT, two types Keypress 
of cued CRT
All values 
reported 
All values 
reported
Uncertainty levels 
3 (uncued) and 
zero (fully cued) 
All values 
reported 
High (optimal) 
levodopa dose 
Fully cued and 
uncued 4 CRT 
Block 1 “simple” 
(cued 2 CRT), 
block 1 “choice” 
(2 CRT) 
“Warningonly” 
and “cuedwatch” 
conditions
From table 4 
From table 2 
E sf d from fig 4
From table 3 
Est’d from fig 1 
Est’d from fig 6 
From table 5
Est’d fig 1
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S tu d ie s  in c lu d e d  in  m e d ic a t io n  a n a ly s is
References Task Response Manipulation Inclusion Source of 
values
Bloxham et al. SRT
(1987)
Pullman et al. SRT, 2
(1988) CRT
Brown et al. 2 CRT
(1993b)
Malapani et al. Go/nogo
(1994) CRT
Labiitta et al. 3 CRT
(1994)
Harrison et al. SRT, 2
(1995) CRT
Keypress Withdrawal, mean 9.5
hours
Wrist flexion / levodopa infusion at 
extension “high”, “medium” and
“low”levels 
Keyrelease Withdrawal for at least
24 hours
Keypress Withdrawal for at least
18 hours
Whole arm “Overnight” withdrawal
reach
Keypress Withdrawal for “about
12 hours”
All “without 
secondary task” 
values 
“High” 
(optimal) and 
“low” levels 
All values
Visual and 
auditory 
baseline 
conditions 
All delays, 
collapsed across 
“direction” 
Averages given 
for SRT and 
CRT (across 
delay)
Est’d from 
f ig  2
Est’d from 
f ig  3
Est’d from 
f ig  3
From table 2
Est’d from 
f ig l
From table 2
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Appendix 4
2-CRT studies (uncued)
Reference Response Imperative
signal
Inclusion Source
Talland et al., (1963) Keypress Light “Disjunctive”
condition
From table 1
Mayeux et al. (1987) Finger lift Light or tone “RT choice” From table 1
Goodrich et al. (1989) Finger lift Tactile CRT, secondary task 
absent
From table 3
Worringham & Keyrelease Light (LED) Block 1 only Est’d from fig 1
Stelmach (1990)
Zimmerman et al. Key release Screen Tasks 2 and 3 From table 2
(1992)
Bradhsaw et al. Key press Vibrotactile Expt 1 and 2, “old” Est’d from figs
(1993) control groups 1 and 2
Brown, Jahanshahi & Key release Light “2-CRT, compatible” Est’d from fig 2
Marsden, (1993)
Revonsuo et al. Key press Screen 2-CRT, “preserved” From table 5
(1993) patient group
Schugens et al. (1993) Key release Screen Choice conditions for 
finger and hand
Est’d from fig 1
Fimm et al.. (1994) Key release Screen CRT From table 2
Pate & Margolin Key press Screen “CRT-1” From table 2
(1994)
Bennett et al. (1995b) Key press Screen Experiment 4 From table 2
Schnider et al. (1995) Key press Screen CRT “best run” From table 2
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A p p e n d ix  5
S im p le  r e a c tio n  t im e s
Reference Response Imperative signal Inclusion Source of values
Heilman et al. 
(1976)
Bloxham et al. 
(1987)
Mayeux et al. 
(1987)
Talland et al. Keypress 
(1963)
Light
Keypress
Button 
press (with 
thumb)
Finger lift
"Simple” and "alerted From table 1 
all RYG”, PD and 
control
Light (quick-peak All values From table 1
incandescant)
Tone Without secondary Est’d from fig 2
task, on medication
Pullman et al. Wrist
(1988) flexion
Crawford et al. Keypress
(1989)
Goodrich et al. Finger lift
(1989)
Reid et al. (1989) Key press
Light or tone
Screen
Screen
Tactile
Light
LightDamn and Quinn Key release
(1991)
Jahanshahi et al. Key release Screen
(1992a)
Jordan et al. Keypress Screen
(1992)
Zimmerman et Key release Screen
al.(1992)
Brown et al. Key release Screen
(1993a)
Simple RT; “PD From table 1
without bradyphrenia”
group
Simple RT, high dose Est’d from fig 3
Mean SRT From table 2
SRT left and right, From table 3
secondary task absent
Early- and late-onset From table 2
groups
SRT Est’d from fig 1
Random block SRT, Est’d from fig 5
all delays
SRT, PD de novo and Est’d from fig 1
treated
Task 1, early and From table 2
advanced PD
Mean SRT across Est’d from fig 1
delays
2 7 7
Ghilca et al. 
(1993)
Nakashima et al. 
(1993)
Revonsuo et al. 
(1993)
Schugens et al.
(1993)
Cooper et al.
(1994)
Fimm etal.
(1994)
Klockgether et 
al. (1994)
Pate & Margolin
(1994)
Bennett et al. 
(1995b)
Gorrell et al.
(1995)
Harrison et al. 
(1995)
Schnider et al.
(1995)
Willingham et al.
(1995)
Key release Tone
Keypress Tone
Keypress Screen
Key release Screen
Keypress Screen
Key release Screen
Initiation of Light (laser dot)
arm
movement
Keypress Screen
Keypress Screen
Key release Screen
Keypress Light
Keypress Screen
Keypress Screen
Age-matched From table 2
controls, left and right 
SRT, calculated by Est’d from figs
adding EMG and MT 1 and 2
“Preserved” PD group From text on 
p97
“Finger” and “hand” Est’d from fig 1 
conditions
SRT Est’d from fig 1
Untreated and treated From table 2
PD
SRT From text on
p50
nd-PD and vm-PD From table 2
groups
Experiments 2 and 3 From table 2
SRT Text on pi 141
SRT, mean of both Table 2
PD groups
Run 1 and run 2 From table 2
“Single” task, all 
delays
Est’d from fig 1
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